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11 Introduction
A question that is central to the study of technology development1 is to what extent
factors causing the success or failure of the development of a new technical object can
be identified and influenced. This thesis is about one of these factors. It focuses on the
development and exchange of knowledge and experience between all parties during
the technology development process, not only the developers and entrepreneurs, but
also the users. In other words, it is about the learning process in technology
development.
The first person to write about the importance of learning for the success of
technology development was probably Charles Babbage (1792-1871). In his
discussion of 'the economy of machinery and manufactures', as he called his subject,
he envisages a young man who still has to learn the skill of making tools. He then
remarks that the apprenticeship is necessary not only to allow the young man to
acquire the requisite skills, but also ‘to enable him to repay by his labour, during the
latter portion of his time, the expense incurred by his master at the commencement’
(Rosenberg, 1994). In other words, it should be realised that the length of an
apprenticeship is determined not only by the time needed to acquire a skill, but also
by the time that the master needs to reap a normal rate of return upon his investment
in human capital. Rosenberg ends his quotations from Babbage by calling him a
tantalising precursor of contemporary work on learning by doing.
Effects of learning can be studied in the development of any technology. Here, we
chose to study the effects of learning on the development of wind turbines, a
development which is desirable for environmental reasons (see for instance Boyle,
1998; Johannson et al., 1993). After the oil crisis in the 1970s and the publication of
the report of the Club of Rome, several countries started to diversify their energy
sources. Among other countries, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, the
United Kingdom and the United States took steps to stimulate the development of
wind energy. However, the success that these countries achieved in building up wind
turbine capacity and a wind turbine industry varies greatly.
                                                          
1 In this thesis we use the terms ‘technology development’ and ‘innovation’ as synonyms.  In line with
other scientific literature, we use the terms in a broad way, indicating the entire process of invention,
market introduction and further diffusion and optimisation.
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What is so fascinating is that the country whose government put the least money into
wind turbine R&D, namely Denmark, turned out to be the most successful in building
up a wind turbine industry (Karnøe, 1995). In the 1990s, more than half of the wind
turbines on the international market were produced by the prospering Danish wind
turbine industry (Van Est, 1999). In the Netherlands, however, the country with
centuries of experience in building windmills, goals kept being adjusted downward,
because they were not met. Both countries started the development of wind energy
around 1975 and in both countries the government actively supported the
development of wind energy. Furthermore, the wind regime in both countries is
almost the same. However, the result of the efforts put into the development of wind
energy in both countries is completely different. In the year 2000, in Denmark a
flourishing wind turbine industry was competing internationally. In the same year, in
Denmark the total wind turbine capacity was 2340 MW (Windpower, 2001), whereas
in the Netherlands it was only 442 MW (Wind Service Holland, 2001). In Denmark,
15% of the electricity demand was satisfied by wind turbines, as opposed to 1% in the
Netherlands. In the Netherlands, only one domestic turbine producer was active in the
year 2000, and had only a minor share of the world market2.
1.1 Research question
The starting point of our resarch is the following broad research question:
Why were the Danes more successful than the Dutch in building up wind turbine
capacity and a wind turbine industry in the period 1973 – 2000?
The Danish success cannot be attributed to the amount of government subsidy,
because in Denmark far less subsidy was provided than in the Netherlands. Also the
slightly higher wind speed in Denmark cannot provide the entire explanation for this
large difference in success. Siting problems cannot be the complete explanation either.
The difference between the Netherlands and Denmark was already apparent in the
1980s, when the siting problems were not playing a large role yet. Therefore, the
answer to this question must be sought in some other area.
Some scientists have looked into this matter. Verbong (1998) described the history of
wind energy in the Netherlands giving particular attention to the functioning of
techno-economic networks. However, he considered only the wind energy policy and
the development of large wind turbines,  and noted as a weak point the fact that the
                                                          
2 In addition to this domestic turbine producer, two domestic turbine blade producers were active in the
Netherlands in the year 2000.
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electricity companies - the foreseen users of these large machines - were not involved.
Wolsink (1991; 1996) primarily addressed the problems of siting wind turbines in the
Netherlands, which in this densely populated country turned out to be particularly
difficult. Johnson and Jacobsson (1999) recently sketched the development in the
Netherlands in relation to that in other countries, namely Germany and Sweden, and
found relatively little co-operation among the Dutch wind energy community. In his
recent book on renewable energy in the Netherlands, Verbong (2002) took a broader
view than in his 1998 article, but his focus was still on energy policy. Like Wolsink,
he attributed a major role to the siting problems in explaining the lack of success of
the Dutch wind energy policy largely to siting problems.
What has been missing until now, is a comprehensive study of the development of
wind energy in the Netherlands and a critical assessment of the reasons for the lack of
success. It is such a study that we have undertaken. Only in later stages of our study,
when we had the opportunity to reflect on the significance of complete networks, co-
operation, siting problems and other aspects did we realise that a focus on learning
processes would clarify what happened in the Dutch development, as compared to the
Danish. How did we arrive at this insight?
Our starting point was to describe systematically the development in the Netherlands
and Denmark from the 1970s until the year 2000, taking into account all actors and
institutions that influenced this development. An appropriate field of research for
answering our research question in this way, is the field of innovation studies. We
found that within this field of research one approach in particular, the one involving
innovation systems, was relevant for our purpose. The core of the innovation systems
approach is the statement that three key parameters are important in technology
development: the sort of actors within the innovation system, the institutional set-up
of the system (which frames the actions of the actors), and the interactions between
the actors within the system (Freeman, 1987; 1988; Lundvall, 1988; 1992; Nelson,
1988; 1993; Edquist, 1997). Since the innovation system approach is broad and
abstract, we decided to focus on one aspect. According to Lundvall (1988), the
interactions are by far the most important aspect within innovation systems. Actors
and an institutional set-up are undoubtedly for important technology development, but
without interactions nothing will happen.
Several types of interactions take place within innovation systems, such as the
exchange of money, artefacts and knowledge. Why did we decide to focus on the
exchange of knowledge, and, thus, on learning instead of on the exchange of money?
The development of wind turbines has been heavily subsidised by national
governments and therefore, a large part of the money exchanged within the innovation
system is the flow of subsidies. And, as stated above, the different levels of subsidies
Chapter 1
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cannot be the explanation for the difference in the results obtained by the Netherlands
and Denmark.
Scholars in innovation studies suggest that a focus on learning might provide the
answer to our research question. Lundvall (1988) states that within innovation
systems, learning processes between the producers and the users of the technology are
very important. Rosenberg (1982) states that, particularly in the case of technologies
that consist of several interacting parts and have to function in changing
environments, learning by using is very important. Wind turbines are a typical
example of this kind of technology. Therefore, we assume that learning processes
might be important for explaining the difference in the results obtained by the
Netherlands and Denmark.
Our specific research question can now be formulated:
To what extent did the learning processes in the Dutch and the Danish wind turbine
innovation systems differ in the period 1973-2000 and what are the consequences of
these differences?
This is the research question we will answer in this thesis. We derive the following
sub-questions:
A. Theoretical sub-questions
- what does the innovation literature tell us about the role of learning in the
development of technologies?
- what kinds of learning processes occur in technology development?
- what conditions impede or facilitate these kinds of learning?
B. Empirical sub-questions
- which learning processes can be singled out in the development of wind energy in
the Netherlands and Denmark?
- how can the differences between these learning processes help to explain the
difference in success between both countries?
1.2 Methodology
The case study methodology
We used the case study methodology to answer the empirical sub-questions. This is an
appropriate research strategy to use when investigating questions of ‘how’ and ‘why’.
Furthermore, case studies are a good approach when the researcher has no control
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over events and is not able to manipulate the relevant behaviour. Yin (1989) defines a
case study as an enquiry into a historical or contemporary phenomenon within its real
life context, when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly
evident and multiple sources of evidence are used. Case studies increase our
knowledge about the context in which actors act and about the influence the context
has on their actions. This is relevant for our case. The phenomenon we study in this
thesis is the development of wind turbines within an innovation system. The
distinction between the phenomenon and its context is not very clear. Furthermore, we
cannot study the phenomenon within an experimental setting with controlled
conditions. We are interested in the factors that influence the learning processes of the
actors within the innovation system. We perform a multiple case study, concentrating
on two separate case studies (the Dutch and the Danish), which provide similar
information about the phenomenon studied.
Data collection
To achieve validity in a case study, it is important to use multiple sources of
information, such as written documents, from archives or from previous research, and
interviews. This implies a complex research process but it is likely to yield better
results and improve the quality of the narrative (Yin, 1989).
In our research into the Dutch case we used both written material and interviews. The
written material was very varied: we used scientific articles, technical articles,
conference proceedings, press releases, policy documents, technical reports, statistics,
articles in popular magazines on renewable energy and promotion material from
manufacturers. We used this material to obtain an overview of the development of
wind turbines in the Netherlands and as a means of checking the data provided via our
interviews.
We gathered an important part of our data in interviews with actors who were or are
involved in the wind turbine innovation system in the Netherlands. Our interviews
were conducted by personal communication, telephone conversations or with the use
of e-mail. The interviews were semi-structured. We dealt critically with the
information gathered during the interviews. We sent each interviewee a written draft
of the interview accompanied by a request for comments. Furthermore, we used the
triangulation method: testing and cross-checking the information gathered from
various sources. In order to increase reliability and circumvent problems like selective
and faded memories, secrecy and vested interests, we tested actors’ statements against
statements by other actors and against written material. We selected the names of the
persons interviewed on the basis of the written material and via the so-called
‘snowball technique’ (in which interviewees identify other useful persons during the
interviews). An important input for our first overview of the phenomenon studied was
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a three month visit to the wind energy department of the Netherlands’ Energy
Research Foundation, ECN. Here, we gathered information both by participant
observation and during interviews with the researchers.
For the Danish case, we drew entirely on written material. In the first phase of the
research, it appeared that a great deal of academic research had already been done on
the development of wind energy in Denmark. Furthermore, a large quantity of
literature on the Danish development was available in the Netherlands. Therefore,
there was no need to carry out interviews in Denmark. However, to obtain an
impression of the Danish situation we spent a period of three months at the
Copenhagen Business School in Denmark. During this period, we spoke to experts on
wind turbine development in Denmark, both at the Copenhagen Business School and
at the Danish Energy Research Centre, Risø.
1.3 Technical background
The development we describe may be hard to understand unless one has some basic
knowledge of the technical aspects of wind turbines. Therefore, we explain first how a
wind turbine works. Then, we will deal briefly with the major technical choices that
have to be made when developing a wind turbine and the advantages and
disadvantages of the various options. For more detailed information, see for instance
Spera et al, 1994; Gipe, 1995; Walker and Jenkins, 1998; Loiter and Norberg-Bohm,
1999; and Freris, 1990.
How does a wind turbine work?
A wind turbine is a machine that converts the energy available in the wind into
electrical energy. The rotor consists of one or more long, slender blades connected to
a hub. The rotor converts the motion of the air into usable mechanical motion. Air
flowing over the rotor blades creates aerodynamic lift, which makes the rotor turn.
The hub transmits the motion of the rotor to the generator in the turbine via a shaft,
usually made of high-strength metal (Loiter and Norberg-Bohm, 1997). The ability of
the rotor to extract energy from the wind is a critical factor in the overall efficiency of
a wind turbine. This efficiency is limited to a theoretical maximum value of 59%,
called the Betz limit (Spera et al., 1994). Much attention and many resources have
focused on getting as close as possible to this maximum.
The rotary motion of the shaft is converted to electricity by a generator. In a
generator, the rotating magnetic field induces an electrical potential in a so-called
stator-coil, which drives an electric current when the generator is connected to a grid
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or another load. To generate electricity at the appropriate grid frequency, the
generator needs to rotate very quickly. Since the rotor rotates far more slowly, a
gearbox is used to increase the rotation speed. The electricity produced by the
generator is transmitted to the electricy grid via a cable.
Wind turbines are often described by their generating capacity or ‘rated capacity’ in
kilowatts (kW). This is the maximum power output the turbine can produce. Turbines
only operate at this rated capacity when the wind is above a certain speed. At lower
wind speeds, the turbine produces less power or no power at all. Another measure
used to describe wind turbines is the diameter of the rotor, expressed in metres. The
amount of energy a turbine can produce is proportional to the square of this diameter
(Spera et al., 1994).
Which technical choices have to be made?
1. a vertical-axis turbine (VAT) or a horizontal-axis turbine (HAT)
Figure 1.1: A vertical axis turbine (left) and a horizontal axis turbine (adapted from Spera,
1994 and Karnøe, 1991).
Figure 1.1 shows a vertical-axis turbine and a horzontal-axis turbine. On a vertical-
axis turbine, the blades are parallel to the rotating axis, whereas on a horizontal-axis
turbine the blades are perpendicular to the rotating axis. On a vertical axis turbine the
generator is situated near the ground, whereas on a horizontal-axis turbine the
generator is situated on top of the tower.
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The major advantages of a VAT-turbine over a HAT-turbine are as follows (Gipe,
1995; Van Kuik, 1999). First of all, the generator is far closer the ground and
therefore is more easily accessible. Secondly, the turbine is omnidirectional. It can
catch the wind from any direction, whereas HAT-turbines have to be oriented to the
wind by a yaw mechanism. Thirdly, the blades can be produced in an easier manner,
namely by extrusion. Fourthly, the gravitional forces on the blades are constant, since
they only rotate in the horizontal direction. But there are important disadvantages.
First of all, the height of the turbine axis is limited because the length of the blades is
limited. Since the speed of the wind is higher farther from the ground, this is a
disadvantage. Secondly, the blades of a VAT-turbine are far longer than those of a
HAT-turbine and therefore are more subject to fatigue. Thirdly, the VAT-turbine is
not self-starting. Fourthly, the rotational speed is lower than that of a HAT-turbine.
Therefore, more gears are needed to speed up the rotation so that it equals that of the
power grid.
The majority of the wind turbines produced world-wide are HAT-turbines. In Den-
mark, only HAT-turbines have been produced3. In the Netherlands, only two VAT-
turbines were produced. Therefore, in the rest of this section we will comment on the
technical options for HAT-turbines.
2. the position of the rotor
The rotor can be positioned up-wind, i.e. on the side of the tower the wind comes
from, or down-wind, i.e. on the other side of the tower. The major advantages of a
down-wind rotor are that a down-wind turbine yaws automatically and that the blades
are bent away from the tower by the wind and therefore will not hit the tower. The
major disadvantages are (Van Kuik, 1999): firstly, loads on the blades are higher in
the wake of the tower; secondly, the aerodynamic noise production is higher. All wind
turbines produced in Denmark and in the Netherlands were and are up-wind turbines.
3. the number of blades
The number can vary between one (the Monopteros-turbine, produced in Germany in
the 1980s) and more than ten (the water-pumping wind turbines in the United States).
In Denmark, only three-bladed turbines have been produced. The wind turbines
produced in the Netherlands have two or three blades. Therefore, we will deal only
with these two types.
                                                          
3 The Danish manufacturer Vestas did attempt to develop a VAT turbine, but stopped the development
at an early stage (Beurskens, 2002).
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The main advantages of a two-bladed rotor are as follows (Van Kuik, 1999). First of
all, less material is needed and therefore the rotor is cheaper. Secondly, the rotor is
lighter. Thirdly, the rotational speed is higher and therefore the gear ratio can be
lower. Fourthly, the hub is simpler. The main disadvantages are: first, because the
rotational speed is higher, the noise production is higher, and, second, the
aerodynamic loads are more variable than those on three-bladed rotors. Thirdly, and
this seems to be most important, people find wind turbines with two-bladed rotors less
visually attractive than those with three-bladed rotors. Therefore, all wind turbines
produced in the Netherlands and more than 90% of the turbines produced worldwide
nowadays are three-bladed.
4. the blade material
The materials that have been used, are mainly GRP (glass fibre reinforced polyester),
wood/epoxy and steel (Van Kuik, 1999; Gipe, 1995). Steel is strong, stiff, inexpensive
and can be processed in a manner that is well understood, but it is relatively heavy and
difficult to mould into complex shapes. Wood-epoxy can be moulded more easily into
complex shapes, and is far lighter than steel. GRP is even easier to mould into
complex shapes and is relatively inexpensive, but it is heavier than wood-epoxy and
weaker than steel.
5. the type of rotor control
Rotor control, or rotor regulation, is needed to prevent the rotor and the generator
from being damaged when the wind speed gets too high. The options are pitch and
stall regulation (Spera et al., 1994; Walker and Jenkins, 1998). In the case of pitch
regulation, the angle of the blades is changed to a position parallel to the wind, by
way of an electrical system. In the case of stall regulation, the shape of the blades
makes the wind force on the rotor decrease when the wind speed increases. This is a
passive control, based on flow separation over the turbine blades. Pitch regulation is
more expensive and more complex than stall regulation. Furthermore, the dynamic
loads are higher when the pitch regulation does not react fast enough to changes in
wind speed. But fine-tuning is more feasible and therefore the efficiency of the wind
turbine can be higher (Van Kuik, 1999). A disadvantage of stall regulation is that
extra safety devices are needed, e.g. spoilers or moveable blade tips, in which case the
blade tips can be rotated to decrease the rotation speed of the blades. It is difficult to
design very large blades with a well-functioning stall regulation. Therefore, nowadays
assisted stall is often applied (Van Kuik, 1999). This is a kind of hybrid system in
which an electrical system is used to move the blades into stall position. In this case,
the major advantages of stall regulation (cheap, not very complex) do not apply.
Chapter 1
10
6. the generator type
The options are synchronous generators or a-synchronous generators (Spera et al.,
1994; Van Kuik, 1999). A-synchronous generators are cheaper and vibrations are
damped, but they are less efficient than synchronous generators.
7. the turbine size
Up to a maximum of about 5 MW, the larger the wind turbine the lower the cost per
kilowatt (Janssen, 1998). However, the larger the wind turbine the higher the loads
and the heavier the rotor. The weight of the latter increases with the third power of the
rotor diameter. Furthermore, vibrations in the blades and the tower increase when the
length of either increases4.
The choices that have been made by wind turbine manufacturers have to a large extent
been based on experience with the alternatives and are thus linked to learning
processes.
1.4 Outline of the thesis
The thesis is organised as follows. In Chapter 2, we describe the innovation literature
used in our research. After briefly introducing other approaches used in this literature,
we describe the innovation system approach in more detail, since this is the basis of
our theoretical framework. Then, we look closely at learning processes and answer the
theoretical sub-questions we formulated. The Chapters 3 and 4 are the empirical
chapters of this thesis. Chapter 3 is devoted to the development of wind turbines in the
Netherlands, Chapter 4 to the development in Denmark. For these descriptions, we
use the innovation system framework as a guideline: we describe the actors, the
institutions and the interactions between the actors. In particular, we focus on the
learning processes within the innovation systems. Finally, in Chapter 5, we draw
conclusions.
                                                          
4 Of course, this only applies if the geometry is kept constant and the same material is used.
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2 Theoretical framework
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we develop our theoretical framework. The specific research question
formulated in the previous chapter is: To what extent did the learning processes in the
Dutch and the Danish wind turbine innovation systems differ in the period 1973-2000
and what are the consequences of these differences? As stated in the previous chapter,
we want to take into account all the actors, organisations and institutions that
influenced the development of wind turbines in the two countries. Given this starting
point, the innovation system approach is a very suitable basis for our theoretical
framework. We will describe this approach in section 2.3. During our research we
used a number of other approaches from the field of innovation studies to help us
develop some preliminary ideas on how to analyse our cases. Furthermore, later on in
this chapter we will use concepts from these approaches and theories when we
investigate the theoretical aspects of learning. For these two reasons, we will outline
these approaches briefly in section 2.2. After discussing the innovation system
approach and several other approaches used in innovation research, we go into the
subject of learning. Here we answer our theoretical sub-questions. What does the
innovation literature tell us about the role of learning in the development of
technologies? What kinds of learning processes occur in technology development?
What conditions impede or facilitate these kinds of learning? We will deal with the
subject of learning processes in section 2.4.
2.2 Theoretical approaches used in innovation studies
The theoretical literature in this research field consists of a number of theoretical
approaches. These stem from different traditional research disciplines, like
economics, sociology, and history. To some extent they are complementary, and to
some extent they overlap. The following theoretical approaches will be described:
evolutionary economics (section 2.2.1), quasi-evolutionary economics (section 2.2.2),
the technical system approach (section 2.2.3), the network theories (section 2.2.4), and
the social construction of technology (SCOT) (section 2.2.5).
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2.2.1 Evolutionary economics
Evolutionary economics was developed primarily as a reaction to mainstream neo-
classical economy. In neo-classical economy, technology is regarded as an exogenous
variable, not requiring a separate explanation. Production is assumed to grow as a
result of growth in labour inputs and capital inputs, combined with a residual factor,
called technical change. Therefore, technical change is interpreted as an upward shift
in the production function (Coombs et al., 1987). It is assumed that all firms have
equal access to the technology and have the knowledge needed for technical change.
Firms are regarded as ‘maximisers’ that have complete knowledge of all available
options.
Evolutionary economists argue, in contrast, that technical change is an endogeneous
variable and therefore needs to be explained. Technical change is regarded as one of
the driving forces of economic growth. The basic point in evolutionary economy is
that uncertainty in technological developments cannot be ignored (Nelson and Winter,
1977). Firms do not have the ability to check all the technological options and they do
not know beforehand which option will be successful. Their rationality is bounded
(Simon, 1957) and their behaviour cannot be regarded as 'maximising'. The
innovation process is described with the use of the evolution metaphor, borrowed
from the biological evolution theory. The basic assumption is that innovation can be
described by two concepts: variation and selection.
Variations are generated by innovating firms. Firms generate variations according to
familiar and known paths, based on positive experiences from the past and on
expectations about the future. On the basis of these experiences and expectations,
firms use internal, firm-specific, search heuristics, also called 'search routines' (Nelson
and Winter, 1977). In later studies, it was argued that search processes in firms are
shaped not only by internal, firm-specific search heuristics, but also by  cognitive
frames of reference which are available at the level of a sector of firms. This cognitive
frame of reference can be compared to a scientific paradigm (Kuhn, 1962). Therefore,
Dosi referred to the frame of reference as a 'technological paradigm' (Dosi, 1982;
1988; Freeman and Perez, 1988).
Because of these technological paradigms, technological development is cumulative.
Technologies develop according to patterns. In Nelson and Winter, 1982, these
patterns are called technological trajectories. Sahal (1985) calls them innovation
avenues that are marked by technological guideposts. A technological guidepost, or
dominant design (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978), is a standard design that provides
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both evidence of the success of the technological paradigm and a direction in which to
search for solutions to technical problems5.
Because technologies develop according to fixed patterns, they are said to be path
dependent. This path dependence can have negative effects, for instance, if it turns out
that technological path chosen is not the most appropriate one. Because investments
have been made in the development of the technology, and in the network in which
the technology functions, it is often very difficult to abandon the chosen technology
and shift to the ‘better one’ (Tushman and Anderson, 1986). This phenomenon is
called lock-in (Arthur, 1988; 1989). A famous example is the qwerty-keyboard, which
is now used universally, although it is not the most efficient type of keyboard (David,
1985; 1986).
Not all the variations that firms generate are successful. The variations are introduced
in what is called the ‘selection environment’. The most promising variations are
selected in this selection environment. It is important to note that the selection
environment is a broader concept than the market: it includes regulations, norms,
beliefs and expectations of multiple actors, government policies, taxes and subsidies.
We will use many of the concepts developed within this theoretical approach, e.g.
technological guidepost, frame of reference and technological paradigm, in section
2.4.3, where we investigate the theoretical aspects of learning by searching.
2.2.2 Quasi-evolutionary economics
This approach draws heavily on the insights developed in evolutionary economics.
Because the scholars who introduced this approach, Van den Belt and Rip, have a
sociological rather than an economic background, the approach is more sociological,
with emphasis on institutions (like the patent system in the synthetic dye industry)
(Van den Belt and Rip, 1987). Furthermore, the focus of study is different in the two
approaches. In evolutionary economics attention is focused primarily on economic
processes and the effects of technological change on firms or industrial sectors. In
contrast, the focus in quasi-evolutionary economics is on the technology itself and on
how it interacts with the selection environment.
Another important difference between evolutionary economics and quasi-evolutionary
economics is that in the latter, variation and selection are considered to be dependent
and closely linked, whereas in evolutionary economics they are regarded as
independent and separate. In quasi-evolutionary economics, variation does not occur
randomly, but is guided by heuristics and other promises of success (Van Lente,
                                                          
5 This concept is analogous to Kuhn's (1962) concept 'exemplar'.
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1993). Furthermore, technology developers actively try to modify the selection
environment to increase the chances of the technology they are developing. One way
of doing this is to protect the innovation at the beginning by creating protective spaces
or niches (Van den Belt and Rip, 1987). This method is known is ‘strategic niche
management’ (Kemp et al., 1998; Weber et al., 1999). Niches can be R&D projects,
market niches or the government-subsidised market introduction of new technologies.
The locus where the linkage processes between variation and selection take place is
called the technological nexus (Schot, 1992). The marketing or environmental
departments of firms can serve as the technological nexus.
Concepts like variation and selection, search heuristics and technological paradigms
play a large role in quasi-evolutionary economics, just as they do in evolutionary
economics. Heuristics are defined as rules that promise success but cannot guarantee
it (Van Lente, 1993). They are part of a shared repertoire embedded in an organisation
or in a community of technical practitioners. The use of heuristics requires
legitimation, like successful earlier problem solving, authority of the technical
community or more general heuristics like upscaling. The concept of heuristics will be
used in section 2.4.3 which deals with learning by searching.
An important point in the quasi-evolutionary theory is that technological development
is assumed to be multi-layered. This assumption is very useful for analytical purposes.
The layers are the following: 1. technology in general, as a symbol that is part of our
culture; 2. technological communities at the meso-level, dedicated to different
technological fields; 3. the niche level, focusing on one specific technology or one
technological path. With regard to the multi-layered structure it is important to know
is how the activities in and between the levels interact, how they interlock and how
they align actors (Schaeffer, 1998).
2.2.3 The technical system approach
Hughes is the main author to use this approach. In his historical case studies, e.g. into
the development of power networks (Hughes, 1983), he convincingly argues that
technologies should not be regarded as artefacts, but as parts of larger wholes of
interrelated components. These components can be technical or social (Hughes,
1987). As examples Hughes mentions generators, transformers and transmission lines
in the electricity system, as well as organisations, firms, banks and research
organisations. The components of the system interact, thereby contributing to the
common system goal. The components are so closely intertwined that it is almost
impossible to distinguish between the technical and the social components. He refers
to this phenomenon as the ‘seamless web’. He defines a technological system as
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(Hughes, 1987, p. 51): ‘containing messy, complex, problem-solving components.
They are both socially constructed and society shaping’.
The system is assumed to have an inherent logic. The system goal is its expansion.
The logic of the system is described by terms like ‘momentum’ and ‘reverse salient’.
A reverse salient is a part of the system that inhibits or slows down its expansion and
has to be removed to make the system function well. Hughes defines the boundaries
of the system by way of control. The components that are under the control of the
system are part of the system; the components that are not under the control of the
system are not part of the system.
In the system, a crucial role is played by the system builder, who is the main actor in
the system; the leader, promoter or builder of the system. Often, this actor has
excellent technical and entrepreneurial capabilities. An example that Hughes uses, is
Thomas Edison. We will use the concept of system builder in section 2.4.6 that deals
with learning by interacting.
The main drawback of this approach is that the theoretical ideas need to be extracted
from the very rich case study descriptions. There is no explicit attempt at formal
theorising. Furthermore, it is not clear to what extent the conclusions drawn can be
generalised.
2.2.4 Network theories
In the network approach we distinguish between two approaches: the actor-network
approach and the industrial network approach. These approaches both have a
sociological character. They draw heavily on the network theory in sociology, which
was developed to analyse social structures at the micro level. In the network approach
in the technology development literature, the focus is on the actors involved in
technology development and especially on the interactions between them. The actors
are embedded in networks.
Actor-network theory
The actor-network theory belongs in the first place to the social sciences. It is part of
the constructivist branch of social theory. Every form of change, including technical
change, is regarded as a change in actor-networks (Callon, 1986). Callon describes the
actor-network as an actor world. The actors can be people, artefacts or texts. The
negotiations between the actors developing a technology are taken as a starting point.
It is stressed that technological development is contingent and unpredictable and that
there is no great difference between human actors and non-human actors. The focus is
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on the way in which an actor ‘enrols’ and ‘translates’ other actors, values and interests
in such a way that the network is made strong. Here, enrolling means incorporating
actors into the network, and translating implies transforming their values and interests
in such a way that the actors are able to work together to achieve a common goal
(Callon, 1986; 1987).
Questions about the direction in which a technology is shaped cannot be answered
using this approach, because every structure is considered to be an outcome. Strong
network links can be made in many different ways and the only thing that can be
analysed with the help of this theory is how these links are made (Callon, 1986;
1987).
In his later work (e.g. Callon et al., 1992) Callon introduces structural aspects. He
introduces the concept of techno-economic networks. The degree of irreversibility and
the length and convergence of the network are measures of the strength of the
network, and are therefore also measures of the success rate of the technological
development. According to Callon, these measures can be measured by studying texts,
artefacts, skills and money transfers. We will use these structural network aspects in
section 2.4.6, when we investigate learning by interacting.
Industrial network theory
Here, the focus is on the network character of the firm and its environment.
Håkansson (1990) points out that firms are embedded in their industrial networks and
that changes in the network affect the behaviour of the firm. He writes that industrial
technology development in most cases is the result of mutual cooperation between
firms. In his network model, he distinguishes between three basic components
(Håkansson (1987)):
- actors, who can be individuals, a group of persons, or even a division within a
company, or a group of companies
- activities, in which resources are combined, developed, exchanged or created
- resources, which consist of physical assets, financial assets and human assets
A network has three functions:
- contributing to the development of the knowledge of actors
- co-ordinating the exchange of resources
- contributing to the mobilisation of resources
Technology development is considered to be influenced by the structure of the
network, the actors involved and their inter-organisational relationships, and the
specific combinations of activities and resources in the network. An innovation is thus
regarded as a product of a network of actors. The main goal of the actors is to increase
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their control of the network. Håkansson’s ideas on the structural aspects of networks
will also be used in section 2.4.6.
2.2.5 The social construction of technology (SCOT) approach
This approach focuses on the way in which various actors interpret an artefact. The
most important aspect of an artefact is its interpretative flexibility: different social
groups attach a different meaning to an artefact (Pinch and Bijker, 1984; Bijker,
1990). Because of this interpretative flexibility, various trajectories can arise within a
technology; this means that within the development of a technology, different
artefacts can be developed, each embodying a different meaning of the technology. A
famous example is Bijker’s study on the development of the bicycle. He shows that
bicycles were developed along different trajectories, e.g. a trajectory of bicycles for
housewives and a trajectory of very different bicycles for sportsmen. When one
interpretation becomes dominant, closure takes place, which means that only one
basic design of the artefact remains (Bijker et al., 1987). Negotiation, rhetoric and
enrolment all play an important role in achieving closure.
The result of closure is the formation of a technological frame, also called 'frame of
meaning regarding the technology'. Such a frame is composed of a set of rules and
routines used by a community to perceive and solve problems (Bijker et al., 1987).
The main difference between a technological frame and a technological paradigm
used in evolutionary economics and quasi-evolutionary economics is that a
technological frame applies to both technologists and non-technologists, whereas a
technological paradigm applies only to technologists. It is possible for more than one
dominant frame to co-exist. Furthermore, not all actors need to be equally involved in
the frame. Actors with a high inclusion in a technological frame will focus on solving
problems perceived within the frame; this leads to incremental innovations. Actors
with a low inclusion in a technological frame often use different solutions to problems
or even solve different problems; this leads to the development of a competing
technological frame. Karnøe and Garud (2001) elaborate on the concept of
technological frame. They discern three kinds of frames: frames regarding production,
frames regarding use and frames regarding regulation of a technology. Grin and Van
de Graaf (1996) note that when a group of actors want to develop a technology
together, they do not necessarily need to have the same frame of meaning regarding
the technology. However, their frames of meaning need to be congruent; in other
words they must not contradict each other. We will use these ideas in section 2.4.6
which deals with learning by interacting.
An important claim in the SCOT approach is that it is important to study not only the
development of ‘successful’ technologies and technological paths, but also
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‘unsuccessful’ technologies and paths (Bijker et al., 1987). Otherwise one will obtain
a linear view that overlooks the ‘side-tracks’ of technological developments that were
tried and later abandoned.
2.3 The innovation system approach
The concept ‘innovation system’ was developed at the end of the 1980s and the
beginning of the 1990s by Freeman (1987, 1988), Lundvall (1988, 1992) and Nelson
(1993, 1994). It starts from the idea that innovations are often developed within
systems formed by actors and organisations. Companies, governments, universities,
banks, consumers, and other organisations all contribute in a different and interactive
way to innovations. These actors and organisations, the relationships between them
and the institutions influencing them, together form the innovation system (Carlsson
et al., 2002). Since our starting point was to take into consideration all actors,
institutions and organisations that influence wind turbine development (see Chapter
1), the innovation system approach can serve as a suitable basis for our theoretical
framework. Therefore, we describe this approach in some detail.
2.3.1 Definitions of the innovation system
A survey of the literature on innovation systems reveals that all authors use a different
definition of an innovation system. Because it is such a broad concept, authors can
define it differently and stress the element(s) they consider the most important.
Freeman (1987) stresses the importance of institutions. He defines the innovation
system as ‘the network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities
and interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies’ (Freeman,
1987, p. 1). In another book he chooses another focus: here he stresses the learning
processes within the innovation system. He writes (Freeman et al., 1988) ‘The
national system of innovation is not just a set of laboratories, but a cumulative process
of learning by producing, learning by using and learning by the interaction of
producers and users’.
Lundvall (1992) uses a broader definition. He stresses the importance of institutions
and learning processes. He writes that an innovation system comprises ‘all parts and
aspects of the economic structure and the institutional set-up affecting learning as well
as searching and exploring – the production system, the marketing system and the
system of finance present themselves as subsystems in which learning takes place’
(Lundvall, 1992, p. 12). He also writes that ‘the structure of production and the
institutional set-up are the two most important dimensions, which jointly define a
system of innovation’ (Lundvall, 1992, p. 10). They ‘form the framework for, and
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strongly affect, processes of interactive learning, sometimes resulting in innovations’
(Lundvall 1992, p. 9).
Carlsson and his colleagues use the term ‘technological system’ instead of ‘innovation
system’. Carlsson and Stankiewicz (1991, p. 121) define a technological system as ‘a
network of agents interacting in a specific economic/industrial area  under a particular
institutional infrastructure or a set of infrastructures and involved in the generation,
diffusion and utilization of technology’. Furthermore, they write ‘Technological
systems are defined in terms of knowledge/competence flows rather than flows of
ordinary goods and services. They consist of dynamic knowledge and competence
networks.’ (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991, p. 121).
2.3.2 Broad guidelines
It should now be clear, that there is no straightforward definition of the innovation
system. Different authors use different definitions, which are often very broad.
However, there is a set of characteristics upon which all researchers agree. In a study
of a specific innovation system, these characteristics can be used as guidelines to
build the theoretical framework. Lundvall describes them as follows (Lundvall, 1992):
- The central focus is on technological innovation but organisational and
institutional change are considered important as well.
- Innovation systems in various countries are claimed to be different, and it is
important to study these differences.
- The viewpoint is holistic, in other words, many determinants and their
relationships are included in the analysis.
- A historical perspective is used. Innovation is seen as an evolutionary and path
dependent process. Therefore, innovation can be understood best when the
historical development is taken into consideration. Because innovation is path
dependent and open ended, it is not possible to define an optimal innovation
system. Since the system keeps changing, it is possible that at one moment one
system is better suited for stimulating certain technological developments,
whereas later on another system performs better.
- Innovation is regarded as an interactive process. Firms do not innovate in
isolation, but in interaction with other actors. Innovation is influenced not only by
the structures and the actors in the system, but also by the interaction between
them.
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- The importance of learning, and especially of interactive learning, is stressed. The
accumulation of knowledge and skills is considered to be crucial. The focus is on
the interactivity between the structures and the actors in the system, and on the
learning processes between them.
- There are no straightforward ‘rules’ about how the boundaries of the system can
be specified; in other words, how to define what belongs to the system and what
does not. But, as Lundvall argues (Lundvall, 1992), it might be impossible to
identify the boundaries in detail. Therefore, as Edquist argues, it might be better to
try to identify the core elements in innovation systems, and focus on the relations
between these (Edquist, 2001). The researcher himself needs to define the
boundaries of the system he is studying. In section 2.3.3 we will discuss this issue
further.
- Innovation systems consist of organisations and institutions on the one hand, and
interacting actors on the other hand. Therefore, a structural view is combined with
an actor-oriented view. But what are organisations and institutions exactly? Here
again, the definitions vary. We will elaborate on this subject in section 2.3.5.
2.3.3 The boundaries of the system
As stated in section 2.3.2, there are no straightforward rules on how to define the
boundaries of an innovation system. What should be included in the analysis and what
should be omitted? Depending on the case studied, the boundaries can be defined by
technological, sectoral or by geographical factors. If the boundaries are defined by
geographical factors, they can be national, regional or local.
In studies that define the boundaries by the technology, the focus is on the specific
technologies around which the system develops. In studies that define the boundaries
by geographical factors, the focus is on the relationships between economic change
and innovation processes in general. A good example of the last-mentioned kind of
study is the book ‘National innovation systems’ by Nelson (1993). In this book, 15
different national innovation systems are described. These national systems differ
with regard to the degree of specialisation, type of institutions and national policies.
This underlines Lundvall’s argument (1992) that nations are still important, even
nowadays, when the economy is becoming more and more international.
Ehrnberg and Jacobsson (1997) define the boundaries of the system by the
technology. They argue that, when focusing on large technological changes, one
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should consider four levels of analysis: the technology, the firm, the industry and the
technological system.
From the above, it can be concluded that the concepts of national innovation systems
and technological systems are not mutually exclusive. They can be combined, for
example in a study of a specific sector in different countries. An example is Texier’s
research into the aerospace sector in France, Sweden and South Korea (Texier, 2000).
Another example is wind turbine technology. As explained in the introduction, the
development of this technology is influenced to a large extent by national policies.
Therefore, in our research we will combine geographical and sectoral dimensions, as
did Texier. The system we investigate consists of all actors, organisations and
institutions engaged in wind turbine technology development within a nation. We will
call this system the national wind turbine innovation system.
2.3.4 Organisations and institutions
As mentioned above, the core of the innovation system approach consists of three
elements:
- the actors engaged in the innovation process
- the relationships between these actors
- the institutions influencing these relationships
The concept ‘institution’ is very important in the innovation system approach.
However, it is not explained very clearly and all authors use different definitions.
Furthermore, the term ‘institution’ is often used incorrectly and is confused with
‘organisation’. Therefore, we give some attention here to the difference between
‘organisation’ and ‘institution’. We define the terms ‘organisation’ and ‘institution’ as
we use them in our research.
Organisations
The main difference between organisations and institutions is that organisations are
formal structures with an explicit purpose that are consciously created, whereas
institutions may develop spontaneously and often do not have a specific purpose
(Johnson, 1997). North (1990) defines organisations as ‘groups of individuals bound
by some common purpose to achieve objectives’. Organisations include many kinds
of entities:
- political bodies, such as ministries, political parties and local councils for science
and technology
- bureaucratic bodies, such as public agencies and offices for implementing
innovation policy
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- regulatory bodies, such as agencies concerned with standards, norms and
certification
- social bodies, such as academies and professional associations
- educational bodies, such as universities and schools
- knowledge-oriented bodies without economic goals, such as government
laboratories
- non-profit organisations with economic goals, such as technical centres
- firms, including R&D companies, joint ventures and consortia
- bridging bodies, such as innovation centres
The organisations mentioned cover a very broad range. Galli and Teubal (1997)
distinguish between hard and soft organisations, the hard ones performing hard
functions of the innovation system and the soft ones performing soft functions. Hard
functions are related to actual knowledge creation, while soft functions support
knowledge creation by performing catalytic and interface roles. Hard functions and
related organisations include:
- R&D, involving universities and public and non-profit organisations
- the supply of scientific and technical services to third parties by industrial firms,
technological centres, technical service companies, universities, governmental
laboratories, etc.
Soft functions and related organisations include (Galli and Teubal, 1997):
- diffusion of knowledge, and technology to economic and public operators acting
at the interface between knowledge suppliers and users; this is done by bridging
organisations, which include innovation centres and liaison units at universities
and public laboratories
- policy-making by government offices, technology assessment offices, academies,
universities, national committees and councils, etc.
- design and implementation institutions concerning patents, laws, standards,
certification, regulations, etc.; these functions are usually performed by public or
intermediate organisations
- diffusion of scientific culture via museums etc.
- professional co-ordination by way of academies, professional associations, etc.
Institutions
As mentioned above, organisations are designed to serve a specific purpose, whereas
institutions appear spontaneously and do not serve a specific purpose. According to
North's definition (1990, p. 3) institutions are: ‘the rules of the game in society or,
more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interactions’.
Institutions are sets of common habits, routines, established practices, laws or rules
that regulate the relations between individuals and groups, thereby reducing
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uncertainties. They provide humans with a means to deal with the complexity of life
without engaging in global rational calculations involving a vast amount of complex
information (Johnson, 1992). It is useful to distinguish between formal institutions,
e.g. laws, government regulations, technical standards and norms, and informal
institutions, e.g. common law, customs, traditions, norms, conventions, codes of
conduct, practices, etc. (Johnson, 1997).
Institutions create patterns in human behaviour. More specifically, in the context of
the innovation system, Carlsson and Stankiewicz define institutions as ‘normative
structures which promote stable patterns of social interactions/transactions necessary
for the performance of vital social functions’, but further on, they also define
‘institutional arrangements (both regimes and organisations)’ and ‘the political
system, educational system, patent legislation, and institutions regulating labour
relations’ as institutions (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1995, p. 45). Lundvall writes:
‘Institutions provide agents and collectives with guide-posts for action’, and
‘institutions may be routines, guiding everyday actions in production, distribution,
and consumption, but they may also be guide-posts for change. In this context, we
may regard technological trajectories and paradigms, which focus the innovative
activities of scientists, engineers, and technicians, as one special kind of institution’
(Lundvall, 1992, p. 10).
Edquist and Johnson (1997) distinguish the following general functions of institutions
with respect to innovation:
- reducing uncertainty, either by providing information about the behaviour of other
people or by reducing the amount of information needed
- managing conflicts and cooperation between individuals and groups
- providing incentives to engage in learning and searching (e.g. status norms,
perceived competitive advantage, property rights)
- providing resources (e.g. via tax rules or subsidies)
Writers using the innovation system approach and researching the overall innovative
abilities of countries instead of the development of a specific technology point to the
important role that institutions at the state level play in innovation. Especially
important is the education and training system (Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997).
schools, universities and R&D organisations play a leading role in this system. Other
important institutions are the capital system, especially the supply of venture capital
and other long-term finance and the rules under which such funds are allocated, the
legal system granting ownership of new inventions and new knowledge (e.g. patent
legislation), the political system, and governmental policies in areas of science,
technology and economics and in labour markets (Smith, 1997; Nelson, 1993;
Ehrnberg and Jacobsson, 1997; Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991).
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In general, institutions are considered to retard the dynamics of technical change,
because of their inertia and rigidity (Johnson, 1992). They are regarded as inflexible.
They are the result of both the functions they serve at present and the functions they
served in the past. Sometimes authors who use the innovation system approach give
the impression that innovators behave like puppets on the strings of institutions,
having no freedom of choice at all. This impression is too extreme. First of all,
insitutions not only constrain innovation, they also facilitate it (Garud and Rappa,
1994). Examples are search routines and patent legislation. Secondly, even if
institutions constrain innovation, they do leave room for strategic choices. Scott
(1995) distinguishes between institutions according to the room they leave to firms for
strategic choices. He distinguishes:
- institutions that impose organisational behaviour; these leave no room for strategic
choice; an example is direct government regulation
- institutions that authorise organisational behaviour; the organisation is not
compelled to conform, but voluntarily seeks out the attentions and approval of the
authorising agent; an example is ISO certification
- institutions that induce organisational behaviour; the organisation is induced to
behave in a certain way, e.g. by financial incentives; examples are grants,
contracts and tax benefits
- institutions that leave organisations room to choose the way they behave
Whether institutions facilitate or constrain the innovation process will depend on
whether they provide what the innovation process needs. Important here is that
institutions are not static, but that they can change, even in the short term. This point
is recognised more and more by innovation system researchers. Johnson (1992)
recognises institutional change, but remarks that this often lags behind technical
change. According to McKelvey (1997), the way in which institutions are designed
and their ability to co-evolve with technology will influence how well different
systems perform to generate and select innovations. On the one hand, institutions
provide stability in the patterns of social interaction, thereby reducing uncertainty; on
the other hand, institutions are flexible and will be recreated through continuing and
new social interactions.
Here we find ourselves in the middle of a very important debate in the social sciences:
what determines what: does action determine structure or does structure determine
action? In this case: do actions by innovating actors constitute the main source of
institutional change, or is the existing institutional structure the main source of the
behavioural paths of the innovators? Giddens (1984) proposed an intermediate point
of view: the interactionist methodology. According to him, to explain social processes
one needs to take both structural and behavioural aspects into account. As mentioned
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above, evidence suggests that this methodology can also be applied to technology
studies: both causal links are important in technology development. Therefore, we
will follow this evidence and assume that behaviour and institutional structure are
both relevant in technology development and influence each other; they are
intertwined. Actor behaviour is influenced by institutional structure and can to some
extent change institutional structure.
2.4 Learning
Another important aspect in the innovation system approach is interactive learning.
This is the transfer of knowledge between actors engaged in the innovation process.
Lundvall in particular puts interactive learning at the centre of the analysis. While
many other researchers concentrate on the influence of institutions on technology
development (e.g. Edquist, 1997; Nelson, 1993), Lundvall and his colleagues of
Aalborg University focus on the role of interactive learning between the users and
producers of technology. They developed some theoretical notions on interactive
learning between users and producers in innovation systems (see section 2.4.6)
(Lundvall, 1992).
Like Lundvall, we put learning at the heart of our research. Therefore, we will look
more closely at the concept of learning. We will investigate not only interactive
learning, but also other kinds of learning that are involved in the innovation process.
Although learning is important during economic activities in general, it is especially
important in innovation processes. Here, product concepts are changing or completely
new products are developed. These new products often do not fit in with existing
societal and technical arrangements, and require new knowledge and skills, often from
a broad range of actors. The more uncertainties are attached to the new technology,
the more learning is required. This is especially the case with systemic technologies,
i.e. technologies consisting of several interacting parts. When these technologies need
to function in varying and poorly understood environmental contexts, learning,
especially learning by using, is of the utmost importance (Rosenberg, 1982). Since
wind turbines are an example of systemic technologies that need to function in
varying environmental contexts, learning plays a large role in their development.
What is learning? And, more specifically, what is the role of learning in technology
development? Which kinds of learning, besides interactive learning, occur in
technology development? And what conditions impede or facilitate these kinds of
learning? We will answer these questions in this section. Our focus is on learning in
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innovation systems. Therefore, we will not refer to the large body of literature on
learning by individuals.
2.4.1 What is learning?
In Collins' Cobuild Dictionary of the English Language, learning is defined as
‘acquiring knowledge of something or skill in something through hard work or careful
reflection’. From this, we can conclude that learning can mean acquiring generally
new knowledge and skills and new combinations of old knowledge and skills, and it
can also mean putting old knowledge and skills into new heads. Henceforth, we will
use the term ‘knowledge’ to mean ‘knowledge and skills’.
Learning by organisations or networks of organisations
As far as learning of organisations or networks of organisations is concerned, there is
not much agreement on how learning should be defined. Furthermore, little attention
is paid to how it occurs (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). Learning is a multi-faceted and
complex concept. Dodgson (1996) defines learning by firms as: ‘the way firms build,
supplement and organise knowledge and routines around their competencies and
within their cultures, and adapt and develop organisational efficiency through
improving the use of these competencies’ (Dodgson, 1996, p. 55).
The competencies of a firm are the focused combination of resources within a firm,
which define its activities and position on the market.  They consist of knowledge and
skills and increase through learning. Teece et al. (1994) distinguish two kinds of
competencies:
- organisational / economic competencies, including competencies regarding what
to produce, for whom and at what cost as well as how to design the most efficient
organisation
- technical competencies, which define the technological basis on which a firm
builds its development and production activities
Firms can learn, although their learning is based on the learning of individuals within
the firm (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). An important task for firms is to organise
itself in such a way that the learning of individuals within the firm results in the
learning of the firm; in other words, that the knowledge and skills are distributed to
the rest of the firm. Learning in firms takes place within all the departments and
throughout all the activities of the firm, although at different speeds and levels
(Hedberg, 1981).
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) add to this: (Learning firms) ‘do not only simply process
information (…) in order to solve existing problems and adapt to a changing
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environment. They actually create new knowledge (…) in order to redefine both
problems and solutions and, in the process, to re-create their environment.’ So,
learning consists of two kinds of activity. The first kind is obtaining knowledge for
solving specific problems based upon existing premises. The second kind is
establishing new premises to override the existing ones. These two kinds of learning
are called ‘Learning I’ and ‘Learning II (Bateson, 1973), or ‘single-loop learning’ and
‘double-loop learning’ (Argyris, 1977; Argyris and Schön, 1978), or ‘adaptive
learning’ and ‘generative learning’ (Senge, 1990).
Learning by forgetting
Most authors claim that learning is cumulative. What is learnt depends on what was
learnt before. By learning, a knowledge base is gradually built up. However, Hedberg
points to the fact that learning is not always cumulative. As circumstances change, the
knowledge and skills that are needed may change as well. Then the firm needs to
unlearn, discarding obsolete knowledge and skills (Hedberg, 1981). Johnson (1992)
refers to this phenomenon as ‘learning by forgetting’. He points out that learning by
forgetting can both occur consciously, or deliberately, which he calls ‘creative
forgetting’ and unconsciously, which he calls ‘forgetting’. Creative forgetting
involves removing old habits of thought, routines and patterns of co-operation, both
within and between firms, making way for new habits of thought, routines and
patterns of co-operation and new learning processes. It takes time and resources, and
is typically problem-triggered (Hedberg, 1981). Changes in techno-economic
paradigms in particular involve a great deal of creative forgetting (Freeman and Perez,
1988). Unconscious forgetting may occur when knowledge and skills are not managed
well in a firm or network. An example of unconscious forgetting resulting in
organisational forgetting can come about when employees with specific, relevant
knowledge leave a firm or network.
Learning has an internal and an external component (Teece et al., 1994; Malerba,
1992). Internally, firms learn mainly through their R&D activities. Furthermore, they
learn via other firm activities, like marketing and manufacturing and, especially, via
interactions between these activities. Externally, firms learn in interaction with other
actors like customers, suppliers and science-based knowledge providers like R&D
laboratories and universities. We will elaborate on these kinds of learning in the
following sections.
Learning processes in a firm are influenced by both internal and external factors.
Internal factors are for example quality control, job training, job rotation,
communication between different departments, norms and habits of workers, trust and
legitimacy, and supervision (Orozco Barrantes, 2001). The learning capacity of a firm
is also influenced by the environment of the firm (Hedberg, 1981). Learning requires
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neither too much change nor too much stability. Too much change can prohibit
learning and experimenting. On the other hand, if established and successful
behaviours never grow obsolete, there is little inducement to learn. Furthermore, an
environment which is (perceived as) very hostile may impede learning as well.
Learning in changing environments may occur defensively or offensively. Defensive
learning means adjusting yourself to reality, while offensive learning involves using
knowledge to improve the fits between the organisation and the environment, either
by changing the organisation or by trying to change the environment (Hedberg, 1981).
2.4.2 Kinds of knowledge and learning
Having discussed the role of learning in the context of technology development, we
now need to investigate which kinds of learning can be distinguished in this context.
First of all, we will describe different kinds of knowledge that are distinguished in the
literature. Then, we will link these kinds of knowledge with kinds of learning.
Kinds of knowledge
Dannemand Andersen (1993) presents a taxonomy of knowledge in the form of
dichotomies. The dichotomies are the following:
1. embodied knowledge and disembodied knowledge
Embodied knowledge is knowledge that is present inside a technological artefact or
inside persons. An organisation can use knowledge embodied in a technological
artefact without understanding the technology. For example, a wind turbine builder
may use a gearbox that he has not built himself but which he has bought from a
supplier. He can use the gearbox for building wind turbines without needing to know
how to produce a gearbox himself. Disembodied knowledge is knowledge that is
freely available, for instance, knowledge that is written down in scientific reports.
2. tacit knowledge and formalised knowledge
Formalised knowledge is knowledge that is written down, e.g. in books and reports.
Others can acquire this knowledge simply by reading the texts. Tacit knowledge is not
written down, but remains in the heads of people6. This form of knowledge is far more
difficult to transfer from one person to another. Dosi et al. (1988, p. 1126) write that
'tacitness refers to those elements of knowledge, insight and so on, that individuals
have which are ill-defined, uncodified and unpublished, which they themselves cannot
fully express and which differ from person to person, but which may to some
                                                          
6 A good example from everyday life is riding a bicycle. You can do it, but it is difficult to explain to
someone how to do it. You can only demonstrate and let the other person imitate.
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significant degree be shared by collaborators and colleagues who have a common
experience'. Polanyi (1958, 1966) is the first to emphasise the importance of tacit
knowledge. He writes that when knowledge has a high tacit component, it is
extremely difficult to transfer without intimate personal contact, demonstration, and
involvement. Whereas most other early literature on learning is concerned mainly
with formalised knowledge, recent studies (Teece, 1981; Davis, 1986; Dosi et al.,
1988; Von Hippel, 1994) have started to give more attention to the tacitness, or
‘stickiness’ of knowledge.
3. R&D-based knowledge and experience-based knowledge
As the terms imply, R&D-based knowledge is based on research and development,
and experience-based knowledge is based on experience.
Malerba (1992) adds two more kinds of knowledge: internal and external knowledge.
Internal knowledge is generated within the company in areas such as production,
R&D and marketing and in the interactions between these areas. External knowledge
is obtained from outside the firm, e.g. from other firms within the same industry, from
suppliers or users, or from research institutes.
Garud (1997) presents another taxonomy of knowledge. He identifies the following
three kinds:
1. know-why
This kind of knowledge is the knowledge about why something works the way it
does; it concerns the scientific background. The laws of motion in nature are
examples of this kind of knowledge. Such knowledge is generally produced in
universities and other specialised organisations.
2. know-how
Know-how is the knowledge about how to produce something, and about how to do it
in an efficient way. It often refers to skills. Know-how is often tacit knowledge and is
therefore difficult to transfer. It can be a basis for sustainable competitive advantage.
3. know-what
This kind of knowledge means knowing how to use something. It involves knowledge
of facts.
Lundvall (1997) introduces another kind of knowledge: ‘know-who’. This refers to
social skills, involving information about who knows what or who knows how to do
things.
Chapter 2
30
Kinds of learning
Garud links the three kinds of knowledge he distinguishes (see above) with three
kinds of learning. Know-why is acquired by learning by searching, know-how by
learning by doing and know-what by learning by using. He is not the first researcher
to identify these kinds of learning. In the following sections, we will describe the
literature in which these kinds of learning were developed. Furthermore, we add a
fourth kind of learning: learning by interacting. This kind, also called ‘interactive
learning’, is widely used in the innovation system approach, especially by Lundvall
and his colleagues. Whereas in processes of learning by doing, learning by using and
learning by searching, knowledge creation takes place, learning by interacting is
connected with knowledge diffusion.
In the remainder of this section we will go into these kinds of learning in more detail.
We will use concepts from the theoretical approaches in innovation studies, which we
presented in section 2.2. We are particularly interested in how to operationalise these
kinds of learning. What do we look for in our case studies to identify learning by
searching? In the literature, no methodology has yet been developed for
operationalising learning in innovation research. We therefore develop our own
methodology. On the basis of the innovation literature, we identify conditions that
facilitate the kinds of learning we have identified. In the following sections, we will
begin by describing the kinds of learning in some detail, and then we will list the
conditions that facilitate them. In the case study chapters, we will use these
'facilitating conditions' as a guide to identify the different kinds of learning.
2.4.3 Learning by searching
We will start by describing the form of learning that first comes to mind when
thinking about technology development: learning by searching. During learning by
searching, 'know-why' is acquired. Learning by searching is related to the systematic
and organised search for new knowledge. It is a broad concept that includes a whole
spectrum of activities ranging from basic research to discovering the optimal design
characteristics of a product and discovering the design characteristics desired by the
market. Synonyms for learning by searching are R&D (research and development)
and ‘learning by studying’ (Garud, 1997). Johnson (1992) separates ‘learning by
searching’ from ‘learning by exploring’. He argues that ‘learning by searching’ occurs
mainly in firms and is closely linked with production, whereas ‘learning by exploring’
occurs in universities and is less profit oriented. However, the two are strongly
interdependent and the borderlines between them are becoming increasingly blurred.
Therefore, we will not make this distinction. In the following, we will only use the
terms ‘learning by searching’ and ‘R&D’, which we will use interchangeably. R&D
consists of searching for new technological options, testing them and learning about
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their viability. Testing usually occurs on a small scale, e.g. in a laboratory or by
building a prototype.
According to Andersen and Lundvall, it is fruitful to analyse R&D mainly as search
strategies which are themselves following routines (Andersen et al., 1988). This idea
was put forward first by Nelson and Winter (1977, 1982). They argued that, because
of their bounded rationality, designers cannot predict in advance which R&D choice
will turn out to be the best. Instead, they apply search routines, or, in other words,
heuristics when looking for improvement in the performance or cost-efficiency of a
product. This method is cheaper and faster than trying out every possibility, although
the solution found is not necessarily the best one possible (Frenken et al., 1999).
Nelson and Winter (1977) define heuristics as ‘beliefs in what is feasible or is at least
worth attempting’. In connection with technological heuristics, Dosi in 1982
introduced the concept of the 'technological paradigm'. He defined this as: ‘a ‘model’
and a ‘pattern’ of solution of selected technological problems, based on selected
principles and on selected material technologies’.
Another concept used by Dosi to analyse guiding rules in R&D is the concept of
exemplar. An exemplar is an early example which has proved to work and which
serves as a guide in subsequent R&D processes. It provides both evidence of the
success of the paradigm and solutions to technical problems (Frenken, 2001). While
analysing the same phenomenon, Sahal introduces the concept ‘technological
guidepost’ (Sahal, 1981). Such a guidepost is an early design that stands out above all
others. It ‘becomes the foundation of a great many innovations via a process of
gradual evolution’ (Sahal 1981, p. 33).
The actors involved in R&D are generally universities, research organisations or
research departments of firms. R&D results are mainly written down in research
reports or articles, which means that a great part of the R&D results is in the form of
formalised knowledge. R&D results are often protected by patents. However, the
knowledge often leaks out, even when protected by a patent (although at a slower
pace) (Garud, 1997).
Now we know what learning by searching is, we need to know how to operationalise
it. What interests us most is which (institutional) conditions in the innovation system
facilitate learning by searching. On the basis of the above, we can list the following:
1. the presence of a technological guidepost, guiding the direction for search
2. the availability of an appropriate scientific theory on the subject, guiding the
direction of search
3. the presence of a technological paradigm, guiding the direction of search
4. the presence of standards and regulations, guiding the direction of search
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These conditions are particularly important for learning by searching at the network
level. When notions about technological guideposts and technological paradigms are
shared, actors can work together in their search, accumulating knowledge in the
network. Of course, there are other prerequisites for learning at the network level. We
will go into these in section 2.4.6.
The innovation literature also mentions other institutional factors in the innovation
system which facilitate learning by searching:
5. changing circumstances
When circumstances change, firms feel the need to start searching. If nothing ever
changes, firms are tempted to keep on performing in the same way as before.
However, when changes occur too quickly, firms may become paralysed and stop
learning by searching (Hedberg, 1981). The anticipation of changes may also cause
learning by searching (McKelvey, 1997).
6. an environment that is not (too) hostile
Just like quick changes, a hostile environment may cause paralysis (Hedberg, 1981;
see also Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997).
7. the availability of capital
Searching costs money and involves risks. Because the outcomes are uncertain, it is
possible that no good, readily applicable results are obtained. Although it is often
thought in scientific and policy circles that innovation is a good thing, firms are often
less enthusiastic, because of these risks. However, the possibility of an increase in
competitive advantage as a result of the innovation is a strong pull towards investing
money in searching. Governments can provide venture capital or R&D subsidies in
order to lower the threshold for investment.
8. some level of knowledge and experience in the field of study
Especially in the case of entirely new technologies or innovation in new technological
directions, firms have an advantage if they do not have to start from zero. Here, in
addition to on-the-job training, the educational system plays a role. Another way to
acquire the level of knowledge that is needed, is to obtain it in an embodied form, i.e.
hire people that have the knowledge.
9. the possibility of making mistakes and learning from them
This is connected with time. Time has to be available for testing and experimenting.
Money is also needed for testing and experimenting (see above).
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10. the way the ownership of novelties and new knowledge is organised
The possibility of receiving property rights on research results is often an incentive for
searching. Why should a firm invest money in R&D when the results can easily leak
to others? However, there is another side of the ownership coin. When property rights
are granted, there is a danger that the road will be closed to other firms eager to search
in the same direction. An example is the present R&D in biotechnology, where the
ownership of patents by some parties provides a disincentive for other parties to invest
money in R&D in the same field.
2.4.4. Learning by doing
As mentioned above, besides R&D, other kinds of learning, namely learning by
doing, learning by using, and learning by interacting, are also important in technology
development. Although in innovation research in general, a great deal of attention has
always been given to R&D, increasing attention has also been given to these other
kinds of learning.  The difference between R&D and these kinds of learning is that
R&D is aimed primarily at the generation of knowledge, whereas the other kinds of
learning are not. They are more or less by-products of (economic) activities that are
performed for other purposes.
The kind of learning that economists first looked into was learning by doing. This
concept was introduced by Arrow in 1962. During learning by doing, know-how is
acquired. Know-how resides in individuals, organisational routines and manufacturing
practices (Garud, 1997). According to Arrow, learning by doing takes place at the
manufacturing stage after the product has been designed. Learning at this stage
consists of increasing production skills. These skills accumulate with experience in
time (Garud, 1997). Through productive processes many problems, faults and bottle-
necks are demonstrated and solved. Furthermore, through trial-and-error practical
experience is gained on how to produce the technology. This increases the efficiency
of production operations (Rosenberg, 1982).
An important aspect of learning by doing is the development of ‘rules of thumb’
(Sahal, 1981). Learning by doing generates mainly tacit knowledge. As Sahal argues
(Sahal, 1981), technological progress is largely a matter of practical experience; it
depends much less on ‘knowledge imported from without’ than on ‘experience from
within’. The down-side is that, if a long time has passed since last the technology was
last produced, the experience can be forgotten and lost (Neij, 1997).
In 1988, Freeman reformulates the ‘learning by doing’ concept into the more specific
concept ‘learning by producing’ (Freeman et al., 1988). According to Freeman, the
actors involved in learning by doing are generally production departments in firms.
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However, other researchers point to the fact that learning by doing also takes place in
other parts of firms, e.g. in marketing and sales departments. Because these
departments are not directly engaged in production, we will not use the term ‘learning
by producing’, but instead we will use the more general and more widely used
concept of ‘learning by doing’.
Which (institutional) conditions in the innovation system facilitate learning by doing?
Since this kind of learning originates as a by-product of economic activity in general,
we claim that learning by doing always exists. Producing is sufficient to trigger it.
This claim is supported by numerous articles about learning curves (see for instance
Yelle, 1979; Neij, 1997; 1999; IEA, 2000b). This literature demonstrates that as a
result of learning by doing, the price of a product decreases when more products are
made.
Therefore, the only facilitating condition for learning by doing is the number of
products produced. We split this condition into two conditions:
1. time
Know-how is built up slowly. Therefore, firms need time to build up this
knowledge stock. When changes occur quickly, there may be too little time to
profit from learning by doing.
2. a high production rate
The higher the production, i.e. the more products there are to practice on, the more
will be learned by doing (Neij, 1999). One of the factors influencing the
production rate is market demand. Therefore, demand-oriented technology policy
can play a role to increase learning by doing.
2.4.5 Learning by using
In his book published in 1981, Sahal mentions that ‘it is plausible, however, that at
least some of the useful know-how is acquired in the utilisation of technology’. He
uses the phrase ‘learning via diffusion’, meaning that the increased adoption of a
technology leads to improvement in its characteristics. Rosenberg elaborates on this
subject and introduces the concept of ‘learning by using’ (Rosenberg, 1982). He
writes that learning by using is especially important in connection with products that
consist of complex, interdependent components. When these products are used,
especially when they are subject to prolonged stress, the outcome of the interaction of
the components cannot be precisely predicted by scientific knowledge or techniques.
This interaction can only be assessed after intensive or prolonged use. One of the
main purposes of learning by using is to determine the optimal performance
characteristics of a durable product since these affect the useful life of the product
(Rosenberg, 1982).
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The actors involved in learning by using are the users of the technology. Often, these
users are firms, like the technology developers. But the users can also be other actors.
In the case of wind turbines, the users are the owners of the wind turbines.
Conditions in the innovation system that facilitate learning by using are as follows:
1. the presence of users. This may seem obvious, but it does not have to be.
Sometimes, technologies are developed entirely by R&D departments without the
involvement of users.
2. the existence of a user group of a minimum size and degree of sophistication. The
characteristics of the product under consideration determine the minimum size of
the demand and its minimum degree of sophistication (Andersen et al., 1988).
3. There have to be contacts between the user and the producer to enable the
producer to learn from using. We will investigate this in the following section.
2.4.6 Learning by interacting
As mentioned above, Lundvall places learning in innovation systems at the centre of
the analysis. He points specifically to the importance of learning between users and
producers. Realising that contacts between users and producers are necessary for
successful innovation Andersen and Lundvall introduced the concept of interactive
learning, or, in other words, learning by interacting (Andersen et al., 1988). Their
main point is that successful innovation is to a large degree dependent on close and
persistent user-producer contacts. The reason is that, particularly in complex
innovation processes, firms are hardly ever able to have or develop all the required
knowledge and skills in-house. Especially if the required information is tacit and
difficult to formalise and communicate more broadly, learning has to occur during
direct face-to-face contacts. The more complex the technology, the more one needs to
rely on the expertise of others (Lundvall, 1988; Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991).
Another motive for learning by interacting is the need to reduce technological and
market uncertainty by improving the predictability of the technology development
(Dodgson, 1996).
Andersen and Lundvall state that learning by interacting is the basis for many
incremental innovations, and that the experiences of learning and minor innovations
are important prerequisites for many radical innovations (Andersen et al., 1988). In
his book ‘National systems of innovation – towards a theory of innovation and
interactive learning’, Lundvall (1992) presents some theoretical notions on learning
by interacting in user-producer interactions. These interactions enable users and
producers to learn and innovate in the following way. During the interaction process,
the user can communicate potential needs. This results in 'demand-pull' innovations.
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In the meantime, during the interaction process, the producer can communicate
potential technical opportunities. These result in 'technology-push' innovations. Here,
Lundvall emphasises the communication of qualitative and tacit knowledge.
Furthermore, he stresses that, because of the existence of learning by interacting,
innovation cannot be regarded as a process that takes place only in R&D departments
(Lundvall, 1992). Instead, innovations occur as a result of on-going interactive
learning processes.
When the concept of learning by interacting was developed, the idea was that the only
actors involved in this kind of learning were users and producers (e.g. Andersen et al.,
1988). According to Garud (1997) this kind of learning takes place in the nexus of the
relationship between the user and the producers. But, if one is considering
technological development from the perspective of the innovation system, one realises
that other relationships are important as well, e.g. the relationship between the
producer and the scientist or the relationship between the producer and the policy-
maker. Learning by interacting also takes place in these relationships. Therefore, in
the following we will not concentrate solely on user-producer relations but we will
also take into account other relations in the innovation system.
Conditions for learning by interacting
Learning by interacting takes place where it is in the interest of the actors to
collaborate and exchange knowledge. It involves linking actors with different
backgrounds, e.g. from different industrial cultures, or from user and supplier
communities. The actors involved need to make investments and commitments.
Interactions continue if the parties are motivated to take part and remain involved,
because they expect some benefit. These benefits can include co-production and
sharing of knowledge, and a reduction of costs and risks, e.g. through alignments of
views and closure of technological controversies, or co-operation in building up new
markets (Williams et al., 2000).
Knowledge often cannot simply be transported from one actor to another. It is often
tacit, specific and commercially sensitive (Dodgson, 1996). Before he can use the new
knowledge, the receiving actor needs to translate it, combine it with other knowledge,
and transform it. Therefore, the main prerequisite for learning by interacting is
proximity. In this context, proximity involves not only physical distance, but also
organisational, economic and cultural proximity (Andersen et al., 1988). The central
idea is that learning by interacting will be restricted if these distances become too
great (Lundvall, 1992). Geographical and cultural closeness, Lundvall argues (1988),
facilitate effective interaction and therefore national borders tend to enclose networks
of technological interaction. Common government and heritage (language, culture,
education, national standardisation) facilitate communication within nations. He
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points out that information transfer can only take place if there are channels of
information through which the message can pass and if there is a code of information.
Other requirements for learning by interacting include common codes of conduct, a
certain lack of competition, mutual interest in the learning process and trust between
the actors (Lundvall, 1988; Nooteboom, 2001).
Van Est, Grin and Van de Graaf note that learning by interacting, which they call
‘joint innovation learning’, is facilitated when the actors involved share the same
frame of meaning about the technology. Frames of meaning consist of problem
definitions and preferred solutions, appreciative systems (or value systems) and
overarching theories that help to explain the situation. However, sharing the same
frame of meaning is not a necessary condition for learning by interacting. For
successful learning by interacting, the frames of meaning of the actors involved in the
learning process need to be congruent, which means that they do not contradict each
other (Van Est, 1997; Grin and Van de Graaf, 1996).
Although proximity is important to if effective learning by interacting is to occur,
actors also need to be diverse to a certain degree; they need to have slightly different
knowledge bases. Obviously, there would be nothing to learn from interacting if the
knowledge bases of the actors were exactly the same. Different knowledge bases lead
to the emergence of new ideas, which in turn might lead to the development of new
technologies or even new technological paradigms (Cohendet and Llerena, 1997).
Therefore, to facilitate learning by interacting the distance between the interacting
actors should be neither too small nor too large (Nooteboom, 1992).
Cohendet and Llerena (1997) point out that norms of openness and disclosure are
important for learning by interacting. When there are strong intellectual property
rights, on the other hand, information is not disclosed and shared. In that situation, the
learning trajectories are narrow and the scope of research is small. However, this is at
odds with our statement in section 2.4.3, namely that strong intellectual property
rights stimulate learning by searching. We assume that finding some kind of middle
course will be the best solution. An example is a policy in which pre-competitive
research is only subsidised if the results are made public, whereas competitive
research does not need to be made public.
Lundvall (1988) makes another interesting claim. On studying the relationship
between the character of technological change and spatial interactions, he suggests
that the nature of interactions varies among technologies. When the technology is
standardised and relatively stable, the information that is exchanged may be translated
into standard codes, and long-distance transmission of information at low cost is
possible. Then, user-producer relationships over a long distance can be effective.
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However, when the technology is complex and keeps changing, a short distance can
be important. The information codes can be flexible and complex, and a common
cultural background can be important for establishing tacit codes of conduct and for
facilitating the decoding of complex knowledge. When the technology and user needs
are complex and changing, a short distance is even more important. From the above,
the hypothesis can be derived that in the later, more orderly stages of the innovation
process long-distance links work well, whereas in the early chaotic stages local
networks are required.
Learning in networks
This brings us to the subject of networks and their importance for learning. As
mentioned in section 2.2.4, Håkansson provides a framework that illustrates the
relation between learning, innovation and networks. He points out that (Håkansson,
1987) one of the three functions of a network is to contribute to the knowledge of the
actors, which involves the transfer of information. Some of the information exchanged
in networks may be marketed information in the form of staff training programmes,
market analyses or technical advice. However, much of the information is transferred
via the informal exchange of ideas (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991). Relations within
a network are investment intensive and often very durable, building on gradually
developed trust. Therefore, a firm has to limit these relations and be selective with
regard to with whom relations should be developed (Håkansson, 1987).
The flow of information within a network may well result in a blending of visions or
of frames of meaning regarding the technology (see also section 2.2.5). Sharing the
same frames of meaning may then lead to a reduction of perceived risk and a
coordination of search efforts and investments between formally independent actors;
this may turn learning by searching into a collective activity (Carlsson and Jacobsson,
1997). Therefore, the type of actors in the network may co-determine the search
direction of the individual firm. Therefore, it is to be expected that a firm with strong
network links with academia and weak network links with users will most probably
search in directions that differ from those of firms that have strong network links with
users and weak network links with academia.
Because of the structural aspects of networks, they can be regarded as a kind of
institution. Like institutions, they may both facilitate and impede learning. Strong and
stable networks are likely to contain a lot of inertia and path dependency. This can
mean that new technologies or new technological ideas that are not shared by the
members of the network may be exploited slowly or not at all (Carlsson and
Jacobsson, 1997). Therefore, the emergence of a new technology may require the
creation of new networks.
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What else is known about relationships between the character of the network and
learning? Callon (1992) introduces structural aspects of networks, like stability,
irreversibility, length and convergence (see section 2.2.4). Carlsson and Stankiewicz
(1991) state that the role of the entrepreneur, or network builder, is important in that it
is to provide the vision that will increase the learning rate in the network.
Williams et al. (2000) point to the importance of intermediaries for learning by
interacting in networks. Their role is to facilitate the transfer and diffusion of
knowledge. When knowledge is difficult to communicate, e.g. because it is tacit or
because it is too complex, intermediaries transfer this knowledge in a ‘person
embodied’ form, in other words: in person. They cross the boundaries between
organisations, departments or knowledge communities. Sometimes their role is to
include other actors who do not experience sufficient incentives, but whose
involvement may be crucial. Often, intermediation is shared among several actors.
Critical for good intermediation is the ability to mobilise knowledge and resources
and to cross different spaces (especially between users and producers) (Williams et
al., 2000).
To conclude
Summarising, (institutional) conditions that facilitate learning by interacting are:
1. mutual interest in the learning process
2. proximity in the broad sense, including geographical closeness, cognitive
closeness, a common language and culture, national standardisation, common
codes of conduct, a certain lack of competition and mutual trust between the
actors, and congruent frames of meaning regarding the technology
3. norms of openness and disclosure
4. the presence of an intermediary if information is not transferred easily or if not all
relevant actors cooperate spontaneously
5. the presence of a network builder
6. the capacity to build new networks and to destroy obsolete ones
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have constructed our theoretical framework. As a starting point, we
used the innovation system approach with its emphasis on the importance of actors,
institutions and the interactions between actors. We will use this approach as a
guideline for our case study descriptions in chapters 3 and 4. Within these
descriptions we focus particularly on the learning processes within the Dutch and
Danish wind turbine innovation systems, investigating the learning processes as
defined in this chapter: learning by searching, learning by doing, learning by using
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and learning by interacting. In order to determine to what extent these learning
processes were present within the innovation systems, we use the 'facilitating
conditions' that we obtained from our literature research in this chapter. We analyse
whether these facilitating conditions were present within each innovation system and
if so, to what extent. The facilitating conditions are as follows:
1. Learning by searching
Facilitating conditions:
- the presence of a technological guidepost, guiding the direction of search
- the availability of an appropriate scientific theory on the subject, guiding the direction of
search
- the presence of a technological paradigm, guiding the direction of search
- the presence of standards and regulations, guiding the direction of search
- changing circumstances
- an environment that is not (too) hostile
- the availability of capital
- some level of knowledge and expertise in the field of study
- the possibility of making mistakes and learn from them
- the way the ownership of novelties and new knowledge is organised
2. Learning by doing
Facilitating conditions:
- time
- a high production rate
3. Learning by using
Facilitating conditions:
- the presence of users during technology development
- a user group of minimum size and degree of sophistication
- contacts between the user and the producer
4. Learning by interacting
Facilitating conditions:
- mutual interest in the learning process
- proximity in the broad sense, including geographical closeness, cognitive closeness, a
common language and culture, national standardisation, common codes of conduct, a
certain lack of competition, mutual trust between the actors, and congruent frames of
meaning regarding the technology
- norms of openness and disclosure
- the presence of an intermediary
- the presence of a network builder
- the capacity to build new networks and destroy obsolete ones
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3 Wind energy in the Netherlands
3.1 Introduction
Until the 1970s, the Netherlands had no explicit energy policy. Energy provision was
regarded as part of industry policy. Therefore, the emphasis was on stimulating and
meeting the energy demands of industrial growth and on ensuring that energy supply
and prices presented no disincentives to growth of the economy. The main concern
was to guarantee that energy was provided continuously at the lowest possible cost
with free choice for the users (Small, 1996). Energy sources were mainly coal, oil and
gas.
In the early 1970s, circumstances changed rapidly. The Club of Rome report was
published in which it was argued that fossil fuel resources were finite and that
therefore fuel demands should be slowed down to avoid depletion of these resources
(Meadows et al., 1972). In the course of the 1973 oil crisis it became clear that the
fossil fuel provision could be used as a political instrument. Therefore, the objectives
of national energy policy had to be reassessed. In the 1970s and the 1980s an energy
policy debate took place in the Netherlands. It focused mainly on the role of nuclear
energy and on energy policy in general. It was against this background that the
potential contribution of alternative energy sources was considered.
In 1974, the First White Paper on Energy (Eerste Energie Nota) was written. In this
white paper the government's new energy policy goals were presented. The emphasis
shifted from a low-cost energy, free-market perspective to an efficiency-conscious,
social and environmental perspective. The key policies in the First White Paper on
Energy were energy saving and diversification (Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs,
1974). In the absence of alternative energy sources, energy saving would reduce
uncertainty by delaying the moment when the finite fossil fuel reserves would run out.
In the intervening period, alternative energy sources would have to be developed.
These new energy sources would have to meet not only energy demand, but also new
economic, social and environmental criteria, e.g. independence from other countries
for the provision of energy. The government encouraged the development of new
energy sources and techniques and aimed to ensure that the Dutch business
community and research capacity would make as large as possible a contribution to
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the development of these new energy sources and to the energy economy as a whole
(Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1974).
A large problem for those promoting the energy diversification policy was that few
alternative energy technologies were available. In order to make sure that the
development of new energy sources would get off the ground, the government played
an active role in this development. First of all, it stimulated projects, especially those
that would not be funded, or would only make slow progress if normal market forces
were applied. Secondly, the government saw itself playing a co-ordinating and
guiding role in furthering developments (Small, 1996).
On the energy supply side, a reorganisation within the energy sector was called for.
The government wanted more efficient use of fuels, more regulation and more direct
influence. Although the government repeatedly attempted to increase its influence, it
was effectively blocked by the electricity sector’s various organisations (Verbong,
1998). The electricity sector in the Netherlands consisted of powerful organisations
that could not easily be influenced.
In general, there was a shift from a relatively passive energy policy to an active one.
Therefore, the government established two new councils: the LSEO (Landelijke
Stuurgroep Energie Onderzoek) and the NEOM (Nederlandse Energie Ontwikkelings
Maatschappij) (Small, 1996). The LSEO was to consider the energy issue from all
possible angles. It was also to be responsible for selecting projects for funding, on the
basis of their scientific or technical merit. The NEOM was responsible for promoting
projects that appeared viable from an energy-policy and long-term economic point of
view. The goal was to bridge the gap between the laboratory protype and the real-
world commercial application. The NEOM was the responsible for transferring
knowledge between research organisations and from these organisations to the
commercial sector.
Although there was much uncertainty concerning the viability and future role of
alternative energy sources, their development was viewed with great optimism. The
cost development of these energy sources was expected to be favourable. The
development was expected to take place in the following steps (Dutch Ministry of
Economic Affairs, 1974):
- until 1985 alternative energy sources were not expected to play a substantial role
in energy provision
- from 1985 to the year 2000 CHP (combined heat and power), wind energy and
energy from waste were expected to make a reasonable contribution to the
national energy supply
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- from the end of the 20th century wind energy in particular was expected to make a
significant contribution to the national energy supply
Not only were renewable energy sources like solar energy and wind energy expected
to become significant alternatives for fossil fuels, but nuclear energy too was to play a
significant role (Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1974).
3.2 1975-1976
3.2.1 The LSEO interim report and the NOW 1 programme
The LSEO, established in 1974, published in January 1975 an interim report
containing the outline of a research programme. The programme’s main goals were
threefold: drawing up an inventory of available knowledge, co-ordinating ongoing
activities, and ensuring the involvement of Dutch industry. The latter goal was seen as
very important and was a government criterion for deciding how to allocate money
(LSEO, 1975). According to the LSEO, the most promising renewable energy options
were solar energy (the conversion of solar energy into heat), geothermal energy and,
in particular, wind energy. Therefore, these renewable energy options were to receive
the most attention in the research programme (LSEO, 1975).
The Dutch had no experience of building wind turbines for the production of energy.
However, because of their centuries long experience in building ‘classical’ windmills
(for grinding grain, sawing wood, etc.), the technicians in the LSEO foresaw no
problems in building wind turbines for the production of energy. In fact, they sought a
leading role for the Netherlands in the development of wind turbines (LSEO, 1975).
As stated before, renewable energy sources were expected to make a significant
contribution to the national energy provision. Therefore, wind turbines would have to
produce very large amounts of MWhs of electricity. This was the starting point of the
LSEO research programme. Wind turbines would have to replace power plants driven
by fossil fuels. Therefore, the LSEO spoke of wind turbines instead of windmills (cf.
gas turbines) and wind power stations (wind 'centrales'). According to the LSEO, even
a small-scale unit was to consist of at least 20 to 30 wind turbines (LSEO, 1975). This
clearly reflected the dominant frame of meaning of the large-scale electricity
generating companies in the Netherlands. Important concerns of these companies
were electricity delivery security and cost effectiveness. Electricity consumers would
have to be given a guarantee that they could use electricity whenever they wanted, at a
low price. Wind turbines would have to meet these goals, just like other electricity
generating turbines. The LSEO identified three major uncertainties about wind energy
that would have to be investigated in the research programme (LSEO, 1975):
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- What type of turbine would be best for meeting the requirement of electricity
delivery security at a low price?
- What effect would air disturbance caused by a turbine in a wind power station
have on the electricity production of other wind turbines?
- Where were the best places to site wind power stations?
These uncertainties led the LSEO to recommend the evaluation of several different
types of wind turbines and the construction of prototypes. Furthermore, the prevailing
opinion was that large wind power stations, consisting of hundreds of turbines, could
not be located on land. This led to another recommendation, namely the evaluation of
the technical possibilities of constructing wind power stations at sea (LSEO, 1975).
Following the LSEO report, several national research programmes, each concentrating
on a different energy source, were set up. Examples are the NOZ, the National
Research Programme on Solar Energy, and the NOW, the National Research
Programme on Wind Energy. The latter was launched in 1976. It covered a 5-year
period, 1976-1981. The main emphasis of the programme was on research. The
available knowledge and the technological options were to be investigated. The main
goal of this investigation was to answer the question of whether wind energy could
make a contribution to the energy supply in the Netherlands and if so, to what extent.
Large subsidies were made available for this research. In the first year of the NOW-1
programme alone, March 1976 - March 1977, 15 million Dutch guilders were made
available (Small, 1996).
3.2.2 The Dutch wind turbine innovation system
After 1976, the Dutch wind turbine innovation system was set up. Before this time the
Dutch had had no experience of building wind turbines for electricity generation. A
wind turbine innovation system did not exist. Then, as a result of the 1975 LSEO
interim report, wind energy became an important topic. Expectations were high: wind
energy would most likely play a significant role in the national energy provision in the
21st century. The exact extent of this role would have to be investigated in the NOW 1
programme, but the role was likely to be significant. In addition, large subsidies were
provided for wind energy R&D. Many actors were interested. To be precise, within
the Dutch wind turbine innovation system two subsystems can be distinguished: the
large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem and the small-scale wind turbine
innovation subsystem. Within the large-scale subsystem, the emphasis from the 1970s
onwards was on the development of large wind turbines, with a power capacity of
several megawatts. Within the small-scale subsystem, from the 1970s the emphasis
was on the development of smaller wind turbines, with a power capacity of several
tens of kilowatts, and on the slow upscaling of these. In part A of this chapter, we will
describe the large-scale subsystem, and in part B we will describe the small-scale
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subsystem. General conclusions regarding the two subsystems will be drawn in
Chapter 5.
Part A: The large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem
3.3 1976 - 1980
The large-scale subsystem involved mainly large firms and research institutes. Eight
Dutch firms, including large firms like Fokker, Stork and Holec, became involved in
wind energy R&D. Research institutes also started wind energy research. In the NOW
1 programme it was explicitly stated that, instead of all wind energy research being
concentrated in one research institute, all large Dutch energy research institutes were
to become involved in wind energy research. These institutes were KNMI, NLR,
TNO, KEMA, and RCN. KNMI, the Dutch meteorological institute, was to collect
wind structure data; NLR, the national aerospace laboratory, would develop
calculation programmes; TNO, 'the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific
Research' was to study wake effects of wind turbines; KEMA, the research institute of
the electricity sector, would study the integration of wind turbines in the electricity
grid; and RCN, the 'Reactor Centre of the Netherlands' was appointed as the project
leader (RCN, 1976). Futhermore, many groups at the Dutch universities were to
become involved: at Eindhoven University of Technology7, 8 a bibliography was to be
compiled, and at Groningen University research was to be conducted into a small
vertical axis wind turbine (RCN, 1976). According to the government, the buyers of
wind turbines were to be electricity production companies. Wind electricity
production was to replace electricity production by fossil fuels and was to be carried
out by the same producers, the electricity production companies. Electricity
production and distribution companies were however not involved in the wind turbine
innovation system in this period. They were very sceptical about wind energy and the
role it could play in the Dutch energy provision. Electricity consumers were not
involved in the wind turbine innovation system either. On the policy side, the major
actor was the Ministry of Economic Affairs. In the Netherlands, the Directorate
General of Energy was and still is part of the Ministry of Economic Affairs.
                                                          
7 The Steering group Wind energy Developing countries (SWD) was started at Eindhoven University of
Technology in 1975 (Smulders, 1981). The group performed research into wind turbines for developing
countries. This research was not financed by the NOW, but by the Dutch Ministry of Development Co-
operation. Since this group was not involved in developing wind turbines for the Dutch market, its
activities will not be discussed further in this chapter.
8 As early as 1974, Eindhoven University of Technology had engaged in wind energy research. A
group of three students investigated the possibilities of wind energy (Beurskens et al., 1974).
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As stated above, the Dutch government explicitly wanted to play a co-ordinating and
guiding role in the development of wind energy. To be able to play this role, it created
a number of intermediaries. Already mentioned are the LSEO, responsible for
allocating R&D funds, and the NEOM, responsible for promoting energy projects and
for transferring knowledge between actors. Furthermore, in 1977 an external advisory
body, the AER (Algemene Energie Raad) was established to advise the government
on energy matters. A fourth intermediary body was BEOP (Bureau Energie
Onderzoeks Projecten). Within BEOP, the main energy research institutes, TNO and
RCN, co-operated in co-ordinating national wind and solar research. These four
intermediaries were also part of the large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem.
Figure 3.1 depicts this subsystem. In the figure, the boxes represent actors.  The
straight lines between the boxes indicate learning processes between actors, and the
dotted lines between the boxes indicate subsidy flows. The thickness of the bold lines
indicates the importance of the interactive learning processes. The italic letters in the
boxes represent the learning processes of the actors. An (s) means learning by
searching, a (d) means learning by doing and a (u) means learning by using.
Figure 3.1: The large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem in the period 1976-1980.
Not only a national wind turbine innovation system, but also an international wind
turbine innovation system were set up in this period. The Dutch government felt that
international co-operation in wind energy R&D was required to make sufficiently
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rapid progress in wind energy R&D. In 1977, the government stated that the
Netherlands should not only take part in international co-operation, but should also
play the role of guiding country in the field of wind energy (Small, 1996).
International networks were established by the IEA, the International Energy Agency.
In 1977, it founded the IEA R&D WECS network, concerning R&D into Wind
Energy Conversion Systems. The aim of this network was to stimulate international
co-operation in research, development and demonstration and information exchange
(IEA, 1978). The Netherlands was a member from the beginning (IEA, 1978). Also in
1977, the IEA founded the IEA Large Scale WECS network. The aim of this network
was to stimulate the placing of large wind turbines. The Netherlands became a
member in 1983 (IEA, 1984). These networks held conferences every two years and
produced yearbooks about the developments in each country.
3.3.1 The role of wind energy in the Dutch energy supply
In the LSEO interim report, it was stated that renewable energy and especially wind
energy were to play a significant role in the Dutch energy provision. In the light of the
first oil crisis, this was essential to ensure that the Netherlands would become
independent of energy imports. In addition to renewable energy, a large role had
always been foreseen for nuclear energy. This form of energy could also be produced
in the Netherlands. Nuclear power plants of several hundreds of megawatts could be
built, which would be able to replace large amounts of power produced by fossil fuels.
Nuclear power was very popular in the Dutch electricity sector. At the RCN research
institute, research into nuclear power had already started in the 1950s (Andriesse,
2000). The electricity production companies were also enthusiastic about nuclear
energy. Therefore, at the beginning of the 1970s, plans were announced for the
building of dozens of nuclear power plants in the Netherlands. However, in the 1970s
there were protests against nuclear power. These protests led to the postponement of
the construction of three nuclear power plants. The nuclear question had to await the
outcome of the National Debate on Energy Policy (Small, 1996).
This meant that the need for a significant amount of renewable energy became even
more urgent. Within the NOW 1 programme, the major question was whether and to
what extent wind energy could contribute to the national energy provision. There was
not only uncertainty but also disagreement as to the potential role of wind energy.
Several researches were conducted into this question. Some experts talked about
dozens of percents around the year 2000; others, including the LSEO, claimed it
would only be a few percent. The KEMA, the research institute of the energy
companies, was even more pessimistic. They were of the opinion that only 650 MWe
could be included in the national grid without technical problems (BEOP, 1981a).
Regarding the cost of the wind turbines, they stated that insufficient data were
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available on which to base an economic analysis (VDEN, 1980). The pessismistic
result of the KEMA study clearly reflects the scepsis of the energy companies
regarding wind energy. Also SEP (the organisation called 'Co-operating Electricity
Production Companies') had its doubts about wind energy. Several SEP studies
regarding the potential for wind energy in the Netherlands showed that a large amount
of reserve capacity would be needed (see for instance Bontius et al., 1981). In a very
optimistic study published in the mid-1970s it was estimated that already by 1978-
1979 10-15% of the national electricity production could be produced by 5,000 wind
turbines each of 1 MW. These turbines would have to be located along the coast,
where the wind speed was highest, in wind farms each containing 100-150 turbines
(Van den Berg et al., 1978).
A major problem was the unreliability of the wind. Furthermore, there was no large-
scale storage capacity for the energy produced by wind turbines. This meant that
electricity supply by wind turbines could not be guaranteed. Wind energy could
therefore supplement the base generating capacity but could not substitute part of it.
Therefore, it was argued that the price of electricity generated by wind turbines should
be relative to the fuel saved by coal or gas-fired plants. This meant that, in order to be
able to compete with electricity from fossil fuels, wind electricity had to be cheaper
than electricity from fossil fuels. Several studies investigated the problem of storing
energy. One possible solution was to create hydrogen from wind electricity, which
could later be converted into electricity. In the mid-1970s TNO carried out an
evaluation of the possible future role of hydrogen as an energy carrier (Bogers, 1975).
Another method for the large-scale storage of energy was proposed by Lievense in
1981 (Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1981). His plan involved the construction
of a water reservoir in the Markerwaard. Water would be pumped into the reservoir by
means of cheap nighttime electricity and electricity generated by 400 wind turbines of
1 – 1.5 MW. Then, four water turbines would convert this energy back into electricity
when required. The Lievense report described rather precisely what features the
turbines would need to have and how much they would cost (Dutch Ministry of
Economic Affairs, 1981). To establish the feasibility of this proposal, a working group
was set up to investigate it in terms of the technical aspects, environmental aspects
and optimisation and in terms of fitting it into the public grid. In the same period, a
similar plan was developed, the Energo project. According to this plan, developed in
1980-1981, the water reservoir proposed by Lievense could be made in the
Oosterschelde. The flood barrier could be used to close the reservoir (Dragt, 2000).
Both the Plan Lievense and the Energo project were never implemented, because they
were very expensive and because the wind capacity in the Netherlands was and
remained small.
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In 1979, the Second White Paper on Energy was published. According to the
government, it was even clearer than in 1974, when the First White Paper on Energy
was published, that energy would be scarcer than before (Dutch Ministry of Economic
Affairs, 1979). Since 1974 demand for oil had grown faster than oil supply, although
the world economy had grown only slightly. Furthermore, in January 1979, when the
Netherlands had just recovered from the first oil crisis, the second oil crisis occurred,
emphasising yet again the need for independence from energy imports. These two
factors made the government put even more emphasis on energy saving and
diversification, e.g. by using renewable energy sources (Dutch Ministry of Economic
Affairs, 1979). To meet future increases in electricity demand, electricity would have
to be produced not only in centralised power plants but also in decentralised
cogeneration units and by renewable energy sources. For wind energy, a specific goal
was formulated: 2,000 to 3,000 large wind turbines by the year 2000 (Dutch Ministry
of Economic Affairs, 1979).
3.3.2 Building wind turbines
In the first, exploratory phase of the NOW 1 programme an answer was sought to the
question of what role wind energy could play in the Dutch energy provision. Although
opinions differed on how large the role of wind energy in the Netherlands could be, it
was estimated that 650 to 2,500 MW of wind turbines could be part of the Dutch
energy provision by the year 2000 (BEOP, 1981a). One study even spoke of 5,000
wind turbines, each of 1 MW, in the year 1979 (Van den Berg et al., 1978). This was a
clear sign of the optimism that prevailed about the building of wind turbines. The idea
was that within a few years the Netherlands would be able to build thousand of wind
turbines. The only question was: which wind turbine would be the most cost
effective? As mentioned above, wind electricity had to be able to compete with
electricity from fossil fuels. Therefore, the most cost-effective wind turbine had to be
developed and produced in large numbers.
Two options were considered: the HAT turbine or Horizontal Axis Turbine and the
VAT turbine or Vertical Axis Turbine. A prototype of each turbine was to be built.
The VAT turbine would be built at the Fokker plant in Schiphol. The HAT turbine
would be located at the ECN9 site in Petten. After the turbines had been designed,
built and tested, one would be selected for mass production. Beforehand, the NOW
managers had most confidence in the VAT turbine (Veldhuis, 1976).
Both the HAT and the VAT turbine have advantages and disadvantages, as mentioned
in Chapter 1 of this thesis. The main technical advantage of the HAT turbine is that it
                                                          
9 From August 1976, the RCN research institute was re-named ECN, the Netherlands Energy Research
Foundation.
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can be self-started, whereas the VAT turbine has to be 'motored up' to its operating
speed. Technical advantages of the VAT turbine are that the generator is situated near
the ground, and not on top of the turbine, as in the case of a HAT turbine. Therefore,
if problems arise the generator can be reached easily. Furthermore, the VAT turbine
can always produce energy from wind coming from any direction. Unlike the HAT
turbine, it does not have to be yawed into the wind.
3.3.3 The VAT turbine prototype
The VAT turbine prototype was designed and built by Fokker in the years 1975-1976
(Pelser, 1981). Other parties involved in the VAT project were Stork and ECN. Stork
designed and built the instrumentation, and ECN was responsible for the measurement
programme (Sens, 1981). The VAT turbine prototype was a Darrieus turbine with a
rotor diameter of 5 metres (5.3 metres to be precise) (Pelser, 1981). The turbine was
equipped with novel technical features, as was the HAT turbine prototype that will be
described in section 3.3.4. The VAT turbine prototype was designed as a scale model.
Design parameters for larger models were to be based on the test results of this model.
Another goal of the project was to gain operational experience with a VAT turbine
(Pelser, 1981).
While the VAT prototype was in operation and was being tested it became evident
that building wind turbines was perhaps not as easy as expected. Early on, there were
problems with the VAT turbine. Large vibrations occurred in the blades, producing a
lot of noise. Many tests on the prototype were performed by the NLR and ECN
(Dragt, 2000). They measured the aerodynamic efficiency of the wind turbine as a
function of wind speed for different aerofoil chords and different numbers of blades,
the strain in the blades, the vibrations in the turbine as a whole and in the blades, the
behaviour of the turbine under emergency conditions and the wake effects around the
turbine (Pelser, 1975; Pelser, 1981). The wake effects were important for calculating
the effects that VAT turbines placed in wind power stations would have on each other.
The research institute TNO was involved in simulating these wake effects with a VAT
turbine model (RCN, 1976).
Some aspects of the aerodynamic and aeroelastic behaviour of a VAT turbine were
still unknown when the 5 m VAT turbine was built. Therefore, the turbine behaved in
ways that were not expected. This led to problems with the measurements. The effects
that had to be measured could not be separated from other unpredicted effects.
Therefore, the design parameters for larger VAT models, the main goal of the 5 m
VAT project, could not be determined (BEOP, 1981b). However valuable operational
experience was gained. It was recommended that a somewhat larger scale model, with
a diameter of 15 or 25 metres, should be built to obtain the desired design parameters
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for large VAT turbines. In 1981, both Fokker and Rijn-Schelde-Verolme produced
designs for a turbine with a 15 metre diameter and a turbine with a 25 metre diameter.
The NOW 1 evaluation report advised that one of these turbines should be built as
soon as possible, so that measurement results of this turbine could be compared with
those of the HAT turbine prototype (BEOP, 1981b). Meanwhile, at the beginning of
1981 the 5 metre VAT prototype was placed on the ECN terrain for testing. After half
a year of testing, it broke down (Stam et al., 1983).
3.3.4 The HAT turbine prototype
At the same time, the HAT turbine prototype was designed and built. As with the
VAT prototype project, the main goal was to obtain measurement results from which
design parameters for a larger turbine could be calculated. The HAT turbine prototype
had a capacity of 300 kW and a rotor diameter of 25 metres. It was calculated within
the NOW 1 programme that the HAT turbine with the optimum price-performance
ratio would be a 3 MW turbine with rotor blades of about 80 metres (Van Holten,
2000). But building such an enormous turbine without experience would be too
expensive and too risky. Building a turbine with a capacity of 1 MW, the figure that
was used in many studies about the role wind energy could play in the Netherlands
(see above), was still considered too risky. Therefore, a nice round, smaller figure was
determined: 3 MW divided by 3 divided by 3: 300 kW. This shows clearly that no
scientific rationale was used in determining the overall parameters of the turbine;
instead 'rules of thumb' were applied (Van Holten, 2000).
However, scientific rationale and scientific methods were used in the design of the
turbine. For example for the blades, models and calculation rules were used from
aeroplane design. Every parameter was carefully calculated in advance (Dekker,
2000). The turbine was designed by Stork and ECN and built by the consortium Stork,
Fokker, Holec and Rademakers. Stork, a machine building company was responsible
for the project management, Fokker, building aircraft, for the blades, Holec,
producing electrical installations for machines, for the electric system within the
turbine and Rademakers for the gear transmission (Pelser, 1981). During the design of
the turbine, contacts between the contractors were good and on a regular basis. The
employees were all engineers, mostly educated at universities, understood each other
perfectly and were all fascinated by beautiful calculations (Dekker, 2000). Their work
was based upon the same paradigm: co-operating in the building of many large wind
turbines that were based on scientific calculations.
The engineers designing the HAT prototype equipped the turbine with two blades.
The consideration was rather simple: the more blades, the higher the material cost and
and the higher the conversion ratio in the cog wheel; but, the more blades, the smaller
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the load changes in the blades when the blades rotate. They had to decide whether to
have turbines with one, or two, or three blades. One blade was considered too risky
because of the large changing loads; three blades was considered too expensive.
Therefore, they decided on two blades (Dekker, 2000). An extra advantage of using
two blades was that no other country had yet built a HAT turbine prototype with two
blades. On the other hand, HAT prototypes with 3 blades had been erected in
Denmark, and a prototype with one blade was to be erected in Germany. Therefore,
measurement results from turbines with a one or three blades could be obtained from
abroad. It would have been possible to produce a turbine which could have either one,
two or three blades. But, since this would have meant building three different rotors,
the plan was considered too expensive (Dekker, 2000).
Furthermore, the turbine contained a number of technical novelties. The most
important novelty was that it could be operated with four regulating procedures
(Pelser, 1981):
- at constant rotor speed
- with a constant blade angle
- at an optimal rotor speed
- at a blade angle or rotor speed that could be chosen by the operator.
The turbine therefore could be operated in different ways, enabling the researchers to
measure the turbine’s behaviour during these different regulating procedures and to
determine the optimum regulating procedure for future larger HAT turbines.
The blades of the turbine were made of reinforced polymer. The angle of the blades
could be altered over an angle of 90 degrees. By turning the blades, or pitching, the
amount of energy that the blades withdraw from the wind could be changed. At low
wind speed, the blades could be turned to a position in which as much energy as
possible is withdrawn from the wind. At high wind speed, the blades could be turned
into a position in which less energy than the maximum amount was withdrawn from
the wind, to avoid damage to the blades. At very high wind speed, the blades could be
turned to a position in which no energy at all was drawn from the wind. The HAT
prototype was the first turbine built in the Netherlands with such a pitch regulation.
The advantage of a pitch regulation is that at every wind speed the optimum amount
of energy can be withdrawn from the wind. The disadvantage is that it is a complex
regulation. Changes in wind speed, measured by an anemometer on top of the wind
turbine, are transmitted to the pitch system, which makes the blade angle change. For
a good result, the pitch system has to react very quickly to changes in wind speed. In
the HAT prototype, the pitch system was regulated by a hydraulic mechanism. The
blade angle could be adjusted at a maximum speed of five degrees per second. The
design of this pitch system was very ingenious (Dekker, 2000).
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Other regulation systems were built into the turbine as well. These systems enabled
the yaw angle and the rotor speed to be regulated. The yaw regulation system was
equipped with a permanent damping brake. Another novelty was the generator.
Although the standard capacity of the turbine was 300 kW, the nominal capacity of
the direct current generator in the turbine was 400 kW. This meant that strong wind
gusts could be handled by the generator without causing peaks in the amount of
electricity produced. As long as the rotor speed remained between 900 and 1600
revolutions per minute, electricity was produced with a stable voltage of 720 Volt
(Pelser, 1981). This was a very important feature, since the electricity companies were
only willing to accept electricity into the net if it had stable features. Input of
electricity into the grid with an unstable voltage would cause ‘grid pollution’ (Pelser,
1981).
The turbine could be braked in two independent ways. Firstly, the blades could be
pitched to a position where no energy was withdrawn from the wind. Secondly, three
mechanical brakes were installed in the turbine: two on the generator and one on the
rotor axis. In addition to these two braking systems, the turbine could also be yawed
out of the wind by the yawing system (Pelser, 1981).
As mentioned above, the main goal of the HAT prototype project was tp obtain
measurement results for calculating the design parameters of larger HAT turbines.
Therefore, the HAT prototype turbine was equipped with very extensive instrumen-
tation which registered its behaviour in the fluctuating wind. The measurement
programme was formulated by ECN and NLR. The following parameters were to be
measured (Pelser, 1981):
- wind speed
- wind direction
- yawing angle
- blade position
- axis torque
- rotor speed
- temperature
- air pressure
- material tension on several parts of the rotor blades
- accelerations and vibrations in the rotor blades and the nave
- forces on the rotor
The HAT prototype was very spacious and solid so that the instrumentation could be
included in the turbine and reached easily if instruments needed to be adjusted or
repaired.
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All the novel features, the measuring instruments and the solid design of the turbine
meant that it was very expensive. The total cost amounted to 8.6 million guilders
(Westra, 1998; Andriesse, 2000). The turbine was fully financed by the Ministry of
Economic Affairs (Verbruggen, 2000). The turbine was located on the ECN terrain in
Petten. There were a number of debates before this location was decided upon
(Andriesse, 2000; Dekker, 2000; Dragt, 2000). Another possible location was the
NLR terrain in Emmeloord. Neither ECN nor NLR had any experience in taking
measurements on wind turbines. ECN however did have some experience of
measuring fluctuations in the open air, whereas NLR was only able to take measure-
ments in wind tunnels. ECN had obtained the experience of measuring fluctuations
while measuring on the 5 metre VAT turbine at Schiphol (Dragt, 2000). A
disadvantage of the ECN terrain was that it was not flat. Because of the small dunes
on the terrain, the wind field was disturbed. This problem was solved by placing 5
wind measuring masts around the HAT prototype turbine. The wind field around the
turbine could be mapped with the help of these measuring masts (Dragt, 2000).
The turbine came into operation on June 29th 1981, as will be described in section
3.4.5. Even before the turbine was put into operation, the actors participating in the
project had learnt a great deal (Dekker, 2000). A new body of knowledge had been
developed as a result of the design, calculation and building of the turbine
components and of the interactions between these components. Other possible
methods for converting the mechanical energy of the rotor into electrical energy were
explored. The technical possibilities of synchronous and asynchronous generators
were investigated.
Another important result of the project, even before it was put into operation, was the
strengthening of the ties within the newly developed large-scale wind turbine
innovation subsystem. The contractors worked closely together, got to know each
other very well and exchanged a large amount of knowledge (Dekker, 2000).
3.3.5 The tipvane project
In the period 1975-1981, another important R&D project was started: the tipvane
project. This project was carried out at Delft University of Technology. The idea of
the tipvane was developed in 1975 by Van Holten, one of the researchers at the
Faculty of Aerospace Engineering at Delft University of Technology (Van Bussel,
1984). He was of the opinion that a moving rotor could extract more energy from the
wind than the theoretical Betz-optimum of 59%. His idea was that the amount of air
flowing through the turbine rotor could be increased with the help of small
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perpendicular blades on the tips of the rotor blades10 (Van Holten, 1978). This would
greatly increase the amount of energy that could be extracted from the wind by the
rotor. This would result in a 60-70% higher energy yield, at an increased cost of about
15% (Van Holten, 1982; Pelser, 1981).
In 1976, research on the tipvane began at Delft University of Technology. A number
of researchers started working with mathematical models, trying to assess the physics
and the potential of the tipvane. By the end of the 1970s, it had been proved
mathematically that increasing the energy yield with the help of tipvanes was
physically possible (Van Holten, 1982; Van Holten, 2000). The next step was to prove
this in an experimental way. The NOW 1 programme managers were very enthusiastic
about the project (BEOP, 1981b). The possibility of increasing energy yield by wind
turbines by up to 70% at relatively low cost fitted in perfectly with their ideas for
wind energy, namely the production of a significant part of the Dutch energy by cost
effective wind turbines. Therefore, they emphasised the importance of continuing this
research and put subsidies at the disposal of Delft University in order to finance the
continuation of the research (BEOP, 1981b).
3.3.6 Conclusion
What can be said about the learning processes within the large-scale wind turbine
innovation subsystem in the Netherlands? First of all, it can be said that although the
large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem was formed in this period, not all
actors formed part of the subsystem. In figure 3.1, it can be seen that the actors in the
subsystem were:
- policy-makers
- turbine manufacturers
- research institutes
Buyers or future buyers were not included, although the actors in the subsystem had a
clear idea of who these buyers were to be: the electricity companies. The electricity
companies, however, were very sceptical about wind energy and did not play an
active role in the subsystem in this period.
                                                          
10 The principle is as follows (Van Bussel, 1984). The effect of the tipvanes on the turbine blades is the
same as if the rotor had been put inside a large funnel. If the narrow end of the funnel is put in the wind
stream, the air pressure on the broad end of the funnel will decrease. This will result in a larger
difference in air pressure than without tipvanes, resulting in a ‘suction’ of air through the rotor.
Because of this ‘suction’ effect, both the amount of air that flows through the rotor and the velocity of
this air will increase. Furthermore, the mixing of air behind the turbine with the outside air flow, the so-
called ‘ejector effect’, also increases the amount of energy extracted from the wind. Both effects
combined would result in a 60-70 % higher energy yield (Van Holten, 1978; BEOP, 1981a).
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Secondly, with regard to the learning processes within the subsystem, it can be said
that the emphasis was on learning by searching. Following the LSEO Interim Report
and the NOW 1 programme, all activities were aimed at increasing theoretical
knowledge about the potential contribution of wind energy to the energy provision in
the Netherlands and about the technical features of wind turbines in general and of
cost-effective large wind turbines in particular. Between the members of the project
teams, e.g. of the HAT prototype and of the VAT prototype, learning by interacting
took place. The members met regularly and exchanged information for the purpose of
learning from each other and together reaching the goals of the project. Learning by
doing also took place during the building and operation of the VAT prototype and the
building of the HAT prototype. However, at the end of this period it was concluded in
the NOW 1 evaluation report that much more operating experience with the VAT was
needed. As far as the HAT was concerned, operating experience started in 1981, this
experience will be described in section 3.4.5.
3.4 1981 - 1985
3.4.1 The NOW 1 evaluation report
The NOW 1 programme period 1976 - 1981 was closed with an evaluation report. The
main conclusions of this report were the following (BEOP, 1981b):
- wind energy offers enough perspectives that its application should be strongly
stimulated.
- before wind energy can be introduced on a large scale, a large number of
bottlenecks need to be removed.
- these bottlenecks can be eliminated in a follow-up NOW programme, the NOW 2
programme.
- the favourable perspectives apply to both large-scale, centralised application of
wind energy and small-scale, decentralised application.
The last conclusion is particularly interesting. Whereas in the late 1970s the focus was
on large-scale, centralised wind power stations filled with large, cost-effective
turbines, a second focus now comes to the forefront: decentralised application. In the
case of decentralised application, the electricity consumer uses electricity produced by
his own wind turbine. In other words, the electricity consumer owns the turbine. In the
case of the centralised application of wind energy it is the electricity production
company that owns the turbine.
Why this change? The reason is the second of the above-mentioned conclusions:
during the NOW 1 programme period a large number of bottlenecks had been
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identified which hindered the large-scale introduction of wind energy. It had become
clear that the large-scale application of large wind turbines was very complicated. In
the first place, the investments would be very large. The HAT prototype had cost
eight million guilders (BEOP, 1981b). Although it was clear that commercial turbines
would not be as expensive, they would still cost a large amount of money. According
to BEOP these large investments would only be possible if four conditions were met
(Piepers, 1981):
1. The use of wind as an energy source would have to become part of the
government’s official energy policy. This implied that the government would have
to take measures to promote the introduction of 2,000-3,000 wind turbines,
formulated in the Second White Paper on Energy.
2. A positive attitude on the part of the energy companies and especially of the SEP
(Co-operating Electricity Producers), with regard to fitting windpower into their
electricity production facilities.
3. The willingness of Dutch industry to set up a production line for producing large
numbers of large wind turbines.
4. Suitable locations would have to become available for the required number of
wind turbines.
One of the main points of the NOW 1 programme had been to involve Dutch industry
in the development of wind energy. According to BEOP, this had only been partly
successful (Piepers, 1981). Although Dutch industry had been involved in the VAT
and the HAT prototypes, they had considered it as an incidental assignment and not as
the start of the manufacture of a new product. Furthermore, Fokker had declared that
it did not intend to produce rotor blades in the future. Companies willing to start a
production line had still to be found.
3.4.2 The NOW 2 proposal
In 1981, a proposal for a follow-up NOW programme, the NOW 2 programme, was
formulated by BEOP. Again, the focus was on R&D. The proposed programme had
the following goals (BEOP, 1981c):
- supporting R&D into wind energy and turbines
- supporting companies that produced wind turbines
- advising governmental organisations to introduce wind energy into the Dutch
energy provision.
To be precise, ‘introduce wind energy’ meant the following: having, within three to
five years, reliable wind turbines that could be fitted into the Dutch energy provision
on a large scale, so that at least 15,000 small wind turbines (with a total capacity of
450 MW) and 1,000 large wind turbines in wind power stations (with a total capacity
of 2,000 MW) would be installed by the year 2000 (BEOP, 1981c).
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Research into the decentralised application of wind energy had a prominent place in
the proposal. The subjects to be considered with regard to decentralised application
were formulated together with organisations that had already been pleading for
decentralised application of wind energy. The subjects were (BEOP, 1981c):
- the design and building of safe and reliable small wind turbines, i.e. 10-100 kW.
As soon as the tipvanes were developed – probably within a few years - the small
wind turbines could be equipped with tipvanes.
- feasibility studies on small wind turbines, i.e. assessing which user categories
would be interested in small wind turbines
- studies into the removal of possible bottlenecks, e.g. formulating regulations
regarding safety and hindrance
- a number of experimental projects for specific applications
- the development of autonomous systems, i.e. the combination of a wind turbine
and a diesel generator. These systems had great potential in remote areas outside
the Netherlands and could provide good export opportunities for Dutch industry.
The last-mentioned subject illustrates that the introduction of wind energy in the
Netherlands had another important goal, besides the diversification of energy sources:
providing opportunities for the Dutch industry.
In 1981, the proposal regarding the NOW 2 programme on decentralised application
was approved by the minister of Economic Affairs. Total costs amounted to 20
million guilders (Curvers et al., 1983). Approval was subject to an important
condition: the minister of Economic Affairs wanted a large say in the granting of
subsidies. Every project had to be approved by the minister himself (Curvers et al.,
1983). This shows clearly the large top-down aspect of the development of wind
energy in the Netherlands. The Ministry of Economic Affairs was a very important
actor in the Dutch wind turbine innovation system. Developments were steered to a
large extent by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Everything was planned by the
Ministry, sometimes in detail.
It was expected that research into the centralised application of wind energy would be
more expensive than research into the decentralised application of wind energy. The
estimated costs were 50 million guilders for the period 1981-1987 and 200 million
guilders for the period 1987-1990 (BEOP, 1981c). With regard to the centralised
application of wind energy, the main subjects were (BEOP, 1981c):
- designing and building safe, reliable, cost-effective wind turbines
- fitting wind power stations into the system of conventional power stations, leading
to a substantial saving of fossil fuels
- ensuring that suitable locations for wind power stations would become available
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The subject ‘designing and building safe, reliable, cost-effective wind turbines’
included the following aspects. The HAT prototype project and the VAT prototype
project were to be continued (BEOP, 1981c). Regarding the HAT, the measurement
programme was to be started now the HAT had been built on the ECN terrain. After
that, a prototype HAT wind turbine was to be built with the optimum features for
application in wind power stations; it was to have a rotor size of 50 to 75 metres.
Preferably, this turbine was to be equipped with tipvanes. In the meantime, Dutch
companies had to be made aware of the advantages of building wind turbines. When
production lines were set up, wind turbines could be produced in series, decreasing
the cost per wind turbine. The aim was to set up production lines by 1987, which
would permit the production of one turbine a week. Regarding the VAT, a 25 metre
prototype was to be built. In this case too, companies would have to be found that
were willing to start a production line.
Furthermore, experience needed to be gained with a wind power station. Therefore,
the project ‘designing, building and testing a pilot wind power station’ was included
in the proposal (BEOP, 1981c). This pilot wind power station was to contain 10 to 20
wind turbines with a total capacity of 20 MW, i.e. 1 to 2 MW per wind turbine.
Preferably, the wind power station was to be sited near ECN, so that ECN could test
the power station and do measurements. This wind power station was to be in
operation in 1990.
According to BEOP, fitting wind turbines into the Dutch energy provision required
further research. The studies into the maximum capacity of wind turbines that could
be fitted into the Dutch energy system that were performed in the NOW programme
were inconclusive. Figures ranged from 650 MW to thousands of MW (BEOP,
1981c). BEOP proposed some new studies, based on the assumption that wind energy
would become an integral part of the Dutch energy system. This notion contradicted
the starting point of KEMA, who regarded wind energy as a strange, new part of the
energy system (Beurskens et al., 1983). Another important aspect of fitting wind
turbines into the Dutch energy system was energy storage. Therefore, the afore-
mentioned Plan Lievense and the Energo Project needed to be studied further. An
Energo pilot plant could be built at the end of the 1980s, followed perhaps by a
Markerwaard plant (BEOP, 1981c).
In addition, subsidies for fundamental research, amounting to five million guilders per
year, were proposed (BEOP, 1981c). Here, the main subject was the tipvane research.
First, tests were to be performed with real tipvanes in a wind tunnel. Next, a prototype
was to be built in Hoek van Holland, to prove that energy yields would also be
increased by tipvanes outside the wind tunnel. After that, product development was to
be started. A number of other subjects on fundamental research were included in the
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proposal, e.g. vibrations, aerodynamics, constructions, design criteria, regulation and
protection, wake effects, conversion systems, and legal aspects. BEOP would be
responsible for bundling the knowledge and for making it optimally applicable to
turbine manufac-turers and buyers (BEOP, 1981c).
3.4.3 Competition from other energy sources
It follows from the above that expectations regarding wind energy were still very
high. In spite of the problems with the VAT prototype, it was still expected that large
numbers of large turbines could be produced within a few years. Large R&D
subsidies were available. This was remarkable, since the situation of the oil market
had improved considerably. However, the Dutch government saw no reason for
reducing its efforts in the field of energy saving and diversification. This strategy
reduced the dependency on other countries for energy provision, and they benefited
the national economy by encouraging the development of technologies and expertise.
In the worsening economic climate of the early 1980s, this was a major advantage.
Furthermore, the oil prices were expected to rise again in the near future.
But the falling oil prices of the early 1980s did have a disadvantageous effect on wind
energy R&D. As mentioned in the previous section, the price of electricity from wind
turbines had to be able to compete with the price of electricity from fossil fuels; in
fact it had to be cheaper than electricity from fossil fuels because it could not serve as
a base load. Falling oil prices meant that electricity from wind turbines had to become
even cheaper. This put still more pressure on technology development and the
development of production lines.
Another competing energy source was nuclear energy. The fate of this energy source
was debated in the National Debate on Energy Policy that started in 1981. The main
goal of this debate was to inform the government about two topics (Steering
Committee of the National Debate on Energy, 1984):
- What were the various possibilities for a long-term and comprehensive energy
policy that took into account the complex and interrelated social, economic and
environmental problems?
- How much support in society would there be for these possibilities?
This information was to enable the government to outline its energy policy for the
coming decades and, particularly, to decide whether nuclear energy should be part of
this policy.
The final report of the debate was published in 1984. The report emphasised that
energy policy should continue to encourage the optimal use of energy, energy saving
and the development of several forms of renewable energy. With regard to fossil
Wind energy in the Netherlands
61
fuels, less oil and more coal should be used as long as environmental criteria were met
(Steering Committee of the National Debate on Energy, 1984). Growth in
decentralised power capacity was encouraged. However, no clear answer was
formulated on what to do about nuclear energy. The government asked the AER and
the Elektriciteitsraad for advice. For economic and environmental reasons, and in line
with the diversification policy, the government chose to proceed with the nuclear
power programme. On the subject of renewable energy, the debate concluded that a
strong government policy with regard to research, development and finance was
essential to ensure a faster introduction of renewable energy. Even if faster
introduction of renewables did not succeed in the short term, an intensive research,
development and demonstration programme was vital in view of the longterm aims
(Steering Committee of the National Debate on Energy, 1984).
3.4.4 Building wind turbines: the second VAT turbine prototype
The VAT and HAT prototype projects continued within the NOW 2 programme. As
pointed out in section 3.3.3, inconclusive test and measurement results of the 5 metre
VAT demonstrated the need for a larger prototype. Both Fokker and Rijn-Schelde-
Verolme made designs for VAT turbines with a rotor diameter of 15 metres and 25
metres. The 15 metre VAT design by Fokker was selected. In the design, considerable
attention was given to electricity yield, costs, life span, safety and maintenance. Costs
were reduced by using standard turbine parts that were readily available, e.g. the
transmission system, the conversion system, and the brake (Polymarin, a.n.).
The turbine was built by Polymarin by order of the Municipal Energy Company
Amsterdam. Here for the first time we see the involvement of an actor from the
energy sector in the large-scale wind turbine subsystem. Other parties involved in the
building of and measuring on the turbine were the research institutes ECN and NLR,
the Eindhoven University of Technology, Fokker and the Centre for Construction and
Mechanisation. Polymarin made the rotor blades. The major suppliers were Brown
Boveri (electrical installation and regulation) and Visno Machinefabriek (turbine
tower and rotor) (Gemeente Energiebedrijf Amsterdam, 1982).
The turbine design was based on that of the 5 metre VAT. It was equipped with two
mechanical brakes. The generator was a direct current generator of 100 kW. The
speed of the rotor axis was variable, which allowed the turbine to utilise a large range
of wind speeds, increasing the energy yield. The turbine could deliver electricity in
wind speeds between 5 and 20 metres per second. The optimum electricity yield was
produced at a wind speed of 17 metres per second. Like the 5 metre VAT, the 15
metre VAT was not equipped with technical novelties. It was sited near Amsterdam,
in the Gaasperplas (Gemeente Energiebedrijf Amsterdam, 1982).
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The measurement programme of the VAT focused on the mechanical behaviour of the
turbine, the influence of the turbine on its environment (the wake), the energetic
behaviour, and the interaction between the electricity net and the wind turbine. It was
conducted by BEOP and the Municipal Energy Company Amsterdam (Gemeente
Energiebedrijf Amsterdam, 1982).
The results of the project were inconclusive. It was claimed that the VAT turbine
could compete with the HAT turbine in terms of investment and operational costs, but
only if large investments were made in further R&D. The 5 metre VAT was shipped
to Indonesia. It did not function well there and soon broke down (Dragt, 2000). The
15 metre VAT functioned at Gaasperplas for a number of years (Dragt, 2000).
It was rather surprising that although Fokker had designed the 15 metre VAT, it did
not build the turbine. It was involved in measurements on the VAT, but its role was
very limited. Around 1985, Fokker decided to terminate its involvement in wind
energy. The bad experience with the 5 metre VAT, combined with problems in the
company required Fokker to give its full attention to its core business: building
aeroplanes (Deterinck et al., 1997). However, not all Fokker’s knowledge on wind
turbines was wasted. Fokker employees who had worked on wind turbines started
working elsewhere in the wind turbine innovation system, e.g. at ECN. Furthermore,
many scientific reports had been written about the VAT design, building and research
and were available to other actors in the innovation system.
3.4.5 The HAT turbine prototype
As stated in section 3.3.4, the HAT prototype on the ECN terrain came into operation
in June 1981. Then, the measurement programme started. One of the first goals was to
validate and adapt the mathematical models that had been used to design the wind
turbine. The major model in this case was Phatas, which was developed by ECN for
designing HAT turbines. In particular, the power curve, i.e. the relation between
power delivered by the turbine and wind speed, had to be validated. Other important
goals were to measure the forces on several parts of the blades and to measure the
acceleration of the blades (Dekker, 2000). Measurement results that were not
predicted beforehand were explained afterwards, theoretically. Shortly after the start
of the measurements, the turbine was struck by lightning. This caused a severe delay,
because all measuring instruments were damaged. The turbine was out of operation
for months (Dekker, 2000).
Another learning goal concerned the operation of the turbine. When the turbine was
being designed, all kinds of disastrous scenarios had been modelled (Dekker, 2000).
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The turbine had been designed to be over-robust: that it was very unlikely that major
things would go wrong. For instance, the models had taken into account the
possibility that one of the two blades might fall off. The turbine had been designed in
such a way, that the other blade would not fall off and that the turbine tower would
not fall down. Also the blades were designed in such a robust way, that the chance of
breaking was very small. Due to the robust construction, the turbine was very stiff.
This was a disadvantage, since small forces on the turbine were hard to measure. The
stiffness caused noise in the measurements (Dekker, 2000).
During the measurement programme, ECN, Fokker, Stork and NLR had meetings
every three months (Dekker, 2000). As mentioned in section 3.3.4, contacts were
good and a great deal of information was exchanged during the meetings. The actors
had different fields of expertise, all important for operating and measuring on a wind
turbine. They thought in the same academic way and shared the same frame of
meaning regarding wind turbines: many large cost-effective wind turbines were
needed. The fact that the actors had the same frame of meaning and realised that the
combination of their knowledge was needed for the HAT prototype project made
them willing to exchange information (Dekker, 2000).
As stated in section 3.3.4, the turbine could be regulated in several ways. Both major
regulation types - pitch and stall regulation - could be used on this turbine. Shortly
after the start of the measurements, fundamental problems were detected in the pitch
regulation. It turned out that changes in wind speed could occur very locally and
within very small time intervals. This was a very important learning moment. Let us
first look at the consequences of local changes in wind speed. This meant that
sometimes the anemometers that were placed several metres away from the turbine
could not detect wind speed changes near the turbine. Because these anemometers
delivered the information to the pitch regulation system, the system did not always
react adequately to wind speed changes near the turbine. This was a problem. In the
first place, a non-optimal blade position meant a non-optimal energy yield. Secondly,
a non-optimal blade position could lead to large forces and strains in the blades. Now,
let us consider the time interval between wind speed changes. When these intervals
were short, the pitch regulation system reacted too slowly to wind speed changes. This
could also cause non-optimal energy yields and large forces and strains on the blades.
The solution would be to use predicting regulations, i.e. regulations that react to wind
speed changes before they occur11.
                                                          
11 These are very difficult to design. Only at the end of the 1990s were the first attempts made to
implement these kinds of regulations in wind turbines.
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The first measurement programme took four years, continuing until about 1985. In
between the measurements, the HAT prototype turbine was used for electricity
production. Table 3.1 shows the energy output of the turbine over these years.
Table 3.1: The energy output of the HAT prototype in the period 1981-1985 (source: IEA,
1987).
Year Hours in operation Energy output (kWh)
1981   378     5.927
1982 2246   64.726
1983 3981 272.363
1984 2574 185.165
1985 3762 230.254
3.4.6 The tipvane research
In the NOW 1 programme period, it had been proved mathematically that it was
physically possible to increase the air flow through a wind turbine rotor with the help
of tipvanes and thus increase the energy yield of the wind turbine. In the NOW 2
programme period, it had to be proved that tipvanes could indeed increase the energy
yield. First, measurements were done with a tipvane scale model in a wind tunnel. The
air flows around the tipvane were visualised with the help of smoke. Whirls did
indeed appear, increasing the air flow through the tipvanes, as had been predicted with
the help of mathematical models (Van Holten, 1982). The next aspect to be measured
was the drag caused by the tipvanes. The higher the drag, the lower the increase in
energy yield. However, it proved impossible to obtain good drag measurement results
in the wind tunnel (Van Bussel et al., 1983). One of the reasons was the small size of
the scale model. Because it was so small, drag and lift were not the same as with a
real scale tipvane would have. Therefore, start real-scale tests were started on a wind
turbine in the open air. The wind turbine had the rotor blades of a 20-year-old Kolibri
helicopter. The flexible attachment of the blades to the rotor axis was copied from the
Kolibri helicopter. The dents in the old blades and the unusual blade attachment
caused measurement problems at first (Van Holten, 2000). But after some
adjustments, whirls around the tipvanes, visualised with the help of woollen threads or
smoke, appeared in the experiments, exactly as predicted. Furthermore, there were no
disturbing vibrations. However, the whirls only appeared in a very small blade speed
range. This meant that an increase in energy yield would occur only in a very small
range of wind speeds. This was not as expected. According to the Delft University of
Technology researchers, the problem was probably caused by the characteristics of
the Kolibri helicopter blades. First, they were old and dented and second, some
features differed from those of normal wind turbine blades. The researchers predicted
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that measurement results would improve considerably if the Kolibri blades were
replaced by a modern polyester rotor (Van Bussel et al., 1983). This recommendation
was reported very convincingly to the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Because the
Ministry was still very interested in possibilities to increase the price-performance
ratio of wind turbines, they granted another 5.7 million guilder subsidy for the tipvane
research in 1983 (Andriesse, 2000).
However, the measurements with the new rotor were not successful either. A great
deal of extra drag developed, reducing the gains in energy production. After much
testing, no solution was found for this problem (Van Holten, 2000). Meanwhile, the
Ministry of Education wanted to speed up the research process. Extra money was
invested, and the NLR research institutes also became involved in the research.
However, measuring results did not improve (Van Holten, 2000). Ultimately, in 1985
the tipvane research was stopped. The Delft University of Technology remained
involved in wind energy research, formulating new research projects based on the
tipvane experiments. These will be described in section 3.5.8.
3.4.7 The Newecs-25 HAT turbines
As mentioned before, an important aim of the NOW 2 project was to interest
companies in the installation of a production line. In 1982, Stork expressed the
intention of starting to build commercial HAT wind turbines. In 1983, the designs
began (Johnson and Jacobsson, 1999). While designing and building the HAT-25
prototype, Stork had gathered a lot of knowledge about HAT wind turbines. As a
result of the bad economic circumstances in the early 1980s, it was attractive for Stork
to become engaged in the production of commercial wind turbines, as a way of
product differentiation (Verbruggen, 2000).
The starting point was to build turbines for wind power stations. A logical first step
was to produce a commercial version of the HAT-25 prototype. This prototype was
designed to be far too expensive and over-robust so that measurements could be
performed. Therefore, for the commercial HAT-25 a new design was made, based on
the HAT-25 prototype. The knowledge obtained while designing and building the
HAT-25 prototype was used, but the commercial HAT-25 was a completely different
wind turbine. The HAT-25 prototype had a direct current generator, a hydraulic pitch
regulation system and carbon fibre blades. The commercial HAT-25, soon called
Newecs-25, was designed to be the first turbine of a series. Therefore, a different
design philosophy were used. Above all, the turbine had to be cheaper (FDO
Technische Adviseurs, 1982). The design incorporated a synchronous generator,
which was currently available and therefore much cheaper. The same pitch regulation
system as in the HAT-25 prototype was used. The blade material was polyester, which
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was far cheaper than carbon fiber. The overall design was much slimmer and less
robust, which saved material (FDO Technische Adviseurs, 1982). Stork received a
subsidy from the Ministry of Economic Affairs for the development of the Newecs-
25. A precondition was that only Dutch contractors and suppliers were used
(Verbruggen, 2000).
Three Newecs-25 turbines were produced. The anticipated buyers were electricity
companies, since the turbine was designed to be placed in large wind power stations.
However, electricity companies did not have a say in the design of the wind turbine.
Although, as previously mentioned, the electricity companies did not have a very
positive attitude towards wind energy, three energy companies were interested in
buying a Newecs-25 turbine. Because the design was so different from that of the
HAT-25 prototype, the Newecs-25 was in fact a prototype as well. However, Stork
presented it as the first of a series of commercial turbines, based upon the HAT-25
prototype, instead of as a prototype (Verbruggen, 2000). With hindsight, this was not
in Stork’s favour. Turbine owners that own a prototype and know that it is a prototype
will react more leniently to any problems that occur.
The first electricity company that was interested was PZEM in the Province of
Zeeland. The turbine was financed by PZEM, Stork and the Ministry of Economic
Affairs. Stork invested about 1.5 million guilders (Verbruggen, 2000). PZEM also
bought another wind turbine, produced by a small Dutch wind turbine company,
Polenko, which will be described in part B of this chapter. PZEM wanted to compare
the two turbines in order to decide which type to order in the future.
The PZEM turbine was put into operation in 1983. In that same year, the rotor got out
of control, causing a breakdown of both blades. A number of causes were identified
(Verbruggen, 2000): something went wrong with the pitch regulation system during a
strong wind gust and, in addition, the mechanical break was a little too late. This
caused the rotor to start rotating faster and faster. To save money, the brakes were
made of a material that would wear out completely if the brakes were used during fast
rotor speeds. Therefore, the brakes wore out completely and the rotor continued
rotating still faster, until the moment when the blades broke. This was the first
indication to the large-scale wind turbine subsystem that building reliable wind
turbines might not be as simple as had been expected.
This accident was very bad for the electricity sector’s opinion of wind energy.
PZEM’s order for the Polenko wind turbine was cancelled and their Newecs-25 was
rebuilt. The mechanical brake was replaced by an electric one. Furthermore, Stork
decided that the pitch regulation system was fundamentally flawed. The blade
regulation speed was two degrees per second, which was too slow (cf. that of the HAT
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prototype, which was five degrees per second). Furthermore, the time interval
between a wind speed change and the response was too long. These problems were
not solved (Verbruggen, 2000). The turbine was in operation again on August 1st 1984
(IEA, 1985).
After that, two more Newecs-25 turbines were built. Stork contacted a number of
electricity companies and tried to sell them the turbines. Stork was particularly
interested in the North Holland electricity company, because the company delivered
electricity in a very large area with high wind speeds. But the electricity company was
not interested in buying a wind turbine. However, the electricity company of
Schiedam, in South Holland, was interested. The third Newecs-25 turbine was sold to
the Kodela electricity company in Curaçao. The Schiedam and Curaçao turbines were
equipped with electric brakes, because of the problems with the PZEM turbine. The
pitch regulation system remained unchanged (Verbruggen, 2000). The Schiedam
turbine was put into operation on June 11th 1985, the Curaçao turbine on September
19th 1985 (IEA, 1987).
In Curaçao, the wind speed is always about 7 metres per second, the wind always
coming from the same direction. This meant that the pitch regulation system did not
need to be used as frequently as in the Netherlands. Therefore, no problems occurred
with the pitch regulation system of the Curaçao Newecs-25. In Schiedam, the turbine
was placed near an industrial area near a busy harbour. Passing ships frequently
caused the wind to fall away often, making considerable demands on the pitch
regulation system. Very often problems occurred, causing the turbine to be out of
operation for a few hours or days (Verbruggen, 2000; IEA, 1989). The turbine
operation remained within the limits of its safety system, which meant that no
accidents occurred (Verbruggen, 2000).
Because the Schiedam turbine was out of operation so often, its availability (i.e. the
percentage of the time in which electricity was produced while the wind speed was
suitable) was never more than 60% a year. In Curaçao the turbine's availability was
generally 90% and in Zeeland the availability was sometimes even 95%. The reason
for this was, that the wind turbine there was watched very closely and if problems
arose the turbine was repaired immediately (Verbruggen, 2000). Stork did all the
servicing and most of the repair work itself. Because Stork had designed and built the
turbines, only Stork knew the details of their construction. This was very
advantageous for Stork, because they learned a great deal from the problems that
occurred in the turbines (Verbruggen, 2000).
The Newecs-25 turbines were purely production turbines. No measurement projects
were carried out (Dekker, 2000). With hindsight, it would have been better to test the
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turbines systematically and carry out brake tests before they were sold. This would
have prevented the breakdown of the PZEM turbine (Verbruggen, 2000).
3.4.8 The pilot wind power station
The next logical step for Stork was to build a series of Newecs-25 turbines that could
be placed in a wind power station. In spite of the problems with the first 3 Newecs-25
turbines, Stork was still very optimistic about the building of wind turbines. Such a
wind power station also fitted into the NOW 2 programme strategy. As stated above,
the NOW 2 proposal stressed that experience was needed with a pilot wind power
station. There was a need for a pilot wind power station needed to be built, containing
10 to 20 wind turbines with a total capacity of 20 MW, i.e. 1 to 2 MW per wind
turbine (BEOP, 1981c). In 1982, the government published the report ‘Wind energy
and storage’. In this report, the government agreed to the construction of a pilot wind
power station consisting of 15 wind turbines of 300 kW. The estimated costs were 70
million Dutch guilders (Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1982).
This was the first wind energy project in which the SEP was actively involved. SEP
agreed to pay half of the estimated costs. The management of the wind power station,
which was first assigned to the Ministry of Economic Affairs, was transferred to the
SEP (Hutting, 2000). The government was of the opinion that SEP, which had
experience of operating power stations, would be able to operate the wind power
station more efficiently than the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Furthermore, the
intention was that electricity production companies would manage all large wind
power stations in the future (Hutting, 2000). Therefore, it would be beneficial if
operating experience were gained in the electricity sector. The assigning of the
management of the pilot wind power station to SEP created bad feeling among the
other actors within the large-scale wind turbine subsystem (Westra, 1998). SEP and
the electricity production companies had always been very sceptical about wind
energy. In fact, they were the main supporters of nuclear energy. Furthermore, the
autonomous position of the Dutch electricity sector’s institutions sometimes strained
the relations between the sector and other research institutions and between the sector
and the wind turbine industry (Westra, 1998).
Interestingly, the turbine capacity to which the government agreed was much lower
than that suggested in the NOW 2 proposal. A major reason was probably that smaller
wind turbines were much cheaper. Furthermore, turbines of 300 kW were considered
as being state-of-the art in 1982, since the HAT-25 also had a 300 kW capacity. The
government must have realised that it might not be possible to develop a turbine of 1
to 2 MW within a few years, and therefore it opted for the state-of-the-art technology.
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At the end of 1982, preparations for the wind power station began. An extended
location research, in which eight locations were considered extensively, led to the
choice of Sexbierum in the Province of Friesland (Mijnlieff, 1984). Here, plenty of
space was available and wind speeds were relatively high. Furthermore, in Sexbierum
a legal re-division and re-allotment of land was taking place. The wind power station
could easily be fitted into this re-division (Hutting, 2000). The surface of the wind
power station was 50 hectares, which made it possible to erect 24 wind turbines of
300 kW with a rotor diameter of 30 metres. It was decided to erect the maximum
number of 24 wind turbines on the land plot. This would maximise the total capacity.
Furthermore, research on wake effects and other wind park effects could be performed
better if more wind turbines were present in the wind power plant (Toussaint, 1985).
The total capacity would therefore be 7.2 MW, which was very low in the view of the
electricity companies, who were used to power stations of hundreds of MW.
The Sexbierum wind power plant was in the first place regarded as a test facility
(Mijnlieff, 1984). Tests and research were to be performed on the interactions
between the wind turbines in a power plant and between the wind turbines and the
electricity grid. Research was also to be conducted into the optimisation of the park
regulation, mechanical loads on the turbines as a result of wake effects, the total
energy yield, and non-technical factors like the effect of the power plant on birds, the
effect on the landscape and the public acceptance of the wind power plant (Mijnlieff,
1984; Toussaint, 1985). The research programme was determined by the two
Advisory Committees that had been established as soon as the Sexbierum project
started. These Advisory Committees were the Advisory Committee on Social and
Environmental Aspects and the Technical Advisory Committee (Toussaint, 1985).
The members of these committees were wind energy experts (Toussaint, 2000).
The wind power plant project was managed by the Policy Committee, which consisted
of three members from the Ministry of Economic Affairs and three members from the
SEP. Final decisions on the allocation of money were taken by the board of the SEP
(Toussaint, 2000). The daily management and the project organisation were in the
hands of KEMA. Both KEMA and the Policy Committee were advised by the afore-
mentioned Advisory Committees (Toussaint, 2000).
The Policy Committee determined the wind turbine specifications on the basis the
advice of the Technical Advisory Committee. As mentioned above, the capacity per
turbine was to be 300 kW. This capacity was considered to be state-of-the-art; a larger
capacity was considered too risky, a smaller capacity would not be representative for
the wind power plants of the future (Toussaint, 2000). The Policy Committee also
chose state-of-the-art techniques with regard to other aspects. The regulation system
chosen was full span pitch regulation, the same as the regulation in the HAT-25 and
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the Newecs-25. The idea was that the wind power stations of the future would also
have pitch regulations. So it would be useful to start practising with this regulation
system in the pilot wind power station (Hutting, 2000). The rotor speed chosen was
variable. Theoretically, this would result in larger energy yields than a constant rotor
speed. Furthermore, with the help of a variable rotor speed, energy could be stored in
the rotor, which decreased the power changes in the electricity delivered to the
electricity grid. The goal was to make the features of this electricity as constant as
possible. To cut down on power changes, it was decided that the coupling between the
turbine and the electricity net was to be soft. The number of blades and the blade
material could be chosen by the manufacturer (Toussaint, 2000; Toussaint, 1985;
Bornebroek, 1983).
After the specifications had been decided upon, a campaign was started to attract
manufacturers to contribute to the manufacture of the turbines and the park
(Toussaint, 2000). As always, the Ministry of Economic Affairs required the
contributing manufacturers to be Dutch. Since this was a pilot project and not a
commercial project, they were entitled to make this demand. SEP wanted to include
foreign manufacturers, but gave in to the Ministry’s demands (Toussaint, 2000).
Furthermore, the manufacturers had to have a solid economic background, since they
needed to be able to give financial guarantees. In fact, this meant that the
manufacturer had to be able to obtain a bank guarantee for the total costs of the
project: about 50 million guilders (Hutting, 2000).
Because of these requirements, many small turbine manufacturers, which will be
referred to in part B of this chapter, were considered unsuitable to participate in the
Sexbierum project. Two manufacturers remained: Stork and Holec (Hutting, 2000).
Stork had experience of building wind turbines and considered itself to be a good
candidate for the project. Building turbines for the Sexbierum wind power plant
would be the perfect next step in Stork’s plan to become a wind turbine manufacturer.
Holec did not have any experience of building wind turbines, only of building
electrical systems for wind turbines and other large machines. But Holec had started
to diversify its production and had just taken over a small wind turbine manufacturing
company, Van der Pol.
Both manufacturers were invited to submit a tender for the project. Both tenders were
expensive. The normal cost of wind turbines at the time was 3,000 guilders per kW;
the aim was to reduce this in time to 2,000 guilders per kW. However, Holec quoted
10,000 guilders per kW, and Stork 12,500 guilders per kW (Hutting, 2000).
Therefore, SEP decided to erect only 18 turbines in the wind power station, instead of
the planned 24.
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The Policy Committee decided that it would also be possible to build two wind
turbine models in the Sexbierum wind power station, i.e. a Holec turbine and a Stork
turbine (Hutting, 2000). But these turbines had to comply with the specifications that
had been formulated by the Policy Committee. But when in 1984 discussions began
on the wind turbine specification, problems began as well (Hutting, 2000; Toussaint,
2000). Stork wanted to manufacture its Newecs-25 turbine, because it was a good
turbine. The rotor width of the Newecs-25 was 26.5 metres, whereas the Policy
Committee wanted a rotor width of 30 metres. Furthermore, the Policy Committee
wanted to do load tests first, to determine whether the wind turbines should perhaps
be heavier. Thirdly, the Committee wanted park electricity regulation, in order to
optimise electricity yields for the whole park and minimise electricity fluctuations.
The Newecs-25 had an electricity regulation facility in the wind turbine. Stork did not
want to change its opinion and neither did the Policy Committee (Toussaint, 2000;
Hutting, 2000).
An impeding factor was the lack of trust between Stork and the electricity sector.
Stork considered itself to be a wind turbine expert and felt that it were not being
treated as such by SEP (Verbruggen, 2000). SEP had decided that, because of the bad
experience with the life span and reliability of wind turbines in the Netherlands and
abroad, a method of ‘restrained designing’ had to be used, a quality control method
for the design phase of the wind turbines (Toussaint, 1985). This meant that the
manufacturer had to table proposals regarding design aspects to SEP, and SEP and its
advisers had to approve these proposals. This was arranged very formally. Many SEP
experts were present at each meeting and agreements made in writing with signatures
(Toussaint, 1985; Verbruggen, 2000).
Furthermore, Stork considered the demands concerning the turbine specifications too
high. For example, the required blade pitch rate was ten degrees per second, whereas
even for the HAT-25 a blade pitch rate of five degrees per second was considered to
be fast enough (Verbruggen, 2000). Furthermore, the requirements concerning the
flexibility of the control software needed to be higher than Stork believed necessary.
KEMA wanted glass fibre connections, which the Newecs-25 did not have. These
requirements would have meant re-designing the Newecs-25 completely. Stork was
unwilling to produce a new design for the amount of money available for the
Sexbierum project (Verbruggen, 2000).
During one of the meetings, the Stork representatives received a phone call from
Zeeland, mentioning that the blades of Newecs-25 in Zeeland had been completely
destroyed. This accident, and Stork’s continuing refusal to change the turbine
specifications, did not improve the atmosphere (Toussaint, 2000).
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SEP, on the other hand, had its doubts about wind energy and wanted to minimise its
risks by keeping everything under control as far as possible. SEP treated the wind
power station like any other power station; the above described quality control
procedures were considered to be normal. They focused on the entire wind power
station and its optimisation and not on the individual wind turbine (Hutting, 2000).
The lack of trust, together with the Newecs-25 incident, made the Policy Commission
veer towards choosing only the Holec design. Holec wanted to comply with the
specifications and Van der Pol had already built a 300 kW prototype. Holec would be
able to give financial guarantees, and Van der Pol had experience in building 300 kW
wind turbines. Furthermore, SEP already had built up experience of dealing with
Holec, since Holec was a supplier of electrical gear for other types of power stations
(Hutting, 2000). Although the Ministry of Economic Affairs urged that Stork should
be asked to manufacture at least a few of the wind turbines for the power station
(Hutting, 2000), it was finally decided that Holec was to manufacture all the turbines.
The manufacturing of the turbines and the operation of the wind power station will be
described in section 3.5.6.
3.4.9 The Newecs-45 HAT turbine
When the Sexbierum tender was not awarded to Stork, Stork began in 1983 to develop
of a larger turbine, the Newecs-45. This turbine had a capacity of 1 MW. The ultimate
goal was to build a turbine with the most cost-effective features, a 3 MW turbine. The
step from 300 KW (Newecs-25) to 3 MW was considered to be too large. Therefore,
as an in-between step, the 1 MW Newecs-45 turbine was designed (Van Holten,
2000). The wisdom of making an in-between step was to be proved later in Germany:
in 1985 the German Growian turbine, with a capacity of 3 MW, broke down as a
result of design faults. It had worked for only 1.5 months. Project costs amounted to
about 90 million DM (IEA, 1986).
The intention was that the Newecs-45, like the Newecs-25, would be situated in wind
power stations and owned by electricity companies. For the development of the
Newecs-45, a special subsidiary company was established within Stork: Stork-FDO-
WES (WES means Wind Energy Systems) (Stork, 1984; Verbruggen, 2000). PEN, the
electricity company of North Holland was interested in buying the wind turbine. PEN
was requested to co-operate in the development of the Newecs-45 by ECN (Hensing
and Overbeek, 1985). Total development costs, about 14 million guilders, were paid
by the European Union, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Ministry of Housing,
Spatial Planning and the Environment, PEN and Stork (Verbruggen, 2000; Hensing
and Overbeek, 1985). Stork was the main contractor for the project, and the turbine
blades were built by Polymarin.
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The main design goals of the Newecs-45 were (Hensing and Overbeek, 1985):
- high reliability
- hinder to be as little as the environment as possible
- high quality of the electricity produced
- manufacturing and building costs to be as low as possible
- electricity production to be as high as possible
The Newecs-45 was an upscaling of the Newecs-25. Like the Newecs-25, it had a
pitch control system. A stall control system would have been far cheaper, but the
design team did not trust stall control. The distrust was taken over from the aeroplane
industry. When designing aeroplanes, stall must be avoided at all costs (Dekker,
2000). The speed of the pitch control system was six degrees per second (as opposed
to two degrees per second in the Newecs-25). The brakes of the Newecs-45 were also
different. Whereas the first Newecs-25 had an aerodynamic brake (the pitch
regulation system) and a full size mechanical brake, the Newecs-45 had an
aerodynamic brake and a parking brake (Stork-FDO-WES, a.n.). This parking brake
could only be used to ‘lock’ the rotor if it had stopped rotating. The full size
mechanical brake was omitted, because Stork was of the opinion that there was only a
very small chance that the aerodynamic brake would fail. However, to be on the safe
side, an emergency brake was added. Little parachutes were built into the blade tips
(Stork-FDO-WES, a.n.). If the rotor speed became too high, the parachutes would
emerge from the blade tips and cause so much drag that the rotor would slow down.
This system was very labour-intensive, since when the parachutes had come out of the
blade tips, somebody had to go to the turbine to put them back again (Verbruggen,
2000).
Other features of the Newecs-45: the rotor diameter was 45 metres, the tower hight
was 60 metres (Stork-FDO-WES, a.n.). The tower was relatively flexible. The turbine
had two rotor blades, made of glass fibre reinforced polyester. This material was
chosen because, due to its high moment of inertia, it would enable the rotor to store
large amounts of energy at small rotor speed variations. To enlarge this effect, extra
material was added to the blade tips (Hensing and Overbeek, 1985).
The blades could have been made of a metal such as steel. However, the use of metals
was forbidden because metals could affect electro-magnetic radiation (radio and tv)
(Hensing and Overbeek, 1985). This was the first time that Stork had used glass fibre
reinforced polyester for wind turbine blades. Therefore, they needed to obtain
knowledge about this material beforehand. TNO performed an extensive test
programme, in which a.o. fatigue and bending of the blades were measured (Hensing
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and Overbeek, 1985). The cog wheel system was also new, and was tested by the
Technical University of Eindhoven.
The Newecs-45 project started in 1983. The specifications for the turbine were
formulated in January of that year. Designing, building and testing took 2.5 years. The
Newecs-45 came into operation on December 11th 1985 (Stork, 1986; IEA, 1986). It
was erected near Medemblik in North Holland. The predicted life span of the turbine
was 25 years. Unlike the Newecs-25 turbines, Stork considered the Newecs-45 to be a
prototype (Verbruggen, 2000).
A measurement programme was to be performed on the Newecs-45. The programme
was subsidised by the European Union. The European Union also provided a subsidy
for setting up a production line for Newecs-45 turbines (Dragt, 2000). The operation
of the Newecs-45 and the measurement programme will be described in section 3.5.4.
3.4.10 The Grohat
In 1983, technology development in the large-scale wind turbine innovation
subsystem was really speeded up. The designing of the Newecs-25 and the Newecs-45
began, the Sexbierum wind power station project got off the ground, and the tipvane
research was stimulated by another financial injection. In addition, the pre-designing
of a Megawatt wind turbine started (Stork, 1984). As stated above, a 3 MW turbine,
which was regarded as the most cost-effective turbine, was the ultimate goal of the
Dutch Wind Energy Development Programmes. The HAT-25, the Newecs-25 and the
Newecs-45 had all been in-between steps on the way to a 3 MW turbine. Besides
being cost-effective, wind turbines of this size would make a significant contribution
of wind energy to the Dutch energy supply, without covering the whole land surface
(Van Holten, 2000). Furthermore, the plan Lievense described above included
turbines with a capacity of 3 MW.
In February 1983, a industrial consortium consisting of Stork, Fokker and Holec, who
were also co-operating in the HAT-25 project, began to develop a business plan for
the Megawatt turbine. This business plan consisted of a pre-design and research into
the marketing possibilities and the aspects of serial production, sales organisation and
the investments required for industrial activities (Hensing and Overbeek, 1985). As in
the case of the HAT-25 and the Newecs turbines, the starting point was to build a
reliable wind turbine, based on a thorough pre-design and design with the help of
computer calculations and models, resulting in. According to Stork ‘small
manufacturers replace this expensive form of analysis by empirical learning, but this
leads to a far less reliable first series of turbines’ (Hensing and Overbeek, 1985, p.
256).
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The 3 MW turbine, called Grohat, was to be a fundamentally new design; a step
forward that would be large enough to compete with manufacturers from abroad
(Kuijs, 1983). In the pre-design study, five development options were considered,
ranging from a turbine built with state-of-the-art techniques, including a.o. stiff rotor
blades, standard blade profiles, a relatively stiff transmission, pitch control and a
constant or variable rotor speed, to a turbine built with the most advanced techniques,
including a.o. soft rotor blades and transmission, modern blade profiles, passive blade
tip regulation and a variable, high rotor speed. The state-of-the-art turbine would be
far more expensive than the advanced one, but the risks would be far smaller. It was
estimated that an advanced Grohat turbine would cost 4.8 million guilders, whereas,
according to the Grohat consortium, a state-of-the-art serial-produced 3 MW turbine
would cost 6.4 million guilders (Kuijs, 1983). According to a study by the Ministry of
Economic Affairs, an advanced Grohat turbine would produce electricity at 8-9 cents
per kWh (Scholtens, 1984). In spite of the greater risks, the pressure on turbine costs,
resulting from competition from abroad and the decreasing costs of fossil fuels, made
the latter option very attractive. It was decided to investigate the new knowledge that
was needed for designing and building the advanced turbine and to develop this
knowledge in advance in a research programme. Then, these advanced techniques
would have to be tested in a 3 MW prototype that was equipped with state-of-the-art
back-up systems (Kuijs, 1983).
Both the manufacturers Stork, Fokker and Holec, and the potential turbine buyers, the
electricity companies, were involved in the pre-design. The research institute of the
electricity companies, KEMA, was in the review commission for the project (Van
Holten, 2000). The Ministry of Economic Affairs was also involved. In the NOW 2
programme, money had been reserved for the Grohat project. The Ministry of
Economic Affairs was so enthusiastic about the project that it made extra subsidies
available (Van Holten, 2000). In 1984, the technical specifications for the Grohat
turbine were drawn up. The total design and building costs were estimated to be 40-50
million guilders. It was estimated that the setting up of a production line for serial
production would cost another 50-100 million guilders (Scholtens, 1984).
In 1985, the Industrial Council for Energy and Environmental Technologies declared
the Grohat turbine to be viable and the project was approved. The Grohat prototype
was to be erected in the Sexbierum wind power station (IEA, 1986). Later that year,
following the problems with the Newecs-25 in Zeeland and with the Growian in
Germany, it was decided that the risks of building a 3 MW prototype with an
advanced design were too high. Therefore, the decision was made to start by
designing a 30-metre scale model for the Grohat rotor. The advanced concepts of the
rotor - flexible blades, blade tip regulation, soft conversion system - could be
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thoroughly tested on this scale model. The scale model rotor was to be tested by Stork
and ECN on the HAT-25 on the ECN terrain (IEA, 1986). These tests will be
described in section 3.5.7.
3.4.11 The large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem in 1981-1985
In the period 1981-1985, the dominant actors in the large-scale wind turbine
innovation subsystem were the same as in the previous period. The Ministry of
Economic Affairs played an important role. The contents of the NOW 2 were
determined by the Ministry and all subsidies had to be approved of by the Minister. In
this way, the Ministry had a large influence on developments.
As in the previous period, the Dutch energy research institutes ECN and TNO were
still involved. The Technical Universities of Eindhoven and Delft also played a role.
There were regular and good contacts between the research institutes, the large wind
turbine manufacturers and the Ministry of Economic Affairs contacts. Delft
University of Technology worked in a rather isolated way on the tipvane concept. The
Ministry of Economic Affairs was very much involved in this research and around
1984, at the insistance of the Ministry, NLR also became involved in this research.
The large manufacturers present in this subsystem were Stork, Holec and Fokker. The
production of commercial wind turbines began in this period. In 1985 Fokker decided
to stop building wind turbines and wind turbine blades. Its bad experience with the 5
metre VAT, combined with problems in the company, required Fokker to give its full
attention to its core business: building aeroplanes (Deterinck et al., 1997). Therefore,
Fokker's presence in the subsystem came to an end.
The main new actors in the subsystem in this period were the turbine buyers. Four
electricity companies and SEP became involved in wind energy, the electricity
companies in the role of owner of a wind turbine, SEP in the role of project manager
of the Sexbierum pilot wind power plant. Contacts between the turbine buyers and the
turbine manufacturers were not as good as contacts between the turbine manufacturers
and the research institutes. Although the buyers and the manufacturers shared the
same frame of meaning with regard to the technology, i.e. large wind turbines in large
wind power plants, the electricity companies and the SEP were not convinced that
more than 650 MW of wind turbine capacity could be fitted into the energy provision
system. Furthermore, they regarded wind power plants just like any other power plant.
The problems during the negotiations between Stork and SEP and SEP's refusal to
buy at least a few Newecs-25 turbines further strained contacts between SEP on the
one hand and the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Stork and ECN on the other hand.
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Intermediary organisations were still involved as well. In May 1984, they were
reorganised. The intermediary organisation BEOP, situated on the ECN terrain, and
PBE, situated on the TNO terrain, were merged in an attempt to streamline energy
research management. The new organisation was called PEO, Project Bureau Energy
Research (Small, 1996). NEOM was to become more market oriented in order to
attract more interest from the Dutch business community. Figure 3.2 depicts the large-
scale wind turbine innovation subsystem in this period.
Figure 3.2: The large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem in the period 1981-1985.
3.4.12 Conclusion
What can be said about the learning processes in this period? First of all, the emphasis
was still on learning by searching. Knowledge was obtained in literature researches
like the Plan Lievense and Energo projects and in the theoretical research, testing and
measurement programmes of the VAT-15 and the HAT-25. Furthermore, theoretical
knowledge was gained in the tipvane research project and in the pre-design and design
phases of the Newecs turbines and the Grohat.
Far more learning by doing took place occurred than in the previous period: during
the production of the VAT-15 and the four Newecs turbines and during the operation
of the prototype and commercial turbines. Stork also gained a great deal of knowledge
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about the Newecs turbines because Stork employees did the repair and servicing
themselves. The electricity companies of Zeeland, Schiedam and Curacao learned by
using the Newecs-25 turbines.
Learning by interacting between manufacturers and research organisations was still
very important. Learning by interacting also took place with foreign large turbine
manufacturers and research organisations during international wind energy
conferences. During the official sessions of these conferences, much knowledge was
transferred during presentations and discussions. Possibly even more information was
exchanged in between the sessions. Most of the manufacturers and research institutes
present at these conferences had the same frame of meaning with regard to wind
turbines as the Dutch large-scale innovation subsystem. They also made designs based
on mathematical models and theoretical knowledge.
Learning by interacting also took place between turbine producers and users. Because
of lack of trust and different frames of meaning, contacts between turbine producers
and users were generally strained. The Zeeland electricity company had a relatively
positive opinion of wind energy; because they watched their turbine closely and
quickly passed on problems to the manufacturer, their turbine yielded more energy. In
the Sexbierum project too learning by interacting took place; participants particularly
learned about each others frames of meaning. Stork learned that their wind turbine
was not the best one for wind power stations, at least in the view of the electricity
sector. The SEP team learned a great deal about several aspects of wind turbines
through KEMA's research for the Sexbierum project and by interacting with the
Advisory Committees.
3.5 1986 - 1991
3.5.1 Competition from other energy sources
After the Chernobyl accident in 1986, it became politically impossible for the Dutch
government to continue with its nuclear programme. Therefore, it was put on hold.
After 1986, no new nuclear power stations were built in the Netherlands12. Since
diversification was still on the political agenda, and acid rain had become a new
matter of concern, the development of renewable energy sources continued to be
important. In 1986, oil prices were reduced steeply and remained low in the late
1980s. The Dutch government decided that energy policy and research must not be
influenced by short-tem reductions in energy prices. Lower energy prices should not
                                                          
12 Actually, the only two nuclear power stations in the Netherlands were built in the 1960s.
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discourage the commercialisation and introduction of new technologies, nor should
long-term research be neglected. Therefore, the R&D programmes on renewable
energy technologies were continued. An important change came about, however:
short- and medium-term R&D was to become more market oriented.
3.5.2 The IPW programme
The new stimulation programme for wind energy was called IPW: the Integral
Programme on Wind Energy. Not only R&D, but also market introduction were major
items in this programme13. Since oil prices were low, energy policy goals were of less
importance in the IPW programme than industrial policy goals (Van der Wart, 2000).
Therefore, a pre-requisite for obtaining a research subsidy was that research results
should be applicable to manufacturers.
A sum of 130 million guilders was set aside for funding the IPW programme for the
period 1986-1990. The IPW programme managers expected that no more funding
would be needed after 1990 (NEOM, 1986). By then, total wind turbine capacity in
the Netherlands would have grown to 100-150 MW and by then cost-effective wind
turbines would be commercially available. Achieving this total capacity by 1991 was
important because the goal was to have 1,000 MW of total wind turbine capacity by
the year 2000 (NEOM, 1986). This was only 50%  of the goal of 2,000 MW by the
year 2000, set out in the 1979 Second White Paper on Energy (Dutch Ministry of
Economic Affairs, 1979).
In 1987, another investigation was conducted into the future role of renewable energy
sources in the Dutch energy provision. The government had asked for this research in
a document called the ‘Government standpoint concerning the final report of the
National Debate on Energy Policy’. The report ‘Renewable Energy, an exploration of
the future’, investigating the techno-economic potential of renewable energy sources
for the period 2030-2050, was published in August 1987. According to this report, the
contribution of renewable energy sources to the energy supply in the future was
limited. Even in the most optimistic scenario the proportion of renewable energy
would not exceed 20% (Small, 1996). The Department of Science, Technology and
Society, at Utrecht University also did research during this period into the contri-
bution of renewable energy source to the Dutch and the global energy supply (see for
instance Van Wijk et al., 1986; Van Wijk, 1990; Van Wijk et al., 1991).
                                                          
13 Only a small part of the IPW was directed towards research. This research was a continuation of the
NOW 1 and NOW 2 programmes. The main goal was the preservation of the knowledge and facilities
that had been built up in the preceding years. To this end, the research institute ECN, Delft University
of Technology and NLR set up a co-operative. This co-operative was to make its know-how and
facilities available to the manufacturers in the most efficient manner possible (ECN et al., 1986).
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As far as R&D programmes were concerned, by 1986 Dutch wind turbine
development had become directed solely to the development of the HAT turbine.
There were several reasons. First of all, as mentioned in section 3.4.4, the main
conclusion of the VAT-15 project was that VAT turbines would only be able to
compete with HAT turbines if large R&D investments were made. Secondly, in 1985,
Fokker, the company with most knowledge on VAT turbines, had decided to stop
producing wind turbines and wind turbine blades and to concentrate solely on
building aeroplanes. Thirdly, HAT turbines were the internationally dominant
technology. Opting for the HAT turbine would let the Netherlands profit optimally
from the internationally available knowledge on wind turbines. To continue sub-
sidising R&D into HAT and VAT was considered too expensive (Dragt, 2000;
NEOM, 1986).
Due to many technical problems the multi-rotor turbine concept, which will be
described in part B of this chapter, was no longer considered as a viable option. Hopes
of a real technological breakthrough, as promised by the tipvane research, were
dashed and the subsidy for this research had been terminated in 1985. Furthermore,
subsidies for the development of autonomous systems, i.e. the combination of a wind
turbine and a diesel generator, were stopped (NEOM, 1986). Although in the NOW 2
these systems were considered to have great export potential, the potential was not
appreciated by Dutch manufacturers. The only remaining wind energy application was
electricity generation. Expectations about the future of wind energy in the Netherlands
were definitely lower than at the beginning of the previous period.
3.5.3 The Newecs-25 turbines
As stated in section 3.4.7, as a result of an accident in 1984, during which the turbine
blades were destroyed, the mechanical brake of the first Newecs-25 replaced with an
electric brake. Therefore, the second and the third Newecs-25 were equipped with an
electric brake from the beginning. Hence, major blade accidents no longer occurred
with the Newecs turbines. However, the slow blade pitch system often caused the
Schiedam turbine to be out of operation. The energy yield of this turbine remained
low. The energy yield of the Curaçao turbine was far better. But in 1987, the disc
brake in this turbine blocked the fast running generator shaft (IEA, 1988). This caused
the complete destruction of the generator. Stork mechanics came to the conclusion
that the cause was a faulty adjustment of the braking pads. More frequent inspections
could have prevented the problem (Verbruggen, 2000).
In 1989 the Zeeland Newecs-25 turbine had blade failure, as a result of corrosion in
the blade root section. The PZEM electricity company decided to sever its connec-
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tions with the wind turbine (IEA, 1990). The other Newecs-25 turbines remained in
operation for a few years longer (Verbruggen, 2000).
3.5.4 The Newecs-45
The Newecs-45 was put into operation at the end of 1985 (IEA, 1986). The
measurement programme was carried out in the first year. Measurements were
performed on the performance as a function of wind speed, and on mechanical loads,
control dynamics, acoustic noise production and electro-magnetic interference by the
wind turbine (IEA, 1986). The measurement programme was almost as extensive as
that of the HAT-25. Half the programme was paid by the European Union, and half by
the NOW 2 programme (Dekker, 2000).
On May 31st 1986, the Newecs-45 achieved its full capacity of 1 MW for the first time
(IEA, 1987). Its availability in 1986 was 75%. This rather low availability was partly
due to the measuring programme and partly due to the fact that the turbine was shut
down in the evening because of television interference (IEA, 1987). Results of the
measurement programme were (IEA, 1987):
- The blade pitch system worked well. The calculation model for the blade pitch
system, used in the design, appeared to be accurate.
- Most measured turbine loads corresponded to the designs predicted by the
calculation model.
In 1986, some minor technical problems occurred, like oil leaks in the disc brakes and
the blade pitch system, corrosion of the blade attachment to the hub and
malfunctioning of the safety parachutes in the blade tips. These problems were all
solved quickly. The PEN electricity company, the owner of the wind turbine, was
satisfied with the accuracy of the rotor speed control system, the safety philosophy of
the turbine and the after sales service (IEA, 1987). In March 1987, there was a major
problem. For safety the turbine was taken out of operation because of small cracks in
the rotor blades, which could pose a problem later if they became larger. While the
cracks were being repaired, a hole was burnt in the blade skin by a warming blanket
with a faulty thermostat. The blade spar, responsible for the strength of the blade, was
heavily damaged. The remaining life span of the blade was estimated to be five years.
Insurance companies were not prepared to take risks with the damaged blade.
Therefore, the turbine was out of operation until a new blade was produced. The blade
was not finished until September 1988. Then the turbine was put into operation again.
During September, October and November of 1988 the turbine’s availability was
about 90% (IEA, 1989). The turbine was in operation until about 1995 (IEA, 1996).
This means that, like the Newecs-25 turbines, it did not achieve its predicted life span.
The Newecs-45 was not good for the public image of wind turbines. Because it was
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out of operation so often, it was mockingly referred to as ‘the civil servant’
(Verbruggen, 2000).
With hindsight, the major problem with the Newecs turbines, both the Newecs-25 and
the Newecs-45, was that they were not tested sufficiently beforehand. If they had been
thoroughly tested, many of the design problems would have become visible and some
operational experience could have been gained, which might have led to changes in
the designs of follow-up turbines (Verbruggen, 2000). Stork relied too much on the
possibility of building reliable turbines based purely on mathematical designs. The
turbines were designed too academically. For instance, the cog wheels were designed
in an integrated way; the design was very elegant, but expensive and impossible to
maintain or repair. Repair and maintenance would only be possible if the whole
turbine case were redesigned. Redesigning the turbine case was considered too
expensive (Verbruggen, 2000).
3.5.5 The Grohat
As mentioned in section 3.4.10, it was decided in 1985 to postpone the building of the
Grohat wind turbine. First, a scale model of the flexible rotor was to be built and
tested. This project, called the Flexhat project, will be described in section 3.5.7.
Stork’s position regarding the building of wind turbines had changed considerably
since they started designing the first Newecs turbines. The problems with the Newecs-
25 turbines and especially with the Newecs-45 had cost large amounts of money and
had diminished the faith of Stork's board of directors in the building of wind turbines.
Another blow to their faith in the building of wind turbines had been the loss of the
Sexbierum order (Verbruggen, 2000). This made the Stork management directors
doubt whether Stork should continue to build wind turbines. In 1987, they decided to
postpone the development of 18 Newecs-45 turbines because of financial risks (Stork,
1988)14. Furthermore, they decided that two other turbine types, the Newecs-40 (1
MW, for coastal regions), and the Newecs-55 (1.5 MW) on which feasibility studies
had been performed, were not to be developed any further (Verbruggen, 2000). The
Ministry of Economic Affairs, who attached a lot of importance to the development of
the Grohat, urged the Stork management to continue the Grohat project. However, no
agreement could be reached on the question of how much would be financed by Stork
and how much by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The parties negotiated for more
than a year, but no agreement was reached (Van Holten, 2000). Therefore, in 1987
Stork's participation in building wind turbines came to an end.
                                                          
14 These wind turbines had already been ordered by a consortium of utilities, in the so-called Megawind
project.
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However, Stork did not withdraw from the wind turbine innovation system altogether.
The subsidiary company Stork-VSH continued to manufacture wind turbine blades15.
Furthermore, Stork remained involved in wind turbine research, taking part in the
Flexhat project, which was carried out in co-operation with the research institute ECN
(Dekker, 2000; Verbruggen, 2000). In this way, the knowledge acquired by Stork
remained available to the wind turbine innovation system.
3.5.6 The Sexbierum wind power station
Building of the Sexbierum wind power station began in 1985. The wind turbines were
to be erected in the period April-September 1986 (IEA, 1986). Holec was to build the
wind turbines. While the turbines were being designed and manufactured, a quality
control procedure was in operation. This meant that the Policy Committee of the
Sexbierum wind power station followed the design and manufacturing process very
closely (Toussaint, 2000).
Holec tried to keep the turbines as cheap as possible. Relatively cheap, basic computer
programmes were used to design the blades and the entire turbine, although more
advanced computer programmes, developed by NLR and ECN based on the HAT-25
measurements, were available. These advanced computer programmes could have
performed elasticity calculations. With the basic computer programmes, only load
calculations were performed (Hutting, 2000). As a result, the wind turbine design was
very conservative, over-dimensioned and stiff. More material was needed for this
over-dimensioned design, which increased the costs (Hutting, 2000).
Van der Pol, who built lifts before starting to manufacture wind turbines, had a great
deal of knowledge about steel. Therefore, he decided to use steel for the blades. The
choice of this material meant that the blades were thicker than they would have been
if they had been made of polyester. When the problem was noticed, the manufacture
of the turbines had already started and it was too late to change the blade material. A
process of lock-in and path-dependency ensued: the choice of turbine part x
determined the future choice of other turbine parts y and z in the future, a step that
often turned to be disadvantageous. But, since the manufacture of turbine part x had
already started, decisions could not be reversed. Furthermore, since only four people
were involved in the Sexbierum project at Holec, much of the designing and
manufacturing work was contracted out (Hutting, 2000). There was not enough
feedback between the design and manufacturing processes of the turbine parts.
                                                          
15 This company was later called Aerpac. In 2001 it was taken over by the American energy trading
company Enron. In 2002 Enron Wind was taken over by General Electric (Enron, 2002).
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Because the blades were heavy, the rotor also had to be heavy. This meant that the
rotor axis and the turbine tower had to be heavy and robust as well (Hutting, 2000).
Van der Pol had given Holec a price guarantee for the design and manufacture of the
blades. Because the blades turned out to be far more expensive than expected, Van der
Pol went bankrupt. Holec, which had also given a price guarantee, had to pay about a
million guilders extra (Hutting, 2000). But finally, after a delay of 1.5 years, the
turbines were erected at the end of 1987 (IEA, 1988).
The wind power station was observed very closely. At SEP, a computer recorded the
turbines’ behaviour. When a problem arose with a turbine, the turbine was turned off
and a mechanic was sent over to repair it. In the wind power station, maintenance
mechanics were always available (Toussaint, 2000).
Technical problems arose during the fist few months. The high salt percentage in the
air caused high corrosion of the generator windings. This led to short-circuits in two
of the turbines on the day of the official opening (Toussaint, 2000). The generators
were coated anew, but after two years corrosion started again. An investigation
carried out on the corrosion showed that the corrosion occurred only at low
temperatures, when the turbines were starting up. When the turbines were in routine
operation, the high temperature in the generator prevented the precipitation of salty
water vapour (Hutting, 2000).
In 1988, problems arose with the cog wheels. This resulted in a three-year-long fight
with the cog wheel manufacturer on the question of who was responsible. Also, minor
problems arose with the yawing installation (Hutting, 2000; IEA, 1989). Availability
figures were rather low (see table 3.2).
Table 3.2: Availability figures for the Sexbierum wind power station (source: SEP, 1993).
Year Availability (%)
1990 54
1991 75
1992 90
The measurement programme started in 1990. Several research institutes: ECN, TNO,
NLR and Delft University of Technology were involved in this programme (KEMA,
1994). In 1992, the measurement programme was concluded. The results were used to
verify wind turbine design models, both at national and international level (IEA,
1990). The research into societal and environmental aspects also came to an end in
1992. The researchers drew some conclusions (Adviescommissie Maatschappelijke en
Milieu-aspecten Proefwindpark Oosterbierum, 1992):
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- In a search for suitable wind turbine locations the energy yields of wind turbines
and the economic aspects of a wind energy project were very important.
- Visual aspects of the wind turbines and the presence of bird migratory routes
should also be taken into consideration as well when looking for wind turbine
locations.
- Therefore, small wind parks with large turbines were to be preferred over large
wind parks with small turbines.
After the testing period, the wind power station was used only for electricity
production. In 1993, it produced 4 GWh (SEP, 1994), whereas in 1994, it delivered 3
GWh of electricity to the grid (SEP, 1995). Then, the wind power station was handed
over to the Friesland electricity company, PEB Friesland. Just before the transfer,
problems arose with bolts in the blades. Because of the dynamic loads, the bolts in the
blades had slowly come loose (Toussaint, 2000). This caused two blades to break off.
All bolts were replaced by SEP. But PEB Friesland was concerned about the bad
image of the wind power station and decided to dismantle the turbines and replace
them with Danish Nordtank turbines (Hutting, 2000). These turbines required less
maintenance and were more advanced than the Holec turbines, since they had been
built later (Toussaint, 2000).
3.5.7 The HAT-25
In 1986, the HAT-25 was used for measurement programmes, within both national
and international frameworks. In 1986 and 1987, research was done into a.o. (IEA,
1987; IEA, 1988):
- the development of adaptive control systems for wind turbines (in co-operation
with Delft University of Technology)
- fatigue loads (within the IEA framework)
- mechanical loads
- acoustic measurements
When not being used for measurements, the turbine was used for electricity
production. Furthermore, in 1986 a feasibility study was performed into the possible
modification of the HAT-25 in order to test the flexible rotor, a proposal contained in
the Grohat project. Both the hub and the control strategies of the HAT-25 had to be
adapted for this testing programme.
In November 1987, the original blades of the HAT-25 were replaced with flexible
blades, the so-called Flexhat blades. These blades were manufactured by Stork-VSH,
a subsidiary company of Stork. Tests were performed on the aerodynamic and fatigue
characteristics of these blades, and the pitchable blade tips were tested (IEA, 1988).
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The goal of the Flexhat programme, which followed from the Grohat project (see
section 3.5.5), was to develop and test advanced components that could be applied in
medium-sized and large wind turbines and that had the potential to reduce investment
costs by 30% (Van Kuik and Dekker, 1991). Specific goals were (IEA, 1989):
- to simplify auxiliary systems and reduce the number of turbine components by
applying passive control systems
- to dampen transmission of both wind loads and electricity net loads by applying
flexible structures
The following turbine components were designed (IEA, 1989; Dekker et al., 1990):
- an elastomeric teetering hub, rather similar to the elastomeric bearings used in
large foreign turbines: the Mod-2 in the USA and the WTS-3 in Sweden
- a flexbeam for the reduction of dynamic loads in the blade roots
- control strategies for passive blade tip controls
Tests were performed from June 12th 1989 until the end of 1992. The test programme
results were:
- Blade loads were reduced according to the design. Even smaller blade loads could
be achieved by further design optimisation
- Turbine operation was not always stable. But this problem was solved by
installing a dampening device between the blade tip and the rest of the blade.
- The safety philosophy that involved two independent brake systems, i.e. two
passive pitch systems, combined with the auxilary system of yawing the turbine
out of the wind, worked.
In 1992, the Flexhat programme was evaluated. Had the main goals been met? Was it
possible to reduce investment costs by 30% and were the developed turbine
components applicable to Dutch wind turbines? Since manufacturers were no longer
involved in the large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem, the target group
consisted of manufacturers of the small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem.
These manufacturers, and the results of the Flexhat programme evaluation, will be
described in part B of this chapter.
3.5.8 Research by Delft University of Technology
As mentioned in the section 3.4.6, the tipvane research at Delft University of
Technology stopped around 1985. However, in the period 1986-1991 Delft did do
some research into wind turbines. The Kolibri helicopter blades used in the tipvane
experiments had flexible blade roots, just like any other helicopter blades. During the
experiments, it turned out that these flexible blade roots reduced the loads in the
blades (Van Holten, 2000). In the period 1986-1991, the applicability of flexible blade
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roots to wind turbines and the blade loads were studied. This research was separate
from the Flexhat research described above (Van Holten, 2000). However, it is clear
that both research programmes had the same goal: do research that would prepare the
technological jump towards advanced turbines that would be far cheaper than the
state-of-the-art turbines.
3.5.9 The large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem in 1986-1991
Large changes occurred in the large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem in this
period. The two wind turbine manufacturers, Fokker and Stork, disappeared from the
innovation subsystem. Fokker terminated its links with wind energy in general and
Stork stopped building wind turbines, but continued building blades and doing
research. Holec, who had become a wind turbine manufacturer after taking over Van
der Pol, disappeared from the subsystem in the early 1990s.
The research institutes and universities were still very active in the innovation
subsystem. ECN and Delft University of Technology were both doing research into
flexible turbine components, although they worked independently. ECN co-operated
with Stork in the Flexhat research.
Turbine buyers, i.e. the electricity companies, were more actively involved in the
subsystem in this period than in the previous period. The electricity companies of
Zeeland, Curaçao and Schiedam each owned a Newecs-25 and had many contacts
with the manufacturer Stork. SEP was involved in the Sexbierum wind power station,
as was KEMA, the research institute of the electricity companies. Contacts between
KEMA/SEP and the manufacturer Holec/Van der Pol were very frequent.
The Ministry of Economic Affairs was still actively involved as well. The Ministry
still tried to steer developments, e.g. by pressing Stork to continue the Grohat project,
by sitting on the Policy Committee of the Sexbierum wind power station and by
providing subsidies.
The structure of the intermediary organisations was changed again. The two
intermediary organisations, PEO and NEOM, merged to form Novem in 1988. In this
way, the links between short-term research on the one hand and pilot projects and
commercialisation on the other hand were to be shortened and strengthened. This was
to lead to more market-focused programmes. The research institute ECN was made
responsible for strategic long-term energy research.
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Figure 3.3: The large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem in the period 1986-1991.
3.5.10 Conclusion
What can be said about the learning processes in the large-scale wind turbine
innovation subsystem in the period 1986-1991? Learning by searching was still
prominent. During the research and measurement programmes on the HAT-25, on the
Newecs-45, at Delft University of Technology and in the Sexbierum wind power
station, a large amount of knowledge was gained and computer programmes were
validated and adjusted.
Learning by doing was important as well. Stork acquired knowledge while
maintaining and repairing the wind turbines it had produced. Holec/Van der Poll
learned a lot while designing and producing the Sexbierum wind turbines. During this
period, both Stork and Holec/Van der Pol learned that manufacturing wind turbines
can be a very expensive and risky business.
Learning by using also occurred. The electricity companies learned that wind turbines
were not as reliable as they were claimed to be and that keeping them in operation and
repairing them could be very expensive. Generally, their opinion of wind energy did
not improve in this period.
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Learning by interacting between the research institutes remained important. ECN and
Delft University of Technology performed some research together. Although they did
not co-operate in the research on advanced flexible wind turbines, they did exchange
knowledge on this research, e.g. during conferences. During these conferences, both
national and international, knowledge was transferred and discussions took place.
Learning by interacting took place between ECN and Stork during the Flexhat
programme. Here, Stork was a researcher, just like ECN.
There was also learning by interacting between producers and users, namely between
Stork and the electricity companies that owned Newecs turbines and in the Sexbierum
wind power station. Because of the regular meetings during the design and
manufacturing phase and because of the quality control procedures, the turbine
manufacturers and the Policy Committee learned a great deal from each other. For
instance, after the Sexbierum project, quality control procedures were implemented in
other wind power station projects (Hutting, 2000). The research institutes and SEP
also interacted during the research programmes of the Sexbierum project. However, in
this research programme the research institute of the electricity sector, KEMA, played
the largest role (Verbruggen, 2000).
The minimum pre-requisite for an innovation (sub)system is the presence of
manufacturer(s). We have seen that in this period the turbine manufacturers of the
Dutch large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem disappeared from the
subsystem. Therefore, in this period the large-scale wind turbine innovation
subsystem came to an end. After this period, both wind energy policy and the research
institutes engaged in wind energy started to focus on the small wind turbine
manufacturers. These small manufacturers, and the small-scale wind turbine
subsystem, will be described in part B of this chapter.
Chapter 3
90
Part B: The small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem
3.6 1976 - 1980
As described in section 3.3, the NOW programme, the National Research Programme
on Wind Energy, started in 1976. Within this programme, subsidies were provided for
R&D into the potential of wind energy in the Netherlands and into wind turbine
building. The goal of this programme was to develop a significant wind turbine
capacity in the Netherlands, consisting of a large number of large wind turbines.
However, the subsidies were available for all companies engaged in building wind
turbines. Several small companies saw an opportunity for themselves and started to
build wind turbines. No wind turbine for the production of electricity had ever been
produced in the Netherlands before 1973. The Netherlands however had a long history
of building traditional wind mills, and therefore large companies, described in part A
of this chapter, and small companies were of the opinion that it could not be too
difficult to build wind turbines for electricity production. Unlike the Danish
companies (see Chapter 4), these companies had no technical data on the building of
wind turbines to fall back on and had to start developing wind turbines from scratch16.
3.6.1 Building small wind turbines
In the period 1976-1980, about ten companies started manufacturing small wind
turbines. These companies all had different manufacturing histories. They were all
very small, consisting of less than ten employees. Some examples (Stam, 2000; Dutch
manufacturers, a.n.)17:
- Van der Pol, who started making wind turbines in 1974, was a steel construction
company and therefore had a lot of knowledge on steel.
                                                          
16 In the 1960s, some – not very successful - attempts had been made to equip traditional Dutch wind
mills with gear for the production of electricity (Van Kuik, 2002; Verbong, 2002). However, since
these wind mills, like the 'Prinsenmolen' and the 'Traanroeier' were wind mills provided with electric
equipment and not wind turbines especially designed for the production of electricity, their data could
not be used by the Dutch wind turbine companies.
17 In addition to these companies, a number alternative energy idealists were engaged in building wind
turbines in this period. Examples are members of De kleine aarde (The small earth) and members of
ODE (Organisation for Renewable Energy). In order to support these efforts, some members of ODE
wrote the Wind Workbook (Westra and Tossijn, 1980). This workbook explained the technical aspects
of wind turbines and described the development of wind energy in the Netherlands and internationally.
The motto of the book was: ‘No nuclear energy or coal, but take a windmill’. Because these
organisations did not produce wind turbines for the market, they will not be discussed further in this
chapter.
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- Bohes (Bohemen Energy Systems), who started making wind turbines in 1982,
was specialised in hydraulic transmissions.
- Bouma, who started making wind turbines in 1981, was specialised in glass fibre
reinforced polyester yachts.
- Newinco.
- Lagerwey, who started making wind turbines in 1976, was the only small wind
turbine manufacturer who had knowledge of wind turbines. He had followed a
wind energy specialisation course at Eindhoven University of Technology.
- NCH and Tolboom had a history of manufacturing farming equipment.
- HMZ was a construction company.
Since there were no data for relating to the building of wind turbines, the companies
started building wind turbines on the basis of the knowledge and skills they had
acquired in their previous activities. This meant that Van der Pol used steel as a
material for both the turbine and the blades, and that Bouma used glass fibre
reinforced polyester as a blade material. Bohes used hydraulic transmission for the
conversion of the rotation energy of the rotor into electrical energy, whereas the other
manufacturers used cog wheels and generators (Stam, 2000).
Some wind turbines were built in this period on the basis of trial-and-error. They were
all HAT turbines, with two or three blades. The capacity of these turbines ranged from
1 to 60 kW (Stam et al., 1983). They were sold mainly to nearby farmers, who were
interested in electricity production for their own use (Wind Service Holland, 2000).
Because of the high price of fossil fuels, electricity from wind turbines was regarded
as an attractive option.
Many problems occurred with the wind turbines. A frequent problem was the
loosening of nuts and bolts because of the constant rotation of the turbine rotor. The
manufacturers did the repair work themselves, which meant they acquired a great deal
of knowledge about the technical features and the operation of wind turbines (Van
Deijl, 2000). The manufacturers did not co-operate with each other at all. They
regarded each other as competitors, each wanting to develop his own technology
(Stam, 2000).
3.6.2 The start of the ECN wind turbine testfield
In 1980, ECN began to get involved in the small wind turbine innovation subsystem.
It set up a wind turbine testfield (Stam et al., 1983). The purpose of the testfield was
to stimulate small turbine manufacturers to improve their wind turbines and to
succeed in installing safe and tested wind turbines in the Netherlands. Many
manufacturers were interested in the testfield, especially since the NOW 1 programme
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paid part of the test costs (Stam, 2000). The first turbine was erected on the testfield
on September 1st 1980. After six months, its rotor broke off (Stam et al., 1983).
3.6.3 The small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem in 1976-1980
In this period, about ten small companies started to build wind turbines. These
manufacturers delivered the few turbines they built to nearby farmers, who constituted
in this period the turbine user group in this subsystem. The Ministry of Economic
Affairs was also part of the small-scale wind innovation subsystem, because it
provided R&D subsidies to the small turbine builders. The organisations BEOP and
NEOM were the intermediaries who took care of the distribution of these subsidies.
At the end of this period, the research institute ECN began to get involved in this
subsystem by setting up a wind turbine testfield. The small-scale wind turbine
innovation subsystem in this period is represented in figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4: The small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem in the period 1976-1980.
3.6.4 Conclusion
What can be said about the learning processes in the small-scale wind turbine
innovation subsystem in this period? The major learning process was learning by
doing. Slowly the manufacturers started to learn by trial-and-error how to build wind
turbines and how to keep them in operation. Learning by using occurred as well,
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because turbines were sold in this period. The users were living next to their turbine,
so they could observe it closely. Problems were passed back quickly to the
manufacturers. The producers learned about the operation of the turbines by learning
by interacting with the turbine owners. The manufacturers and the research institute
ECN began to learn by interacting at the end of this period. We will go into this
further in section 3.7.9.
3.7 1981 - 1985
3.7.1 The NOW 2 programme
After the NOW 1 programme was terminated in 1981, the NOW programme
managers starting to take slightly more interest in the small wind turbine
manufacturers. Almost from the start of the NOW 1 programme, politically left-wing
oriented organisations like ODE, the Organisation for Renewable Energy, EA, the
Centre for Alternative Energy, and CE, the Centre for Energy Saving, had criticised
the NOW programme managers for their exclusive interest in large-scale applications
of wind energy (Westra, 1998). These organisations represented the anti-nuclear and
alternative movements, who viewed modern technology, epitomised by nuclear
technology, as a crucial part of the capitalist society that they were rejecting in favour
of a more ‘humane’ type of society. The promotion of alternative energy sources, an
example of environment-friendly technology adapted to human size, was part of their
strategy to reach their goal. They were especially attracted by the idea that a wind
turbine could lead to self-sufficiency; the owner could provid his own energy without
being dependent on the large electricity companies (Westra, 1998).
As stated in section 3.4.1, one of the main conclusions of the NOW 1 evaluation
report was that the favourable perspectives for wind energy were applicable to both
large-scale, centralised application of wind energy and small-scale, decentralised
application. During the NOW 1 programme, a large number of bottlenecks hindering
the introduction of large-scale wind energy were identified. For instance, the
development of large wind turbines would take at least a few years; large wind
turbines were very expensive; and the Dutch industry had not yet started to take an
active interest in setting up production lines for the manufacture of large numbers of
large wind turbines (BEOP, 1981b). This meant that if the government wanted to
create a sizeable wind turbine capacity in the near future, other options had to be
taken into account as well. Since some small companies had already started producing
small wind turbines, it seemed a good idea to do research on the viability of using
small wind turbines for decentralised electricity production. As mentioned in section
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3.4.2, the subjects on the NOW 2 programme for small-scale wind energy were
(BEOP, 1981c):
- designing and building safe and reliable small wind turbines, i.e. 10-100 kW. As
soon as the tipvanes were developed – probably in a few years - the small wind
turbines could be equipped with tipvanes.
- feasibility studies on small wind turbines, i.e. assessing which user categories
would be interested in small wind turbines
- studies into the removal of possible bottlenecks, e.g. formulating regulations
regarding safety and hinder
- a number of experimental projects for specific applications
- the development of autonomous systems, i.e. the combination of a wind turbine
and a diesel generator. These systems had great potential in remote areas outside
the Netherlands, and could provide good export opportunities for Dutch industry.
The total amount of R&D subsidies available was 20 million guilders. This would
have to lead to a total capacity of at least 15,000 small wind turbines in the year 2000,
with a total capacity of 450 MW (BEOP, 1981c).
During the NOW 2 programme period, many scientific reports were concerned with
feasibility studies on small wind turbines. Possible user categories mentioned included
residential areas, glasshouse horticulture companies and other energy-intensive
companies.
3.7.2 The decentralised wind energy pilot projects
ECN also carried out research into specific decentralised wind energy applications.
The two largest projects were the pilot projects Camperduin and De Wâlden. Both
projects started in 1983 (Curvers et al., 1983). The Camperduin project investigated
the use of wind energy for the electricity provision of a residential area. The project
was carried out by the PEN electricity company of North Holland, Amsterdam
University and ECN. Two Lagerwey turbines with a 10.6 metre rotor diameter with
variable rotor speed were installed in a residential area that contained 28 houses.
Research was performed into the wind energy conversion system, the usefulness of
the wind electricity and the coupling between the turbines and the electricity grid
(Curvers et al., 1983). An important conclusion was that wind energy supply and
electricity demand were very weakly correlated in time; this indicated that back-up
energy supply from the public electricity grid would always be needed (Curvers et al.,
1983). In the project, the wind electricity could only be used for 44% of the time
(Curvers et al., 1986).
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The De Wâlden project also started in 1983. This project investigated the applicability
of wind energy to polder draining (Curvers et al, 1983). Next to a pumping station, a
wind turbine was coupled electrically to a water pump motor. The wind turbine,
produced by Van der Pol, had a 16 metre rotor diameter. Project members were
BEOP, the district Water Board ‘De Wâlden’, the Friesland electricity company PEB,
Delft University of Technology, which designed the wind turbine-water pump model,
and ECN, which designed the measurement system and carried out the measurements
(Curvers et al., 1983). In the first two years of the project, the wind turbine-water
pump system could not operate normally because of major technical malfunctioning
and design faults. In 1985, the problems were solved and the system's availability was
as high as 95% (Van Hulle, 1986). The wind electricity was not used optimally, since
the pumping station was used for only 1,000 hours a year. The rest of the electricity
from the wind turbine was wasted (Van Hulle, 1986).
The general conclusions of the projects described above, were (Curvers et al., 1986):
- the usefulness of the wind energy produced was limited
- the buy-back tariffs for the remaining amount of wind electricity were very
important for the financial aspects of the project18.
Furthermore, ECN formulated focus points for the further development of small wind
turbines (Curvers et al., 1986):
- the turbines should be made more suitable for erection outdoors
- electric yaw mechanisms should be improved
- the rotor speed for turbines with a variable rotor speed should be restricted
Although these technical problems were signalled about the wind turbines and written
in scientific reports, the manufacturers were not satisfied with the feedback of the
technical problems to them (Van Deijl, 2000).
3.7.3 The wind turbine testfield
The Lagerwey and Van der Pol turbines were selected for the above-mentioned pilot
projects because ECN knew they were available since they had been tested on the
wind turbine testfield (Curvers et al., 1983). As stated in section 3.6.2, the testfield
had been set up by ECN in 1980. The initial aim was to perform functional tests only,
i.e. to investigate whether the turbines functioned well in practice (brake, yaw system,
blade pitch mechanisms) and not to perform more systematic tests. But soon, other
actors showed interest in the tests. These new actors had different interests than ECN.
They were (Stam et al., 1983):
- manufacturers (who were interested primarily in product improvements,
mechanical loads and energy yields)
                                                          
18 This issue will be discussed in section 3.7.5.
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- licensers (who were interested in safety and environmental aspects)
- turbine buyers (who were interested in energy yields, reliability and life span)
- energy companies (who were interested in the quality of the electricity produced)
- research institutes (who were interested in dynamic behaviour, aerodynamic
features and fatigue)
- advisers
Therefore, ECN decided to investigate more features of the wind turbines (Stam et al.,
1983). A standard test programme was drawn up. The manufacturers were very
reluctant to hand over design data and construction details. They did not trust ECN
and would not pass on information about their turbines to other manufacturers (Stam,
2000). Therefore, ECN gave the manufacturers guarantees that test data would be
used confidentially and that elaborate test results would be handed over only to the
manufacturer of the turbine. Only a short resumee of the test results would be made
public (Stam et al., 1983).
As soon as the testfield started, it was decided that not every wind turbine could be
tested on the testfield. There was too great a risk of accidents caused by unreliable
turbines, for instance the braking off of blades (Stam, 2000). Therefore, it was decided
that wind turbines needed an acceptance certificate to be issued after a short test had
proved that the turbine’s control systems worked. This acceptance certificate meant
only that the wind turbine was admitted to the testfield. However, these acceptance
certificates were often used as promotion material (Stam, 2000).
In 1981 and 1982, seven turbines were tested. Their generator capacities ranged from
11 to 60 kW (Stam et al., 1983). A 1983 report on the testfield concluded that there
was no serial production of commercial wind turbines in the Netherlands yet (Stam et
al., 1983). According to the report, the turbines available in 1983 were in fact
prototypes with matching growing pains. Furthermore, testing the wind turbines took
more time than predicted. Instead of the predicted three months, the total test
procedure took six to twelve months on average. The main reason was that the
turbines very often had profound design faults (Stam et al., 1983). During the test
period, manufacturers were allowed to make technical changes in their turbine (Stam,
2000). Because of the delays and the confidentiality of the test results, other actors
than the manufacturers generally obtained no information or very late information
about the wind turbine (Stam et al., 1983). Therefore, sometimes the above-mentioned
acceptance certificates were used by licensers (Stam, 2000).
As from 1981, the following items were included in the tests (Stam et al., 1983):
- checking the design calculations; often no calculations or insufficient calculations
were available. ECN then performed the missing calculations.
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- checking the electrical system
- testing whether the mechanical, aerodynamic and electrical parts of the turbine
could withstand external (in the electricity network) and internal (within the wind
turbine) singular failure
- testing the yaw mechanism and the start and stop procedures
- testing the safety systems
- measuring the mechanical loads and load variations during normal operations,
start and stop procedures and extreme situations
- measuring vibrations in the blades; these measurements were performed by NLR
- measuring the energy yield and the quality of the electricity produced
- visiting the workshop to obtain insight into manufacturing and assembling
techniques
- taking sound measurements
- inspecting a working turbine of the same type
These tests caused manufacturers to make technical improvements to their wind
turbines. ECN and the co-operating research institutes used the tests for (Stam et al.,
1983):
- stipulating the direction of future technological development
- developing norms (e.g. for design criteria and noise pollution)
- setting up fatigue research for wind turbines
- verifying theoretical models.
General conclusions regarding the small wind turbines tested on the testfield up till
1983 were (Stam et al., 1983):
- Nearly all turbines tested had serious faults in their safety systems. These faults
varied from brake failures to blades that broke off.
- All turbines tested had faults in their electrical system.
- Most manufacturers made over-optimistic estimates of the energy yield.
- The manufacturers had problems in adjusting the safety systems of the turbines.
In the period 1983-1985, nine turbines were tested on the testfield and nine more were
tested on location. ECN had a Rotor Axis Drive Facility (RAAF) at its disposal,
which was used to test turbine rotors separately from the turbines. Furthermore, in
1985 a concept norm was defined, the so-called NEN 6096 (Stam, 1986b). This norm
was based partly on experience on the testfield up till 1985. The norm required that
wind turbines were safe enough to withstand internal and external failure.
Furthermore, design rules were defined in the NEN 6096. These design rules were
rather conservative. The manufacturer was allowed to use other design rules but had
to prove by accurate analysis that his design method was at least equivalent to the one
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described in the NEN 6096. From 1985, the turbines on the testfield were judged on
the basis of NEN 6096 (Stam, 1986b).
Turbine quality was reported to have improved between 1983 and 1985 (Stam,
1986b). The aerodynamic yields of the rotor had increased, reliability had increased,
although it was still insufficient and the number of parts that broke off had decreased
(only one in 1985). The manufacturers gave more attention to safety philosophy, the
braking systems generally worked well and quality control during manufacture was
better.
However, problems continued to arise in the control systems of the turbines. Some
manufacturers had tried stall control. In 1986, it was reported that stall control and
passive pitch control were insufficiently developed in the Netherlands (Stam, 1986b).
Tuning a passive pitch system turned out to be very difficult and to be not
reproducible. Furthermore, the system was too slow, causing high fluctuations of the
energy in the rotor. Active pitch, which was the control system that was used most,
appeared to be feasible. However, even with this system fluctuations of the energy in
the rotor developed (Stam, 1986b). The yaw system created problems, leading to a
loss of energy yield and an increase in dynamic loads. Problems also appeared in the
safety systems, although the manufacturers paid more attention to these systems than
in 1983. Tiltable blade tips and brake flaps often worked at the wrong moment or not
at all (Stam, 1986b). Furthermore, material fatigue was still a major problem,
shortening the lifetimes of the turbines. The turbines were unlikely to last for  15 to 20
years, which was the lifetime intended by the manufacturers (Stam, 1986b).
The knowledge transfer from ECN to the manufacturers was limited. ECN was not
allowed to provide the manufacturers with specific design recommendations, because
that would have distorted competition (Stam, 2000). Only obvious things like the
securing of nuts and bolts were recommended specifically. Furthermore, the
manufacturers were told what needed to be changed, but not how ECN thought they
should change it (Stam, 2000). Furthermore, the manufacturers could not learn from
the results of other manufacturers' turbine tests, because these results were not made
public. Only general results on all wind turbines were made public, in the form of
scientific reports, and results of the measuring programmes of the HAT-25 and VAT
prototypes. However, the manufacturers did not read these reports. They were simply
too busy surviving (Van Deijl, 2000; Dekker, 2000). The manufacturers did not learn
from each other by communicating either. They did not trust each other, so they took
care not to disclose any information about their turbines to each other (Stam, 2000).
The setting up of the Association of Dutch Wind Turbine Manufacturers in 1982 did
not alter this situation.
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Communication between ECN and manufacturers was difficult at times. As
mentioned above, what ECN hoped to gain from the testfield was information that
could be used to validate models, to set up further research and to determine the
direction of future technological development. Most members of the ECN wind group
were involved in the large-scale development of wind energy. Their frame of meaning
regarding wind energy was different from that of the manufacturers. ECN's starting
points were mathematical models and aerodynamic theories, taken over from the
aerospace industry. The manufacturers' starting point was simply getting to know how
to manufacture a turbine that worked (Stam, 2000). Whereas the ECN researchers
thought in terms of large wind turbines based on mathematical designs, the
manufacturers of the small wind turbines thought in terms of the small wind turbines
they were able to assemble. ECN and the small manufacturers did not share the same
paradigm.
On the basis of experiences gained in the testfield up till 1985, ECN concluded in
1986 that the wind turbines of that time were not profitable (Stam, 1986a). The price-
performance ratio was too high. The main solution to this problem for small wind
turbines was, according to ECN, the same as the solution that was proposed by the
researchers on large wind turbines (see part A of this chapter): to make use of
advanced techniques (Stam, 1986a). Although some improvements were considered
possible by making small adjustments, e.g. improvement of the blade profiles and the
rotor speed control systems, and the further development of cog wheels and
generators, these improvements would not lead to major changes in price-performance
ratio. Major increases in price-performance ratio could be achieved by the use of
advanced components and serial production (Stam, 1986a).
3.7.4 Cumulative installed capacity
The wind turbine capacity in the Netherlands slowly began to grow in the period
1981-1985. This capacity is represented in figure 3.5 on the next page. The main
turbine buyers were farmers, small companies and renewable energy enthusiasts
(Langenbach, 2000). In 1985, when oil prices dropped drastically, it became harder to
sell wind turbines. Since the turbine buyers were not subsidised in any way, pay-back
times for wind turbines were very long. Since wind turbines could not deliver energy
if there was no wind, the majority of turbine owners connected their wind turbine to
the electric grid (Langenbach, 2000). If the wind was not blowing, they could use
electricity from the grid and if the wind turbine was producing energy when it was
needed, the energy could be fed into the grid.
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 Figure 3.5: Cumulative installed wind turbine capacity, per year, in the period 1981-1985
(source: Hack and De Bruijne, 1988).
3.7.5 Buy-back tariffs
A problem with this decentralised way of producing electricity was that the electricity
sector was not at all in favour. They much preferred centralised energy production by
their own electricity production companies (Small, 1996). Decentralised energy
production made matters much more complicated for the electricity sector. However,
they were forced by the government to accept the fact that decentralised electricity
production installations, like co-generation plants and wind turbines, would feed
electricity into the electricity grid. They were also forced to pay buy-back tariffs to the
owners of decentralised installations for the electricity they fed into the grid (Small,
1996).
Each electricity company could itself determine the level of the buy-back tariff (Blok,
2000). This meant that there were large differences in the tariffs of the various
electricity companies that existed in the Netherlands at that time. The buy-back tariffs
were very low. They were proportional to the amount of base load fuels that could be
saved by the energy delivered (Blok, 2000). The reason for the low tariffs, according
to the electricity companies, was that wind energy could only save a small proportion
of base load fuel because the wind is unreliable. The buy-back tariffs were
particularly low in the mid-1980s when the oil prices fell. Furthermore, each
individual customer had to negotiate his own buy-back tariff with his electricity
company. Since these customers were not very well organised19, they could not argue
forcefully with their electricity company (Blok, 2000; Langenbach, 2000).
                                                          
19 In 1982, the Dutch wind turbine owners had set up the ‘Vereniging van Windmolengebruikers’
(Association of Wind turbine users). However, this association did not have as much power as the
Danish association for wind turbine users (Langenbach, 2000). For one year, the Dutch association
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3.7.6 Financial problems
The low buy-back tariffs were a serious problem for the turbine manufacturers.
Selling wind turbines became very difficult, since the pay-back time for a wind
turbine became very long, especially in the mid-1980s. This resulted in severe
financial problems for a large number of turbine manufacturers. Some manufacturers,
like Lagerwey, went bankrupt (Boersma, 2000). However, because large subsidies
from the IPW were to arrive soon (see section 3.8.1), Lagerwey was able to start up
again. Van der Pol was taken over by the large company Holec, as described in the
sections on the Sexbierum wind power station in part A of this chapter, and got into
even more serious financial problems because of the Sexbierum project.
3.7.7 Export
In the period 1981-1985, there was a real wind energy boom in the United States
(Karnøe, 1991; Van Est, 1999). In 1978, the US government had introduced new legal
instruments to decrease oil and gas dependency. The Energy Tax Act had made wind
energy more attractive for investors. Additional measures by the California State
government created a profitable market for wind turbine producers. Danish companies
were exceptionally successful in this new market as their turbines were far more
reliable than their American competitors’ products (Van Est, 1999).
Some Dutch wind turbines were also exported to the United States. They were
produced by Bouma and Polenko (Hvidtfelt Nielsen, 2001). However, the price-
performance ratio of their turbines was poorer than that of the Danish turbines. The
Dutch turbines were less reliable and their specific output was lower than that of the
Danish ones (see figure 3.6 on the next page) (Hvidtfelt Nielsen, 2001). Therefore,
thousands of Danish turbines were exported to the United States, compared to only a
small number of Dutch turbines (Hvidtfelt Nielsen, 2001).
3.7.8 The small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem in 1981-1985
During this period about ten wind turbine manufacturers were still in the market. The
number of turbine buyers had increased, but only slightly. By 1985 only about 6.5
MW of wind turbine capacity had been installed in the Netherlands. As in the
previous period, the turbine buyers were farmers, small energy-intensive companies
                                                                                                                                                                     
published a magazine, ‘Windstoot’ (Wind Thrust), in which the performances of Dutch wind turbines
were published. By 1983, the magazine had merged with the magazine ‘Renewable Energy’ of ODE,
the Organisation for Renewable Energy (Langenbach, 2000).
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and energy enthusiasts. No electricity companies had yet bought any small wind
turbines.
Figure 3.6: The specific output of wind turbines in the United States (1985) (source: Hvidfeldt
Nielsen, 2001).
The role of the Ministry of Economic Affairs in the subsystem expanded. More
attention was paid to small wind turbines in the NOW 2 and, since the Ministry
wanted to decide itself which projects would be subsidised, it became actively
involved in the small wind turbine innovation subsystem. The intermediaries involved
in granting subsidies were still involved in the subsystem. However, the relationship
between the Ministry and the intermediaries PEO and NEOM on the one hand and the
manufacturers on the other hand was not very good. The manufacturers did really
trust them. As one manufacturer said (Van Deijl, 2000): ‘When I was at PEO, I did
not feel I was taken seriously’. And: ‘It was a matter of large parties shoving money
towards each other’.
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ECN also became more involved in the subsystem, because of the large role that the
testfield began to play. Every manufacturer had his turbines tested on this testfield.
The small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem in this period is represented in
figure 3.7.
Figure 3.7: The small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem in the period 1981-1985.
3.7.9 Conclusion
Let us analyse the learning processes in this period. Learning by searching began to be
important in the small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem. Research was
conducted into decentralised turbine systems. Learning by doing became more
important, since more turbines were produced. Also on the testfield, learning by doing
occurred because the manufacturers had to keep adjusting their turbines until they
passed the tests. Learning by using also gained in importance, since more turbines
were sold and the number of users grew.
Learning by interacting was the most important type of learning in this period. The
turbine manufacturers learned by interacting with the turbine users. The users reported
problems with the turbines and the manufacturers went to the turbines to discuss the
problems with the users and solve the problems. The turbine facturers also learned by
interacting with the research institute ECN, on the testfield. Although ECN did not
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give them specific design instructions, they did get some general instructions on
which components of the turbine were not working properly and how these problems
could be solved. They did not learn from each other’s problems, however, since test
results were secret and the turbine manufacturers did not discuss their turbines or
turbine problems with each other, since they did not trust each other. An important
type of learning by interacting was 'learning to be viable'. The turbine manufacturers
could only sell their turbines, or be viable, if they had their turbines tested and could
hand over a certificate to the future buyers and licensers stating that the turbine was
working according to the NEN norms.
3.8 1986 - 1992
3.8.1 The IPW programme
This period was crucial for the small-scale wind turbine subsystem. In 1986, the
Integral Programme on Wind Energy was launched (NEOM, 1986). This programme
was fundamentally different from the previous NOW 1 and NOW 2 programmes,
since it was not a research programme. Instead, supporting the industry was the main
feature of this programme (NEOM, 1986). The programme managers observed that,
although the quality of the available wind turbines had improved, costs were still far
too high. The NOW research programmes had generated a lot of knowledge, but the
Dutch manufacturers did not implement this knowledge in their turbines (NEOM,
1986).
On the other hand, according to the IPW programme makers, potential buyers did not
invest enough in wind turbines. Although the number of buyers of small wind turbines
had increased in the previous period, far fewer turbines had been sold than the NOW
2 programme makers had expected (NEOM, 1986). It is worth remembering that the
NOW 2 had stated that at least 15,000 wind turbines, or a total capacity of 450 MW,
should have been erected by 2000. Since only about 6.5 MW had been installed by
1985, 450 MW in 2000 implied a large growth in the period 1985-2000.
Since the manufacturers needed a substantial home market in order to begin a serial
production and to reduce turbine prices, something had to be done. The programme
makers saw it as a vicious circle: because no cheap and reliable turbines were
available (and oil prices were low), there was no large home market and because there
was no large home market, the prices were high and technology development was
difficult. Because technology development was difficult, the turbines were not very
reliable (NEOM, 1986). Although the wind turbines had significantly improved
between 1981 and 1985 and the market had grown, as described in the previous
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section, the developments were not fast enough according to the Ministry of
Economic Affairs and the NOW programme managers. Already in 1984, the NOW
programme managers had had meetings with turbine manufacturers about boosting
radical innovations within the sector. The results of these meetings were however not
good enough, according to the NOW programme managers and the Ministry of
Economic Affairs (Stam, 2000)20.
The problems were to be solved by way of the IPW programme. As described in part
A of this chapter, in this programme, the goal for the year 2000 was relaxed. Instead
of a total capacity of 2,000 MW, a total capacity of 1,000 MW had to be installed in
the Netherlands by the year 2000. As an intermediate goal, it was decided that a
power capacity of 100-150 MW of wind energy was to be installed by the end of
1990. Secondly, economic stimulation measures for turbine buyers were introduced in
the form of investment subsidies. The subsidies were related to the amount of wind
turbine power installed. The total amount of investment subsidies was 68.5 million
guilders, to which a sum could be added annually. The amount to be added was to be
decided each year, the maximum being 30 million guilders (NEOM, 1986). Thirdly,
new research was set up, which was to lead to the development of one or more
commercial Dutch wind turbine types. From 1990 no more government support would
have to be required to reach the goal of 1,000 MW in the year 2000. For this research,
subsidies amounting to 37 million Dutch guilders were available for industrial R&D
and 21 million Dutch guilders for general research (NEOM, 1986).
However, there was a snag in this for the manufacturers. Only breakthroughs and
advanced concepts could receive support in the IPW programme. As the
manufacturers were still very busy making their wind turbines reliable, the
introduction of advanced concepts would represent a large technological jump.
Furthermore, the Ministry of Economic Affairs was of the opinion that too many
turbine manufacturers were on the market - there were 24 in the year 1986 (Stam,
1986a)21. Dividing the funding between all 24 manufacturers was considered a waste
of money. The manufacturers had two options: either form a consortium or compete
with each other on a project basis. Because of the distrust between the manufacturers,
                                                          
20 During his farewell speech, a high official at the Ministry, Lely, called the Dutch wind turbine
manufacturers 'a very badly playing football team that still doesn't want to work together' (Anonymous,
1987).
21 Among these were four manufacturers that built only very small wind turbines with power capacities
of less than 5 kW: LMW, Aiolos, Voskuyl and Tolboom (Stam, 1986a). These manufacturers operated
in a different market and will therefore not be discussed further in this chapter. Furthermore Stam
(1986a) mentions four manufacturers of water-pumping and heat-producing systems and six rotor blade
producers.
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they were reluctant to form consortia. So, they chose the second option: competing on
a project basis.
The IPW programme was intended to sift out the wind turbine manufacturers in two
ways. First of all, only those manufacturers that had a sound business plan could
apply for R&D subsidies (NEOM, 1986). The business plans were tested according to
a rigid procedure by the intermediary organisation Novem. If a business plan was
approved, it was tested every year to see whether it was being adhered to. Up till
1988, 18 businessplans had been presented to Novem, but only six of them had been
approved. The manufacturers whose business plans were approved were Berewoud,
Bouma, Lagerwey, NCH, Newinco (the new name of Polenko) and Trasco (Hack and
De Bruijne, 1988). An amount of R&D subsidy of about 14 million guilders was
promised to these companies. The business plans of two foreign manufacturers had
also been approved: those of HMZ, a Belgian company which had had a subsidiary
company in the Netherlands since 1984 (WindMaster, a.n.) and of Micon, a Danish
company (Hack and De Bruijne, 1988).
Secondly, the project was to be realised within one year of its inception (IEA, 1987).
Thirdly, turbine buyers could only receive investment subsidies for wind turbines
which had a Limited Quality Certificate (BKC). These certificates were issued by
ECN when tests on the ECN testfield had proved that the wind turbine complied with
certain norms and criteria, mostly set out in the concept norm NEN 6096 (see section
3.7.3) (Beurskens, Lindhout and Stam, 1988). The BKC covered energy yield, safety
and sound production, but did not cover life span and reliability. Not only did firms
require a BKC certificate to apply for a subsidy, they also often needed the certificate
to obtain a permit to build a wind turbine (Hack and De Bruijne, 1988). In 1988, 11
turbine models had been awarded a BKC certificate. These models were (Hack and
De Bruijne, 1988):
- Bouma 80 kW, 160 kW and 250 kW
- Lagerwey 75 kW
- Micon 250 kW
- NCH 75 kW
- Newinco 50 kW, 100 kW and 250 kW
- Stork 1 MW (the Newecs-45, see part A of this chapter)22
- Trasco 165 kW
                                                          
22 Since Stork had already stopped manufacturing wind turbines by 1988 (see part A of this chapter),
they made no use of their certificate.
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3.8.2 The Dutch home market
The Dutch home market was given an enormous impulse by the IPW. Now that
investment subsidies were available for wind turbines, buying a wind turbine was
financially much more interesting than in the previous period. In 1988, investment
plans were presented to Novem for a total turbine capacity of 300 MW, which was
twice the goal in the year 1990, namely 150 MW.
An important change in the home market was that now, for the first time, the
electricity companies showed an interest in buying wind turbines23. Private and
institutional investors also started to invest in wind turbines. In 1988, about 80% of
the home market consisted of electricity companies and private and institutional
investors, and 20% of the market consisted of the same kind of wind turbine owners
as in the period before 1985: small companies and farms. Wind turbine co-operatives
were added to this last segment from 1988 (Hack and De Bruijne, 1988). These co-
operatives consisted of private persons who invested together in a wind turbine for
collective use. The advantage of investing in wind turbines through a co-operative
instead of privately were lower investment costs and a stronger position in
negotiations with electricity companies for buy-back tariffs. Like in the previous
period, the electricity companies still offered very low buy back tariffs to
decentralised energy producers, partly because oil prices were still very low. Only a
limited number of co-operatives were established in the Netherlands in this period and
in the following periods (Langenbach, 2000). Establishing co-operatives was not part
of Dutch culture, as it was in Denmark (see Chapter 4).
Centralised wind parks were established very quickly. In 1988, the following
centralised wind parks were set up (Hack and De Bruijne, 1988):
- A project in Urk of 25 300 kW turbines from the Belgian manufacturer HMZ. The
owner was the electricity company of Overijssel: IJsselmij. This was the largest
wind park in Europe in 1988. It was in operation before the pilot wind power
station in Sexbierum.
- A private project of 16 160 kW Bouma turbines, near Vlissingen.
- A project of 15 turbines in Zijpe, consisting of five different models (Lagerwey 75
kW, Newinco 50 kW, Newinco 100 kW, NCH 75 kW and Berewoud 80 kW).
This project was owned by the electricity company of North Holland (PEN) and
set up to compare different turbine models.
                                                          
23 However, according to a study of the management consultancy agency Krekel Van der Woerd
Wouterse BV the electricity companies were still not very enthusiastic about decentralised energy
production. The electricity companies were too passive and were reluctant to give up their monopoly
position (Krekel Van der Woerd Wouterse BV, 1988).
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- A project in Bath (Zeeland) with three 75 kW Lagerwey turbines. The owner was
a wind turbine co-operation.
- A project of 18 160 kW Bouma turbines, in Callantsoog. The owner was PEN
electricity company.
However, because of the low oil prices, these projects were only profitable because of
the high investment subsidies. In 1988, the subsidy amounted to 40-50% of the total
investment costs, but decreased to 33% in 1990 (Hack and De Bruijne, 1988).
3.8.3 Technology development: striving for large generator capacities
As mentioned above, manufacturers were 'sifted' by the IPW programme. Only
manufacturers that had a sound business plan could receive an R&D subsidy and only
owners of wind turbines that had received a BKC certificate could receive investment
subsidies. But that was not all. The direction of technology development was to a
large extent steered by the IPW programme. The investment subsidies were dependent
on the generator capacity of the wind turbine. The amount of subsidy available per
kW decreased every year (NEOM, 1986). The amounts are shown in table 3.3.
Table 3.3:  The subsidy per kW for the years 1986-1990 (source: NEOM, 1986).
Year IPW subsidy (guilders / kW)
1986 700
1987 650
1988 400
1989 250
1990 100
1991 0
As stated in section 3.7.3, up till 1985 only wind turbines with generator capacities of
less than 100 kW were approved on the ECN testfield. After 1985, wind turbines with
larger rotor capacities were developed very quickly. It can be seen from the list of the
wind parks realised in 1988 (see above) that by 1988 Newinco had already developed
a certified 100 kW turbine, Bouma had developed a certified 160 kW turbine and the
Belgian manufacturer HMZ had even sold 300 kW turbines in the Netherlands.
Furthermore, as can be seen from the list of certified wind turbines on the previous
page, in 1988 even two Dutch turbines with a generator capacity of 250 kW were
certified; they had been produced by Bouma and Newinco. And, mentioned in part A
of this section, Van der Pol/Holec erected 300 kW turbines in the Sexbierum wind
park. So, from 1986 onwards, large technological jumps were made. And these jumps
occurred in quick succession, since the amount of subsidy per kW decreased every
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year. So the sooner a large turbine could be sold, the more subsidy the turbine buyer
would receive.
This meant that Dutch turbines came onto the market which had not been thoroughly
tested. It was not for nothing that ECN called the certificates ‘limited quality
certificates’. For example, turbine reliability and life span were not tested.
Furthermore, since investment subsidies were dependent on generator capacity,
turbines were designed with an over-dimensioned rotor (Gipe, 1995). The turbine
rotors were very large in relation to the turbine blades. Such wind turbines did not
give an optimum energy yield. Turbines were optimised with regard to rotor capacity,
not to energy yield. Therefore, the Dutch turbines could not compete with the turbines
produced by foreign countries like Denmark and Germany, where these kinds of
subsidy rules did not apply (Gipe, 1995). This is a typical example of 'learning to be
fundable'. Since turbines were more fundable if they had relatively high generator
capacities, the Dutch manufacturers decided to develop wind turbines with relatively
high generator capacities.
Even larger technological steps were taken as from 1988. It was reported that
Newinco and HMZ-Netherlands were both developing a 500 kW wind turbine in 1988
(IEA, 1989). So they had taken a technological jump from 250 kW to 500 kW. The
turbines, however, were developed independently and had different characteristics.
The Newinco turbine had slightly longer blades, 34 metres compared to the 33 metres
of the HMZ-Netherlands turbine. The Newinco turbine had stall regulation (Newinco
had used blade pitch control in its previous turbines of 50 and 100 kW), whereas the
HMZ-Netherlands turbine had blade pitch regulation. The Newinco turbine had two
induction generators of 250 kW, whereas the HMZ-Netherlands turbine had one
induction generator of 250 kW (IEA, 1989).
The turbines were equipped with advanced technical features, the R&D for which had
been financed by the IPW programme (IEA, 1990). The basic principle of these
advanced features which was developed within the large-scale wind turbine
innovation subsystem was flexibility; flexibility would reduce turbine loads, thereby
reducing costs and increasing turbine life span (see part A of this chapter). The
Newinco turbine had a rather flexible hub construction and was equipped with an
innovative, electronically controlled, yaw system (IEA, 1990). The HMZ prototype
was first equipped with a teetering hub with adjustable hydraulic damping. However,
during the first test runs teetering instabilities occurred, so it was decided to change
the hub into a conservative, rigid one (IEA, 1990). In 1989, HMZ was already taking
new technological jumps: it was developing a 750 kW and a 1 MW wind turbine. The
1 MW turbine was developed in co-operation with blade manufacturer Polymarin, and
subsidised by the European Union (IEA, 1990).
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The prototypes were finished in 1989. The Newinco prototype was certified and
installed in 1989, the HMZ prototype one year later. After installation, the prototypes
were tested within the framework of the IPW programme (IEA, 1989).  Both turbines
were intended to be the first of a series (IEA, 1991). The electricity company of
Rotterdam had already ordered 15 Newinco 500 kW turbines in 1989. The order was
to be finalised after the prototype had proven to operate satisfactorily (IEA, 1990).
However, the tests were not satisfactory. The Newinco turbine lost its blade tips,
which delayed the test period by about six months (IEA, 1991). The HMZ turbine was
abandoned in the middle of 1990 because of new technical problems. A new version
was developed (IEA, 1991).
In 1990, Holec was back on the market. In spite of its bad experience with the
Sexbierum turbines, Holec was incouraged by the good conditions of the IPW
programme to develop new wind turbine manufacturing activities. By 1990, a 500 kW
turbine prototype, derived from the 300 kW Sexbierum turbines, had been developed
and was installed near Urk (IEA, 1991).
3.8.4 Technology development: building advanced wind turbines
Not only were advanced components introduced, but also completely advanced wind
turbines were built in this period. This was, in fact, one of the main goals of the IPW
programme: the provision of R&D subsidies to promote the production of advanced
wind turbines, which were cheaper than the wind turbines built up till 1986. These
new, advanced turbines would make the Dutch manufacturers more competitive on
the international market. Furthermore, they would improve the position of electricity
produced by the wind in relation to electricity produced by fossil fuels (NEOM,
1986). Since the manufacturers in the large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem
had stopped manufacturing wind turbines, the programme makers’ interest shifted to
the manufacturers in the small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem.
By December 1983, a call for tenders for the design and production of advanced wind
turbines had been launched (Hoogeveen and Kieff, 1988). The manufacturers Paques
and Berewoud both received R&D subsidies for the projects they applied. Berewoud
designed a wind turbine called the ‘Profitable Wind Turbine’ (RWT) and Paques
designed a wind turbine called the ‘Cost Effective Wind Turbine’ (KEWT). The RWT
was a down-wind turbine with a rotor diameter of 16 metres, had a generating
capacity of 80 kW and a hydraulically active blade pitch regulation. The KEWT was
even more advanced: it had passive blade pitch and a flexbeam, the idea for which
had been taken over from the ECN-Stork Flexhat project described in part A of this
chapter. The KEWT had an up-wind rotor and a generating capacity of 160 kW
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(Hoogeveen and Kieff, 1988). The detailed designs were submitted in 1986. At the
end of 1986, Paques and Berewoud merged and started building the two prototypes
together (Hoogeveen, 1986).
It turned out to be extremely difficult to implement the ideas of advanced wind
turbines in a well-functioning wind turbine. A technological jump was required that
was too large for the manufacturers. The development of the wind turbine took far
more time than expected and in 1988 the Ministry of Economic Affairs announced
that it did not intend to act as guarantor for the large overspending of the R&D
budget. The Berewoud/Paques company was declared bankrupt (Van Calmthout,
1988).
The RWT and KEWT prototypes did appear on the ECN testfield. The most advanced
turbine, the KEWT, did not function long enough for the tests to be completed. The
blades of the KEWT broke during test runs (Hoogeveen and Kieff, 1988). The turbine
was not developed further. The RWT received a Limited Quality Certificate, but after
the tests the prototype broke down. Only a few RWT turbines were sold (Stam, 2000).
3.8.5 Another approach: Lagerwey
Lagerwey was the only manufacturer who did not make these large technological
jumps. In contrast with the other Dutch manufacturers, he did not switch his focus to
electricity companies as potential turbine buyers. Instead, he kept selling relatively
small wind turbines with a generator capacity of 75 to 80 kW to farmers and small
companies.
Lagerwey had gained a lot of experience with the 75-80 kW turbine type and had
gradually improved it. He produced it in series, which enabled him to decrease the
costs per turbine. He sold hundreds of these turbines (Van Deijl, 2000; Boersma,
2000). The disadvantage of his approach was that the small turbines he produced
could hardly be sold to buyers other than farmers and small companies. He was not
able to compete in the market segment for large turbines with other Dutch
manufacturers or with foreign manufacturers from Denmark and Germany who
started to appear on the Dutch market in the period 1986-1990. Table 3.4 shows the
percentage of turbines sold to utilities by each Dutch manufacturer, NedWind,
WindMaster and Lagerwey, in the years 1990 and 1991.
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Table 3.4: The percentage of turbine capacity sold to utilities by the Dutch manufacturers in
1990 and 1991 (source: CEA, 1993).
Manufacturer Percentage of turbine capacity Percentage of turbine cap.
sold to utilities in 1990 (%) sold to utilities in 1991 (%)
NedWind 51 71
WindMaster 100 100
Lagerwey 7 5
Lagerwey did use input from research institutes to improve his relatively small 75 and
80 kW turbines, but hed did not use the information in a systematic way (Van Holten,
2000). He visited Delft University of Technology now and then, to hear what ideas
had been developed there. Then he went back to his company with the ideas he
considered useful, and started trying to apply them to his wind turbine. In this way, he
introduced into his wind turbines the principles of variable rotor speed, passive pitch
regulation and turnable hinges (Van Holten, 2000; Boersma, 2000). Lagerwey also
tested his 75 kW wind turbine on the small testfield of Delft University of Technology
(in use for testing the tipvane). While testing his turbine there, informal knowledge
transfer, based on personal contacts, took place (Van Holten, 2000; Boersma, 2000).
The other turbine manufacturers did not use the Delft testfield (Van Holten, 2000).
It should be mentioned here that in this period, Lagerwey did become involved in
producing wind turbines with larger generator capacities: multirotor turbines. The
multirotor project had already started in the NOW 2 period (1981-1985). At the
insistence of the left-wing oriented organisation Alternative Energy (EA), this project
had been fitted into the NOW 2 programme. The aim was to achieve high generator
capacities in a wind turbine based on the technological possibilities of that time: wind
turbines with a generator capacity of less than 100 kW. In 1984-1985 Lagerwey
designed a multirotor turbine of 75 kW with six rotors. These rotors were the same of
those of his 75 kW turbine had, the turbine which he had developed before 1984 and
which had begun to sell well (Lagerwey, 1986; Benner and Van der Velden, 1988).
The multirotor turbine was built and erected on the Maasvlakte, near Rotterdam, in
1986 (Paes and Van der Velden, 1986). Soon, however, it became evident that
multirotor turbines were far more difficult to operate than normal wind turbines. The
six rotors and the interactions between them produced vibrations in the multirotor
turbine with a large number of different frequencies. The interactions between these
frequencies caused very high material loads, which resulted in the breaking off of two
turbine blades in September 1986. Also wake effects around the turbine mast caused a
turbine blade to break off in the spring of 1986 (Paes and Van der Velden, 1986). In
October 1987, during a heavy storm five rotors struck the mast, causing parts of
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several blades to brake off. The turbine became very unstable, and as a result a rotor
support arm broke off as well (Benner and Van der Velden, 1988).
It was decided to remove two of the six rotors, in order to reduce the number of
frequencies in the multirotor turbine, which in turn would reduce the instability of the
turbine and the material loads (Benner and Van der Velden, 1988). Although the
turbine worked rather well after that24, further development of multirotor turbines was
not included in the IPW programme. A small company, Multiwind, was established,
and it began to produce wind turbines with two rotors. However, only a limited
number of these turbines were sold and the company went out of business (Van Deijl,
2000). This was the end of the development of multirotor turbines.
3.8.6 Financial difficulties
The R&D projects described above, set up to design large wind turbines with
advanced components or fully advanced wind turbines, cost the manufacturers a great
deal of money, in spite of the R&D subsidies they received. Furthermore, the turbine
buyers demanded financial liability from the manufacturers for the wind turbines they
sold. Many manufacturers could not fulfil these financial obligations. This resulted in
a number of mergers in the small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem. Newinco
and Bouma merged to form NedWind25, owned by Hollandia Kloos Holding BV26,
and Holec and WindMaster (the new name for HMZ Netherlands) were also
combined into one concern (Begemann) (IEA, 1992). As mentioned above, Berewoud
and Paques alsomerged in this period, but they were unable to stay in business (Van
Calmthout, 1988). The sole remaining independent manufacturer was Lagerwey.
3.8.7 Buy-back tariffs
The low buy-back tariffs payed by electricity companies to wind turbine owners for
the electricity they delivered to the electricity grid remained a serious problem.
Although profitability of wind turbine projects was increased by way of the
investment subsidies, pay-back times were still long because of the low buy-back
tariffs. In June 1984, the Centre for Energy Saving had stated that higher buy-back
                                                          
24 The turbine is still present on the Maasvlakte and is now regarded as ‘industrial heritage’ (Boersma,
2000).
25 Within NedWind, Bouma specialised in the manufacture of wind turbine blades. Later, this became
the company Rotorline. In 1999, Rotorline was taken over by the Danish blade manufacturer LM (IEA,
2000a).
26 In 1990, Hollandia Kloos tried to form a trading partnership with all Dutch turbine manufacturers,
called 'Wind Energy Netherlands BV', in order to improve the competitive position of the Dutch
turbine manufacturers (Lubbers, 1990). The trading partnership was not realised, however.
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tariffs would be justified. The buy-back tariffs should be made equal to the money
they saved because they saved fuel. According to the Centre for Energy Saving, a just
general buy-back tariff would be 13.9 cents per kWh (Werkgroep Duurzaam-
energieplan, 1984). This figure was based on a fuel factor of 9.5 MJ/kWh, a fuel
compensation comparable to that of low-sulphide oil and a capacity compensation
based on a 30% capacity saving by wind turbines. This tariff was to start in 1986, and
would increase the buy-back tariff, that 10.5 cents per kWh on average, to 13.9 cents
per kWh; an increase of 30% (Werkgroep Duurzaam-energieplan, 1984).
The proposal of the Centre for Energy Saving was not implemented in the NOW 2.
The electricity sector in the Netherlands would not allow the government to impose
buy-back tariffs. Therefore, a buy back tariff still had to be negotiated with the local
electricity company for every project. In 1988, only the Zeeland electricity company
offered a buy-back tariff that was close to the tariff proposed by the Centre for Energy
Saving: 13.6 cents per kWh (EZ/VROM, 1988).
As from 1989, the situation for decentralised electricity production seemed to
improve. The introduction of the Electricity Law in 1989 had unexpected
consequences. In accordance with this law, electricity production and distribution
were separated (Small, 1996). Large distribution companies were formed. These
companies adopted ambitious environmental action plans (MAPs) with substantial
CO2 reduction goals. The most favoured options for achieving these goals were co-
generation projects and - to a lesser degree - wind and solar energy (Small, 1996).
The Electricity Law allowed the distribution companies to create small-scale
production capacities of up to 25 MW (previously, only electricity production
companies were allowed to produce electricity). This strengthened the position of the
owners of decentralised electricity production units like wind turbines in their
negotiations with the electricity production companies (Small, 1996).
3.8.8 Windplan
In 1989, eight electricity distribution companies formed Windplan, the aim of which
was to install a total capacity of 250 MW of wind turbines by 1995 (VEEN, 1990).
Other aims of Windplan were (Kuipers and Molendijk, 1991):
- tendering for and purchasing 250 kW and 500 kW turbines according to an agreed
programme of functional requirements
- increasing the wind turbine reliability by giving quality assurance during design,
manufacture, assembly and test operation
- decreasing the price of the current 250 kW and 500 kW turbines by offering a
fairly continuous market
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- supporting the development of larger wind turbines, to be available after 1995
- obtaining governmental subsidies for the combined investment programme
The Minister of Economic Affairs, who considered electricity companies to be the
wind turbine users of the future, was strongly in favour of this plan. He decided to
devote a large amount of money to it. However, in 1993 Windplan was dissolved,
although only a small part of the money had been spent and only a small part of the
250 MW of wind turbines had been installed. One of the reasons for dissolving
Windplan was the very high demands that the distribution companies made on the
wind turbines, which would involve major technological adaptations to the turbines.
The Dutch turbine manufacturers could not satisfy these demands (Gipe, 1995).
Furthermore, erecting wind turbines in the Netherlands became very difficult because
of siting problems, which often led to the cancellation or delay of wind turbine
projects. This must also have reduced the interest of the distribution companies in
wind turbines.
3.8.9 Siting problems
Because in the period 1986-1991 the number of wind turbines in the Netherlands
suddenly started to grow relatively fast, siting problems began. Since the Netherlands
ia a small country, many Dutch nationals had problems with the erection of wind
turbine parks near their homes (Wolsink, 1991). Furthermore, municipalities were
reluctant to grant the building permits that were required to erect a wind turbine or a
number of wind turbines. The municipalities’ development plans also caused
problems. Wind turbines in principle did not fit into these development plans
(Wolsink, 1996). Therefore, changing the development plan for a wind turbine (park)
required consent from the local council to change the development plan. Often this
consent was not given and even if it was, the project was delayed.
The Environment Premium Regulation was a new device for increasing the market.
The owners of wind turbines sited in windy regions and of wind turbines producing
very little noise could receive a premium. A total budget of 16 million guilders was
available (Small, 1996). In spite of this extra regulation, siting problems remained.
The 100-150 MW capacity by 1990, the in-between goal of the IPW programme, was
not achieved by far. By 1990, only 40 MW of wind turbines had been installed (IEA,
2000a) (see figure 3.8). Strangely enough, the goals were not adjusted again. The goal
of 1,000 MW in the year 2000 remained. In 1990, a new goal was set: 2,000 MW by
the year 2010, of which 1,800 MW was to be erected on land and 200 MW at sea
(Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1990).
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Increasing concern about the environment and the effects of carbon dioxide resulting
from the burning of fossil fuels gave a new impetus to energy saving and renewable
energy. In total, the government made 651 million guilders available for the period
1990-2000 (Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1990). Although the goal in 1986
had been that by 1990 wind energy would no longer need government support, it was
decided that the support for wind energy had to continue. A new support programme,
the TWIN programme, was launched in 1992. This programme will be described in
the section 3.9.1.
In 1991, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Housing, Spatial
Planning and the Environment tried to solve the siting problem by signing an
agreement with the Dutch windy provinces, the seven Dutch provinces along the
coast. Each windy province committed itself to the installation of a specific total wind
turbine capacity before the year 2000. The total turbine capacity in the year 2000
would be 1,000 MW, which was the IPW goal (Novem, 1991b).
The development of wind turbine capacity in this period is represented in figure 3.8.
The market share per manufacturer for projects approved in 1986-1992 is represented
in table 3.5. Table 3.6 shows the newly installed capacity in the Netherlands and the
percentage of this capacity installed by the utiltities.
Figure 3.8: Cumulative installed wind turbine capacity in the Netherlands in the period 1986-
1991 (source: IEA, 2000a).
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Table 3.5: Market share per manufacturer for projects approved in 1986-1992 (source: IEA,
1993).
Manufacturer Turbine capacity (MW) Percentage of total (%)
NedWind 48 53
WindMaster 25 27
Lagerwey 9 9
Micon 10 11
Table 3.6: Newly installed capacity, per year, and the percentage of this capacity that is
owned by the utilities27 (source: CEA, 1993).
Year Newly installed capacity (MW)  Percentage owned by utilities (%)
1986 0.6 50
1987 9.0 86
1988 7.1 76
1989 12.1 69
1990 16.7 58
1991 33.8 89
3.8.10 The small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem in 1986-1991
During this period, the number of manufacturers in the small-scale wind turbine
innovation subsystem decreased sharply. Of the twelve manufacturers that were in
business in 1986, only three remained in 1991: Lagerwey, NedWind and WindMaster.
The research institute ECN was still important in the subsystem, because of the ECN
testfield. Delft University of Technology was included in the subsystem because
manufacturer Lagerwey used input from this university in his products.
The number of users grew enormously in this period. Not only farmers and small
companies, but also private and institutional investors and electricity companies
showed an interest in buying wind turbines. The main reasons for this were the
investment subsidies, which greatly improved the profitability of a wind turbine
project.
The Ministry of Economic Affairs played a more important role than in the previous
period. Besides creating better preconditions for the turbine manufacturers, the
Ministry also steered technology development by making the investment subsidies
dependent on the generator capacity of the wind turbine and by making the R&D
                                                          
27 See section 4.8.6 for a comparable table on the Danish situation.
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subsidy to manufacturers dependent on the business plan of the manufacturers and on
the advanced features of the wind turbine R&D project they submitted. The
intermediaries were still responsible for handing out the subsidies. Figure 3.9 depicts
the small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem in the period 1986-1991.
Figure 3.9: The small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem in the period 1986-1991.
3.8.11 Conclusion
Let us now turn to the learning processes in the small-scale wind turbine subsystem in
this period. Learning processes in the subsystem changed drastically in this period.
Whereas in the previous periods learning by doing was the major learning process for
the turbine manufacturers, it was now learning by searching that increased in
importance. Learning by doing increased compared to the previous period, because far
more turbines were produced and serial production began. The more turbines that
were produced, the more experience was gained in how to produce them in the most
efficient way. Furthermore, since more wind turbines were sold, more problems had
to be solved. Problem-solving increased knowledge about the functioning and
possible failure of wind turbines. On the ECN testfield, a lot of learning by doing
occurred, because the manufacturers made improvements to their turbines during the
test period.
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Learning by using increased as well, since the number of users increased. The
electricity companies in particular obtained knowledge about wind turbines. They
became acquainted with technical features and found out how to obtain building
permits and how to persuade local councils to change development plans.
Learning by searching, which was of no importance in the previous periods, became
important in the period 1986-1991. Manufacturers started to use models developed by
ECN to design their wind turbines. Furthermore, searching by ECN was used as an
input for developing ever larger turbines with advanced components, and completely
advanced turbines. However, the small manufacturers found it very difficult to apply
the results of learning by searching. There were many problems with the advanced
components and the advanced turbines did not work at all.
Learning by interacting was important too. Manufacturers interacted with ECN on the
testfield and while designing advanced turbines and turbine components. ECN was
forced to make its search results applicable to the industry, so the gap between the
theoretical thinking of ECN researchers and the more practical approach of the turbine
manufacturers was becoming smaller. A problem was that results of ECN research
often became available too late. Because there was a large pressure on the
manufacturers to innovate, they needed research results fast. There were still
communication problems between ECN and manufacturers. Lagerwey interacted
particularly with Delft University of Technology researchers. He learned a great deal
from them by personal contacts and by listening to their ideas. The manufacturers still
hardly read any of the scientific reports (Dekker, 2000).
Manufacturers also still learned about their turbines by interacting with turbine users.
The manufacturers who sold turbines to electricity companies learned about the
frames of meaning of the new turbine buyers. Differences between the frames of
meaning of the electricity companies and the manufactures became especially
important in Windplan, when these differences turned out to be irreconcilable.
A new form of learning by interacting was learning to be 'fundable'. Not every turbine
was still fundable. The higher the generator capacity and/or the more advanced the
features, the more fundable it was. Furthermore, the manufacturers needed to have a
sound business plan before they were eligible for R&D funds. Another important
learning aspect was connected with the siting problem. Before one could erect a
turbine, more and more problems had to be overcome, such as obtaining a building
permit and persuading local councils to change development plans. This involved the
acquisition of new skills.
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3.9 1992 - 2000
3.9.1 The TWIN programme
In 1992, the IPW programme was replaced by the TWIN programme (Application of
Wind Energy in the Netherlands). The TWIN programme period lasted from 1992 to
1995. The aims of the TWIN programme were (Novem, 1991a):
- the installation of a total capacity of 400 MW in 1995, 1,000 MW in 2000 and
2,000 MW in 2010; this was to be achieved by means of subsidies, the provision
of information and data monitoring.
- the improvement of existing turbines and the development of a larger turbine,
which would lead to better price-performance ratios.
- providing a scientific basis for industrial development.
- the installation of 200 MW offshore by 2010; this was to be achieved by drawing
up a development plan and by developing an offshore wind turbine.
3.9.2 Providing a scientific basis for industrial development
The Flexhat project, in which advanced flexible wind turbine components had been
designed and developed on the basis of scientific research (see part A of this chapter)
had ended in 1991. Some results of this research had been used in the KEWT and
RWT turbine developments by the manufacturers Berewoud and Paques, as described
in section 3.8.4. The KEWT and RWT developments had not resulted in good wind
turbines. The jump from scientific development to the application of the ideas to
turbines had proven to be too large for the Dutch manufacturers. Therefore, the main
conclusion in the evaluation report of the Flexhat project was that the results of the
project were not applicable to the Dutch industrial development. Furthermore, there
was doubt about whether the promised price reduction of 30% would be ifthe
advanced components were used (Hagg et al., 1992).
This unfavourable outcome of the Flexhat project caused the TWIN programme
managers to adopt a different approach. From then on, scientific research could only
receive TWIN research subsidies if the results were applicable to turbine
manufacturers and if scientific research were initiated by the turbine manufacturers.
This pre-requisite was defined by the industrial platform, which had been established
in 1991 (IEA, 1992).
3.9.3 Cumulative installed capacity
Investment subsidies were to expire by the year 1996. Then, they were to be replaced
by fiscal instruments. This led to a large increase in wind turbine capacity up till
Wind energy in the Netherlands
121
1996: capacity rose from 40 MW in 1990 to 250 MW in 1995. In 1996, only 52 MW
were installed and in the following years even less (see figure 3.10). Table 3.7 shows
the market share per turbine producer on the Dutch market in 1993 and 1997. The
advance of foreign manufacturers into the Dutch market is clear.
Figure 3.10: Cumulative installed wind turbine capacity in the Netherlands in the period
1992-2000 (source: IEA, 2000a; Wind Service Holland, 2001).
Table 3.7: Market share per turbine producer on the Dutch market in 1993 and 1997 (sources:
CEA, 1993; IEA, 1998).
Manufacturer Market share in 1993 (%) Market share in 1997 (%)
NedWind 40 11
WindMaster 28 30
Lagerwey 11 0
Micon 15 0
Enercon 4 0
Vestas 0 20
Nordtank 0 22
Bonus 0 17
Rest 2 0
3.9.4 Siting problems
The major obstacle was that siting problems remained and even increased. The
Agreement with the seven windy provinces did not work at all. The bodies that were
to grant building permits and change development plans were the local councils.
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These local councils were not party to the negotiations for the Agreement with the
seven windy provinces. Therefore, they did not feel like co-operating (Wolsink,
1996). Resistance from local inhabitants remained high. The main objections related
to the noise produced by the wind turbines and their dominating presence in the
landscape (Wolsink, 1991). The siting problems meant that project developers,
individual wind turbine buyers and turbine manufacturers needed great skill in
negotiating with local councils and inhabitants. Another obstacle was still the buy-
back tariffs. In 1994, these tariffs were still low and differed per electricity company
(Gipe, 1995).
3.9.5 Developing even larger wind turbines
Foreign manufacturers had begun to enter the Dutch market in this period. Especially
Danish turbines, and later also German turbines, sold relatively well on the Dutch
market; they sold better than Dutch turbines. The Danish turbines had a better price-
performance ratio, because they were more reliable and were larger (Boersma, 2000).
This increased pressure on the Dutch manufacturers to develop better and larger wind
turbines. Another reason for developing better and larger wind turbines was the
extremely fierce competition on the foreign markets (e.g. Germany) (Boersma, 2000).
Even Lagerwey, who until then had sold only wind turbines of 75 kW and 80 kW,
started developing a larger wind turbine. The 75 kW and 80 kW wind turbines had
sold very well until then, and had a good reputation. But the siting problems made the
installation of small stand-alone turbines in the Dutch landscape almost impossible. If
wind turbines had to be erected, local councils preferred wind parks with large
turbines. Therefore, Lagerwey decided to start focusing on the development of larger
wind turbines (Boersma, 2001). He made a large jump in terms of turbine capacity:
from 80 kW to 250 kW. The new turbine was to be a scaled-up version of the 80 kW
turbine. Development started in 1992. In 1994, the turbine, with rotor blades of 27
metres, received its certificate (IEA, 1995). However, the turbine gave many
problems; it frequently lost rotor blades (Boersma, 2001). Lagerwey decided to
develop a low-wind version of the 250 kW turbine as well: a turbine with rotor blades
of 30 metres. This turbine was certified in 1996 (IEA, 1997). Stork contributed to the
development of this version (Verbruggen, 2000).
At the same time, Lagerwey developed an even larger turbine: with a generating
capacity of 750 kW. The problems with the 250 kW turbine showed that it could not
be scaled up any further (Van Deijl, 2000). Therefore, a totally new concept was
introduced for the 750 kW turbine: a direct drive generator. Development of the
prototype took Lagerwey about five years; it took him a long time to figure out how it
all worked and how it could best be manufactured (Van Deijl, 2000). The direct drive
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generator was designed especially for the turbine. Delft University of Technology
helped with the design (IEA, 1999). For his previous turbines, Lagerwey had used
standard generators that were currently available and therefore cheaper. However,
large standard generators, needed for 750 kW wind turbines, have a large risk of
failure and produce a lot of heat (Van Deijl, 2000). Therefore, Lagerweij chose to use
a direct drive generator. Technological progress in direct drive generators, e.g. in their
regulation systems, made them more reliable and suitable for application in wind
turbines (Van Deijl, 2000).
The 750 kW turbine had a variable rotor speed, which allowed a large amount of
energy to be stored in the rotor. Power was regulated by three independently pitchable
blades. This regulation was also used for braking. The problem of lagging pitch
regulation (see the sections on the HAT-25 in part A of this chapter) was still not
solved. But the extra rotor power caused by lagging pitch regulation could be stored in
the rotor because of the variable rotor speed. The development of this turbine cost a
few million guilders. The pay-back time was about 10 years, the turbine’s life span
was 20 years (Van Deijl, 2000). Even while beginning to develop the 750 kW turbine,
Lagerwey started procedures for obtaining permits in a municipality in the province of
North Brabant. This meant that the permits had been issued by the time the prototype
had been developed (Van Deijl, 2000).
Lagerwey had always been independent and had never accepted much input from the
research institutes. He developed the 250 kW and 750 kW turbines mainly from his
own resources (Verbruggen, 2000). He did use design models, but he still relied on his
trial and errror method. But developing such large turbines by way of trial-and-error is
a risky business and gave Lagerwey financial problems in 1996. Stork considered a
take over, but decided against it. Also plans for co-operation did not work out. The
R&D approaches at Lagerwey and Stork so different they could never result in a
fruitful co-operation (Verbruggen, 2000). Lagerwey solved his financial problems by
carrying out a major reorganisation (Boersma, 2000).
A prototype of the 750 kW turbine with a 45 metre rotor was built in 1995 and tests
started in 1996. The tests showed that the rotor could be enlarged to 50 metres (IEA,
1997). An enlarged rotor was installed in 1997 and by 1998 the turbine received its
certificate and was put into operation (IEA, 1999). By the year 2000, two 750 kW
turbines had been sold. Of the 250 kW turbines, a few hundred had been sold to India
and orders had been received from Japan and Germany (Van Deijl, 2000; IEA,
2000a). Export to these countries was a way to circumvent the Dutch siting problems.
However, in the case of newly developed turbines, it is important to sell them first on
the home market, so that problems can be observed and solved quickly. This is the
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way Lagerwey developed his small wind turbines: he sold them on the home market
and learned by solving their problems.
3.9.6 WindMaster and NedWind
In 1992, the 500 kW wind turbine from NedWind was used in many wind parks.
WindMaster had developed an even larger turbine: a 750 kW wind turbine with a 40-
metre rotor. In 1992, the prototype was tested. The noise level turned out to be very
high: 103 dB (IEA, 1993). After scientific research, the noise level was brought down
to 98 dB. In 1993, the turbine was extensively redesigned. The rotor diameter was
increased to 43.2 metres (IEA, 1994). Certification started in 1994 (IEA, 1995).
In 1996, WindMaster designed a larger rotor for the turbine: a 48 metre rotor, which
could be used in areas with lower winds. The rotor was designed with the help of
advanced dynamic rotor optimisation computer codes, developed by ECN (IEA,
1997). WindMaster also bought the rights of the Markham 45/600 technology, a
variable-speed, three bladed, pitch-controlled wind turbine. The goal was to have a
range of turbines from 600 to 900 kW for high and low wind speed sites available by
1997. All WindMasters turbines were to have variable speeds, three blades and full
network adaptable features (IEA, 1997; IEA, 1998).
In December 1998, the costs of all this technology development became too high for
WindMaster and it went bankrupt. Turbine sales had been low, since the Dutch
market had become very limited and WindMaster’s wind turbines did not have a good
reputation (Verbruggen, 2000). The remainder of WindMaster’s properties and most
of the employees were taken over by Lagerwey. In this way, the knowledge and skills
of the WindMaster company remained in the small-scale wind turbine subsystem
(Verbruggen, 2000).
In the meantime, in 1992 NedWind had started developing a 52.6 m / 1 MW wind
turbine with financial support from the European Union. The turbine was an up-scaled
version of the 500 kW NedWind turbine. It had a two-speed conversion system, two
blades and stall control (IEA, 1993). Stork co-operated with NedWind in the
development of the turbine. Stork made the load calculations and the conceptual
design, while NedWind made the detailed design. Stork used the Flexlast design
programme, a result of the Flexhat project, for the load calculations (Verbruggen,
2000). The co-operation went rather well, although the approach of both companies
was very different. Stork was an engineering company, while NedWind specialised in
building.  Two prototypes were erected: one in North Holland and one in Groningen.
The utilities of these provinces were to operate the turbines for a year (IEA, 1993). In
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1994, the rotor of the 1 MW turbine was enlarged to 55 metres and the turbine was
certified (IEA, 1995).
Furthermore, NedWind scaled up the 250 kW turbine to 300 kW. There were high
hopes for the 300 kW turbine, but only a few were sold, because the turbine was much
smaller than other wind turbines available (Verbruggen, 2000). Furthermore, it had
two blades, as had all NedWind turbinse, to save costs. This proved to be the wrong
choice, since the Dutch consider two-bladed wind turbines to be uglier than three-
bladed ones. This made the siting problems for two-bladed turbines even greater than
those for three-bladed turbines.
The small Dutch market and the enormous competition on the foreign markets made
NedWind decide to stop designing new wind turbines. Only the 500 kW and the 1
MW turbine were re-designed. However, the financial situation of the company
deteriorated and in July 1998 it was taken over by the Danish company NEG-Micon
(IEA, 1999). As from 1999 only one Dutch turbine manufacturer remained:
Lagerwey.
3.9.7 Wind energy policy
In spite of the manufacturers’ problems, the Dutch government kept pushing for more
wind power. The targets of 1,000 MW in 2000 and 2,000 MW in 2010 were not
reduced, although they could not be met by far: by 1998, only 396 MW of wind
turbines had been installed (Wind Service Holland, 2000). A plan of action for
renewable energy was set up, stressing the importance of R&D for achieving the
goals. R&D were to be stimulated by extra funding (Novem, 1996b). Furthermore,
private producers were to receive adequate remuneration for electricity they supplied
to the electricity net. The TWIN-2 programme, launched in 1996, still aimed at
making wind energy competitive with fossil fuels by improving the price-performance
ratio of wind turbines by 30% in the year 2000. The total TWIN budget was 68.8
million guilders (Novem, 1996b). Research into advanced concepts was still
considered very important, although the applicability of this research to Dutch wind
turbines was still limited.
3.9.8 Wind turbines at sea
Forced by the siting problems, in 1996, Novem had research conducted into the
economic feasibility of non-traditional locations such as locations with low wind
speeds and locations offshore. Since there seemed to be no possibility of erecting
many more wind turbines on land, all attention became focused the erection of wind
turbines offshore (Novem, 1996c).
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In 1997, a feasibility study was performed on wind energy in the North Sea. The
scheme turned out to have great potential (Novem, 1997). Therefore, two projects
were launched by Novem: the near-shore project and the Dowec project. The aim of
the near-shore project is to build a medium-sized wind park in the North Sea near the
shore. The wind park will used to gain knowledge about how to build wind turbines at
sea and to find out what effects a wind park at sea will have on birds and horizon
pollution. In the feasibility study two locations were considered: near the shore at
IJmuiden and near the mouth of the Westerschelde (Novem, 1997).
In 1999, a third location, Egmond, was chosen for the wind park. This immediately
gave rise to protests from the Egmond inhabitants. Participation procedures took a lot
of time and delayed the project considerably. In 2001, a call for tenders was issued,
consortia were invited to submit proposals in 2002. In the meantime, another party
had become interested in building wind parks at sea, not near-shore like the project
described above, but really offshore. There is a chance that, like in the case of the
Sexbierum pilot wind power station, a commercial wind park will be established in
the North Sea before the pilot wind park is completed.
The goal of the second project, called Dowec (Dutch Offshore Wind Energy
Convertor), is to build a 5 MW offshore turbine. This turbine is to be based on new
technological insights and will represent a major technological jump forwards. It is
clear that the paradigm on how to steer technological development has not changed
since 1975. As an in-between goal a 3 MW offshore turbine is to be designed
(Janssen, 1998). The aim was to make the Dutch manufacturers co-operate in
developing an offshore wind turbine. In the first phase of the project, which started at
the end of 1997, 70% of all R&D costs were funded by the government on condition
that all knowledge obtained would be shared between the manufacturers. In this
phase, generally applicable knowledge about offshore turbines was to be developed
(Janssen, 1998). However, because the manufacturers still mistrusted each other and
were very busy developing of onshore turbines, they were not very enthusiastic about
the Dowec project. At the beginning of 1998, only NedWind was still involved in the
project. After NedWind had been taken over by Neg-Micon, Dutch manufacturers
were no longer involved in the project (ECN, 2001).
3.9.9 The small-scale wind turbine subsystem in the period 1992-2000
At the beginning of this period, three manufacturers participated in the subsystem:
NedWind, WindMaster and Lagerwey. By 2000, only Lagerwey was left. As in the
previous period, turbine buyers were mainly electricity companies and project
developers. The number of farmers and small companies buying turbines decreased
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considerably, because of the siting problems. The number of electricity companies
and project developers buying wind turbines decreased as well. The role of the
research institutes increased. They co-operated with the manufacturers in the
development of new wind turbines. The Ministry of Economic Affairs continued to
play an important role. It still aimed at actively steering technology development.
Subsidies were provided by the intermediary organisation Novem. The small-scale
wind turbine innovation subystem is depicted in figure 3.11.
Figure 3.11: The small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem in the period 1992-2000.
3.9.10 Conclusion
Let us summarise the learning processes in this period. Learning by searching was
important, as in the previous period. The manufacturers used computer programmes
for designing their turbines and used input and help from research institutes. Some
results of the Flexhat project were used by Lagerwey and by other manufacturers.
Furthermore, at the end of this period the research institutes explored the possibilities
of wind power at sea. However, the spin-off to the Dutch manufacturers was limited.
Learning by doing, the basis of the development strategy of the small manufacturers,
remained very important. During the tests and the operation of the newly developed
turbines, much knowledge was gained on how the turbines could be improved. Trial-
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and-error methods were still used, although less frequently because such methods are
much more expensive when applied to large wind turbines. Learning by doing could
not be used optimally, because due to the large pressure on technology development,
the development of the next turbine had often already started when the testing of the
prototype of the previous turbine had hardly begun. Consequently, learning results
from previous models could hardly be used for follow-up models.
Learning by interacting with users continued to be an important way of learning from
problems in the turbines. There was still no learning by interacting between
manufacturers; the manufacturers still did not trust each other and did not intend to
co-operate, not even in the development of generally applicable knowledge. Learning
by interacting with research organisations became more important. ECN, Delft
University of Technology and Stork researchers were involved in some turbine
development projects. However, since the approach of the manufacturers was still
very different from that of the research institutes, co-operation was still sometimes
difficult, and learning by interacting was not very effective.
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4 Wind energy in Denmark
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Poul la Cour and F.L. Smidth
Denmark’s experience with wind turbines that produce electricity started before 1973.
The Danish physics professor and wind pioneer Poul la Cour began experimenting
with wind generated electricity in 1891 (Gipe, 1995). La Cour was a very  versatile
scientist, who combined knowledge obtained from machine construction, electrical
engineering and aerodynamics with craft pragmatism (Heymann, 1995). Around
1903, he developed the 'Klapsejler', a simple, robust and reliable windmill that
produced direct current electricity (Heymann, 1998). This windmill helped introduce
electricity into Denmark’s countryside and helped Denmark overcome severe fossil
fuel shortages during the Second World War. La Cour saw electricity as a progressive
force in the restructuring of society. He was engaged in several activities for public
enlightenment (Jørgensen and Karnøe, 1995). In order to solve the problem of the
intermittent nature of the wind, he combined wind turbines with storage of electrical
energy by way of batteries and by separating water. With financial support from the
Danish government, he improved the aerodynamic design of the blades and designed
a wind turbine with two, three or four narrow blades.
During the Second World War, another type of windmill was built: F.L. Smidth’s
more modern Aeromotor. Smidth used the experience he had gained by working with
concrete while building concrete wind turbine towers. He used knowledge from the
rapidly advancing field of aerodynamics to develop modern airfoils for the turbine
blades. The laminated wooden blades of the turbine were coned towards the tower
(Gipe, 1995). The wind turbine’s maximum capacity was 70 kW. It was designed with
two or three blades and various overspeed regulations: pitch, variable rotor speed and
brake flaps on the blades (Karnøe, 1991). Smidth developed and manufactured 60
Aeromotors. Because the wooden blades were failure-prone, the maintenance costs of
these wind turbines were high (Jørgensen and Karnøe, 1995). After the Second World
War, the small decentralised windmills that produced direct current were quickly
replaced by large, centralised, power plants that produced alternating current from
fossil fuels.
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4.1.2 Johannes Juul
In the 1940s, the Danish technician Johannes Juul began to develop wind turbines that
produced alternating current that could be connected to the electricity grid. According
to Juul, the wind turbines could reduce Denmark’s dependence on fossil fuel imports.
Juul, an electrician, started his wind turbine activities after his retirement. Before that,
he had worked at the SEAS utility in Sealand, building and maintaining electrical
installations and developing new electrical devices. In 1947, by order of the SEAS,
utility he started to research wind power (Heymann, 1998). SEAS let Juul start this
research because it faced an energy shortage in the late 1940s (Jørgensen and Karnøe,
1995). Juul received considerable support for his design and development work  not
only from SEAS, but also from the Association of Danish Utility Companies
(Heymann, 1999).
In 1948, Juul built a wind tunnel which he used for testing blade profiles and rotor
designs. In 1949, he built his first small, 15 kW wind turbine with an 8 metre rotor
diameter (Gipe, 1995; Hvidtfelt Nielsen, 1999). This wind turbine was equipped with
a rotor that had two rigid blades facing down-wind and with passive yaw control. It
produced AC electricity and was connected to the SEAS electricity grid. Power output
was controlled mainly by stalling and by additional air brakes at the pitchable blade
tips (Heymann, 1998; Karnøe, 1991). The construction was very stiff. The turbine was
called the wind motor.
By operating and testing the wind motor, Juul gained a great deal of knowledge,
which was essential for the development of his wind turbine design. However, after
three months of operation, one of the blades broke as a result of fatigue. Juul solved
the problem by fitting new blades and placing additional small rods between the
blades. After another four months of testing, another blade bent from fatigue. Juul
inserted more rods for further blade support. He concluded that equipping the wind
turbine with three blades, joined by rods would reduce the fatigue even further. He
realised that the down-wind position of the rotor combined with insufficient yaw
caused unwanted vibrations in the turbine. Therefore, he moved the rotor to the up-
wind position and added active yaw control, which proved to be a superior solution
(Heymann, 1998).
In 1952, Juul built a somewhat larger, 40 kW wind turbine with an up-wind three-
bladed rotor and active yaw control. This turbine was a modified Smidth turbine
(Gipe, 1995). Because it operated satisfactorily, Juul felt encouraged to take another
step: in 1956 near Gedser on the island of Falster he built a larger, 100 kW wind
turbine, and later enlarged it to a 200 kW turbine with a 24 meter rotor. The turbine
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was built with 300,000 DKK support from the Marshall plan (Jørgensen and Karnøe,
1995). In the manufacturing process Juul was assisted by the technical staff of the
SEAS utility (Hvidtfelt Nielsen, 1999).
Juul equipped the Gedser turbine with design features that he had developed while
operating his previous wind turbines: a concrete tower, three blades rigidly fixed to
the hub and supported by several rods, stall control combined with passive pitchable
blade tips, an up-wind rotor, and active yaw control. As an extra overspeed
precaution, the turbine was fitted with a mechanical brake in the generator shaft
(Hvidtfelt Nielsen, 1999). The turbine blades were made of wood covered with
aluminium plates (Jørgensen and Karnøe, 1995). He used this simple material,
because of shortages of materials like glass fibre (Karnøe, 1991). Juul’s design
calculations were very basic and simple, but they worked. The main design criteria
were simplicity, security and low cost (Heymann, 1998). Juul had taken over these
criteria from La Cour’s windmills, which he had seen when he was very young
(Karnøe, 1991). These criteria were to be the basis for the success of the Danish wind
turbine manufacturers two decades later.
The test operation period of the Gedser turbine lasted from 1957 until 1967. In this
period, the turbine worked reliably. It produced 2.2 million kWh and was capable of
producing 350,000 kWh annually (Gipe, 1995). However, by 1962, the SEAS utility
had concluded, on the basis of economic calculations, that the wind turbine was
unable to compete with fossil fuels. SEAS based its conclusions on the Windpower
Commission's28 view that the cost-effectiveness of wind turbines should be calculated
not from the value of the electricity they produced, but from the amount of fossil fuel
saved in the power stations (Jørgensen and Karnøe, 1995). Although the Gedser
turbine was a success from a technical point of view, operation was stopped for
economic reasons (Heymann, 1998; Hvidtfelt Nielsen, 1999). The costs of the
electricity produced by the Gedser turbine were two times higher than they were
allowed to be for profitable operation (Heymann, 1995).
4.1.3 The oil crisis
The 1973 oil crisis both in the Netherlands and in Denmark triggered the development
of new activities in the field of wind energy. In contrast to the Netherlands, Denmark
had no fossil fuel resources of its own. Therefore, Denmark was even more dependent
on other countries for the provision of energy. In 1973, about 94% of the country’s
energy supply consisted of imported oil; the remaining 6% consisted of foreign solid
fuels, like coal (Heymann, 1998; Hvidtfelt Nielsen, 2001).
                                                          
28 This commission was founded in 1950 to support and supervise Juul’s efforts (Heymann, 1999).
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Both in the Netherlands and in Denmark we can distinguish two different wind
turbine development paths after 1973: large-scale and small-scale. Both development
paths had their own innovation subsystem. In part A of this chapter, we will describe
the developments within the large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem. In part B,
we will describe the developments within the small-scale wind turbine innovation
subsystem. Since these descriptions are based merely on secondary material, they will
be less elaborate than those in the previous chapter. General conclusions about both
subsystems will be drawn in Chapter 5.
Part A: The large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem
4.2 1975 - 1976
After the 1973 oil crisis, the Danish Academy for Technical Science did some
research into the possibilities for wind energy in Denmark. In 1975, the conclusions of
this research were published: wind resources were plentiful and about 50 million
DKK would be enough to establish a technology base to start the production of wind
turbines (Karnøe, 1991). In about 10-15 years these wind turbines would be able to
provide 10% of the energy needed in Denmark, at competitive prices. No reserve
capacity would be needed if only 10% of the energy or less was provided by wind
turbines. If the percentage increased, a small amount of reserve capacity would be
needed to provide energy when there was no wind blowing (Karnøe, 1991; Gipe,
1995).
4.3 1977 - 1980
4.3.1 The Wind Power Programme
The conclusions of the investigations of the Danish Academy for Technical Science
resulted in the setting up of a Danish development programme for wind energy in
1977. The main objective was to determine under what circumstances and to what
degree wind energy could make a contribution to the Danish electricity supply system
(IEA, 1985). Within the programme, called the Wind Power Programme, the research
organisation Risø National Laboratory and the Technical University of Denmark were
to develop the knowledge needed to build large wind turbines (Van Est, 1999). It was
envisaged that large wind turbine parks owned and operated by utilities would be built
by a consortium of large Danish firms. The Federal Wind Energy Programme in the
United States served as an R&D model for the Wind Power Programme (Van Est,
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1997). Like the Federal Wind Energy Programme, the Danish programme relied on
scientific knowledge and the efforts of large industrial firms (Van Est, 1999).
The first phase of this development programme lasted from 1977 till 1980 and had a
budget of 35 million DKK. Of this budget, 82% went towards the development of
large wind turbines and 18% towards the development of small wind turbines (see
part B of this chapter) (Karnøe, 1991). In the first phase of the Wind Power
Programme, a new measurement programme was carried out on the 20-year-old
Gedser wind turbine. This was done in co-operation with the United States Ministry
of Energy. The fact that the Gedser turbine was the only wind turbine in the world
with such a large capacity, and had been in operation without technical problems for
10 years made both the Danes and the Americans very interested in performing
measurements on that turbine. In 1977 the Gedser turbine was restored and put into
test operation until March 1979, with positive results (Heymann, 1998).
In 1977, a Danish delegation visited the United States. The official objectives of this
visit were threefold (Van Est, 1999):
- to keep abreast of the American research plans
- to maintain and extend the contact between the American and Danish Wind Power
Programmes
- to discuss the Danish-American co-operation in the Gedser measurement
programme.
However, a fourth, more practical objective was perhaps even more important: the
delegates wanted to buy a ready-made rotor, or, if that turned out to be impossible, a
calculation method to construct a Danish rotor (Van Est, 1999). They did not achieve
this fourth objective. The large American companies engaged in wind energy, e.g.
Hamilton-Standard, were not interested in selling technological know-how. They were
willing to export glass fibre reinforced polyester rotor blades, but their price was so
high that the Danish delegation could not afford to buy them (Karnøe, 1998; Van Est,
1999). This forced the Danes to start developing their own modern wind turbine
blades. The challenge was taken up by the Risø research institute. Like the Dutch
research institute ECN, Risø was set up in the 1950s as a nuclear energy research
institute and had not gained any experience in the field of wind energy before the
1970s.
After the Gedser measurement programmes, the American and Danish large turbine
development programmes started to follow different paths. Whereas the Americans
chose to elaborate on the scientifically more elegant design concept of the German
Hütter, the Danes decided to take the main features of over Juul’s design.
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Besides setting up wind turbine R&D, the Wind Power Programme aimed to set up a
complete wind turbine innovation system. Since the utilities were foreseen to be the
future buyers of the wind turbines, they were directly involved in the management of
the Wind Power Programme. The programme was co-ordinated by the joint research
institutes of the Danish Utilities, DEFU (Van Est, 1997; IEA, 1985).
4.3.2 The Nibe wind turbines
In 1977, before the test results for the Gedser wind turbine became available, it was
decided to build two prototype wind turbines at Nibe in northern Jutland. These wind
turbines were to have three blades, an up-wind rotor of 40 metres, an active yaw
system and a power capacity of 630 kW. The large upscaling step from 200 kW and
630 kW clearly reveals the idea that wind turbine technology would be very
straightforward and that only large wind turbines would be able to make a significant
contribution to the country’s energy provision. The goal was to develop and produce
on the basis of the Nibe turbines 500 to 600 large wind turbines with power capacities
between 500 kW and 1 MW, from 1985 until 1990 (Karnøe, 1991).
Because of limited financial resources, the turbine rotor blades were not made entirely
of glass fibre reinforced polyester. Instead, a hybrid structure was chosen, consisting
of both steel and glass fibre reinforced polyester. The main difference between both
Nibe wind turbines was the power control system: the Nibe A turbine had a stall-
controlled rotor, like the Gedser turbine, whereas the Nibe B turbine had pitch control.
Alle turbine components were manufactured in Denmark. The blades of the two
turbines were designed at Risø, and the rest of the design work was done in the
Department of Fluid Mechanics at the Technical University of Denmark (Van Est,
1997). The turbines were financed partly by the Ministry of Energy and partly by the
utility SEAS (Karnøe, 1991).
No Danish company was interested in building the Nibe prototype. Therefore, the
turbines were procured on a multi-contract basis. A range of companies with different
technical skills were contracted. Sometimes, e.g. in the case of the 20 metre long
blades, it was difficult to find a Danish company with the right expertise. Companies
that built turbine components include (Karnøe, 1991):
- F.L. Smidth from Copenhagen, which built the gear of the Nibe B
- Thrige Titan from Odense, which built the generator and the electrical system
- Frichs from Århus, which constructed most of the machine parts
The Nibe A turbine was connected to the electricity grid in September 1979, the Nibe
B turbine in August 1980 (IEA, 1984). In the first few months, the trials revealed a
large number of problems, so the trial period was extended from days to months. The
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most serious problem was metal fatigue in the steel parts of the rotor blades (Van Est,
1999).
4.3.3 The large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem in 1977-1980
In this period, the large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem was set up in
Denmark. All important actors were represented within this subsystem:
- the Ministry of Energy, which set up the Wind Power Programme in co-operation
with the Danish utilities
- the utilities, which were the foreseen wind turbine buyers and had a very large say
in the Wind Power Programme. SEAS, the Jutland utility was even more
involved, since it partly financed the Nibe turbines.
- several large companies, each providing a part of the Nibe wind turbines
- the research institutes Risø and the Institute for Fluid Mechanics at the Danish
Technical University, which designed the Nibe turbines
- intermediary organisations, which provided the funding
Figure 4.1 depicts the large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem in this period.
Figure 4.1: The large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem in  the period 1977-1980.
In this figure, as in the innovation subsystem figures in the previous chapter, the
boxes represent actors. The straight lines between the boxes indicate learning
processes between actors, whereas the dotted lines between the boxes indicate subsidy
flows. The thickness of the bold lines indicates the importance of the interactive
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learning processes. The italics in the boxes represent the learning processes of the
actors. An (s) means learning by searching, a (d) means learning by doing and a (u)
means learning by using.
4.3.4 Conclusion
Let us look at the learning processes within the Danish large-scale wind turbine
innovation system in this period. Learning by searching was the most important form
of learning. Within the Wind Power Programme, much research was done into the
possibilities for wind energy in Denmark. Furthermore, the research institutes
designed the Nibe turbines on the basis of learning by searching. While the Nibe
turbines were being built and the turbines were coming into operation, learning by
doing and learning by using began. Learning by using was done only by one utility:
SEAS. Because the utilities were very much involved in the Wind Power Programme,
they were more co-operative and more on the same line with the other actors involved
than in the Netherlands. They facilitated learning by interacting between the utilities
and the other actors. The companies building components of the Nibe turbines,
regarded this project as a one-only project and not as the start of further activities in
wind turbine development. Therefore, the companies were less integrated into the
large-scale subsystem than in the Netherlands and learning by interacting was more
difficult. All actors within the subsystem shared the same paradigm: to make possible
the installation of a large number of large wind turbines within the Danish electricity
grid.
4.4 1981-1985
4.4.1 Danish Wind Technology
In 1981, the official goal was formulated: by the year 2005 10% of Danish electricity
consumption was to be supplied by wind energy. This implied a total of 1,500 MW of
installed turbine capacity (Karnøe, 1991).
However, it had become clear that no large Danish company was interested in
developing large wind turbines. The above mentioned consortium that built the Nibe
turbines showed little interest in building other large wind turbines. Therefore, in
December 1981 the Danish Ministry of Energy, together with the SEAS utility,
established the wind turbine company Danish Wind Technology (Dansk Vindteknik
A/S) (Van Est, 1999). This company was to develop and market large wind turbines
based on the research results from the Wind Power Programme. This clearly
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illustrates the science-push paradigm within the Danish large-scale wind turbine
innovation subsystem.
Up till 1984, the accumulated costs of the Wind Power Programme were 70.5 million
DKK. Of this amount, the utility had contributed 11.5 million DKK, and the United
States Department of Energy had contributed about 1 million DKK because it co-
sponsored the Gedser measurement programme (IEA, 1985). During this period and
the previous period, the main achievement of the Wind Power Programme was the
development of the Nibe wind turbines. Furthermore, theoretical investigations e.g.
site evaluations, grid integration investigations and offshore feasibility studies, were
performed (IEA, 1985). A wind atlas was made, in which the Danish wind resources
throughout the country were described (IEA, 1986). Technology development, and
especially R&D into the reduction of material fatigue in wind turbines and the
reduction of installation costs, was considered to be the most important aspect of the
Wind Power Programme (IEA, 1986).
4.4.2 The Nibe turbines
From the beginning, there were many problems with the Nibe turbines, the major one
being metal fatigue in the blades. The turbines were often out of operation. From
November 1983 until 1984, the Nibe A turbine was out of operation due to problems
with the gear box, the bolts in the blades and metal fatigue in the blades. Because
wake and stall measurements were considered more important than electricity
production, it was decided that in the following years the turbine would only operate
if measurements were to be made (IEA, 1985). From 1983 until 1991, the Nibe A
turbine only operated for a few hours (IEA, 1992).
The Nibe B was out of service during most of 1983 because of various fatigue
problems in the blades. In January 1984, three new laminated wooden blades were
installed on Nibe B. In the rest of the year 1984, its availability was higher than ever
before, namely 86% (IEA, 1985). The pitch-controlled Nibe B turbine outperformed
Nibe A, having completed more than 18,000 hours of operation by the autumn of
1988 (Heymann, 1998).
4.4.3 Other wind turbines
In 1984, ELKRAFT ordered the construction of five 750 kW turbines and ELSAM
the construction of a very large 2 MW turbine. Both the 750 kW turbines and the 2
MW turbine were scaled-up versions of the Nibe B pitch-controlled wind turbine. The
better performance of the Nibe B turbine was the reason for this choice, although it
was more difficult to manufacture a turbine with pitch regulation than with stall
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regulation. Both the 750 kW turbines and the 2 MW turbine will be described in the
following section (IEA, 1985).
Furthermore, in 1982 Danish Wind Technology built a 265 kW wind turbine at
Koldby in Jutland and in 1983 developed an updated version of that machine at Nibe
with a 300 kW generator, (IEA, 1985). Unlike the Nibe turbines and the below
described 750 kW and 2 MW turbines, which were all up-wind wind turbines, these
new turbines were down-wind machines (IEA, 1985).
4.4.4 The large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem in 1981-1985
In this period all important actors were represented within the subsystem:
- the Ministry of Energy, which had set up the Wind Power Programme together
with the utilities and had partly financed the large wind turbines
- the utilities, which had a very large say in the Wind Power Programme. Both
ELKRAFT and ELSAM became actively involved in this period, ordering the
building of wind turbines in their area.
- the newly established company Danish Wind Technology, established by the
utilities and the Ministry of Energy. However, still no large Danish firm was
interested in developing and building large wind turbines.
- the research institute Risø and the Institute for Fluid Mechanics at the Danish
Technical University, which designed the large wind turbines
- intermediary organisations, which provided the funding
The large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem in the period 1981-1985 is
represented in figure 4.2.
4.4.5 Conclusion
What can be said about the learning processes in this period? Learning by searching,
performed by Risø and the Danish Technical University, remained important. It was
seen as the basis of the development of large wind turbines. Learning by doing and
learning by using gained in importance, since the Nibe turbines had been in operation
for a number of years. Wind turbines turned out to be more difficult to operate than
expected, mainly because of material fatigue problems. Since the relations with the
utiltities were still good and more utilities became involved in the large-scale wind
turbine subsystem in this period, learning by interacting between the utilities and the
other actors became more important. In addition, a wind turbine manufacturer was
established in this period: Danish Wind Technology. This company was well
integrated into the subsystem, since it had been set up by the utilities and the Ministry
of Energy. Therefore, learning by interacting between this company and the other
actors went very well.
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Figure 4.2: The large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem in  the period 1981-1985.
4.5 1986 - 1991
4.5.1 The Masnedø turbines
In spite of large technical problems with the Nibe turbines, particularly with the
turbine blades, the utilities decided, at the insistence of the Ministry of Energy, to
continue the wind turbine development programme. In 1984 the utility ELKRAFT
had ordered the newly established company Danish Wind Technology in 1984 to
build five 750 kW wind turbines with technology close to that used in the Nibe B
turbine (IEA, 1985; Van Est, 1999). The five 750 kW turbines were erected on the isle
of Masnedø. One of the lessons learnt from the Nibe turbines was that blade problems
in a large-scale turbine could be avoided if the blades were homogenous. Therefore,
the 40 metre long blades of the Masnedø turbines, called Windane 40, were made
entirely of glass fibre reinforced polyester (IEA, 1985). The power system was
regulated by pitch control (IEA, 1986).
The theoretical part of the design process for these turbines, as for the Nibe turbines,
was performed by the Institute for Fluid Mechanics at the Danish Technical
University in Copenhagen. The institute performed calculations and developed
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models. Danish Wind Technology built the turbines and the blades. The research
institute Risø performed measurements. In this way, theory and practice were
completely separate (Karnøe, 1991).
The total project cost about 50 million DKK and was financed by ELSAM, the
European Union and the Danish government (IEA, 1986). The construction of the five
Masnedø turbines started in March 1985 (IEA, 1986). In January 1987, the turbines
came into operation. It was not long until numerous problems arose. On October 12,
1987, one turbine burned down completely when it caught fire due to overheating
(IEA, 1988). The cause was a defective circuit breaker which did not cut off the
power supply to the 750 kW generator when the rotor came to a standstill. The
generator that was still loaded then overheated and burst into flames (IEA, 1988). The
turbine was rebuilt and was put into operation again in 1990 (IEA, 1991).
Other problems like material fatigue and the rupture of a shaft in the gearbox and
other gearbox problems forced the engineers in 1988 to limit the maximum power
output to 450 kW (Heymann, 1998; IEA, 1989). In 1989 and 1990, all Masnedø
turbines were equipped with new gearboxes (IEA, 1990; IEA, 1991). Furthermore,
soon after commissioning had begun, surface cracks appeared on a number of turbine
blades. Two of the turbines were equipped with wooden blades, technically similar to
those of the Nibe B turbine. The remaining three turbines were provided with new
fibre glass blades during 1991.
4.5.2 The Tjæreborg turbine
Another Danish utility, ELSAM, went even further and built an even larger turbine: a
2 MW wind turbine, at Tjæreborg near Esbjerg. This turbine was an upscaled version
of the Nibe B turbine with a rotor diameter of 60 metres (IEA, 1988). As in the case
of the Nibe turbines, no Danish manufacturer showed any interest in building a
prototype of that size. Therefore, the Tjæreborg turbine was also procured on a multi-
contract basis (Van Est, 1999). The wind turbine cost about 65 million DKK and was
financed by ELSAM, the European Union and the Danish government (Jørgensen and
Karnøe, 1995; IEA, 1986). It had a three-bladed up-wind rotor with a 61-metre
diameter and was pitch-controlled, like Nibe B. The blades of the Tjæreborg turbine,
like those of the Masnedø turbines, were made completely of glass fibre reinforced
polyester. Each weighed eight tonnes (IEA, 1988).
The Tjæreborg turbine was manufactured between 1986 and 1988 and officially
inaugurated in June 1988 (IEA, 1989). Despite initial problems, the turbine performed
better than its predecessors, but like theirs, its economic performance was
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disappointing (Heymann, 1998). In August 1989, the gearbox failed seriously because
the main gear wheel fractured. It was replaced in 1990 (IEA, 1990).
4.5.3 Other wind turbines
At the end of 1985, three upscaled Koldby wind turbines, with a rotor diameter of 31
metres and a generating capacity of 300 kW and called Windane 31, were ordered to
be built at Hundested on the north coast of Sealand. A modified version of these
turbines was installed in 1985 on Langeland by FYNSVÆRKET, the utility on Funen
(IEA, 1986). Although built to produce electricity, an additional goal was to compare
the costs of Windane 31 with those of the other wind turbines with different
generating capacities. In this way, it was hoped that within the Wind Power
Programme the optimum turbine size and the optimum price could be determined
(IEA, 1986).
In 1989, ELKRAFT started designing a 50 metre diameter, 1 MW prototype turbine
with variable rotor speed and blades that could operate in both the pitch and the stall
control modes. The prototype was scheduled to be commissioned in mid-1991 (IEA,
1990). It was put into operation at Avedøre, near Copenhagen, in December 1993
(IEA, 1994).
4.5.4 The end of the Wind Power Programme
Around 1990, the large-scale testing and demonstration programmes were abolished.
The Danish state sold its shares in Danish Wind Technology (Karnøe, 1991).
Apparently, large Danish companies were not interested in taking the risk of
developing large wind turbines. By that time, the small-scale wind turbine innovation
subsystem had demonstrated its ability to manufacture reliable well-working wind
turbines that were far cheaper than the wind turbines developed within the Wind
Power Programme. This subsystem will be described in part B of this chapter. The
Nibe turbines were taken over by ELSAM in 1988 and resumed operation after an
overhaul. The Nibe A turbine was equipped with fully pitchable blades, like the Nibe
B turbine (IEA, 1988). The Nibe B was provided with a new gearbox (IEA, 1990).
The performance of the Nibe turbines remained inferior to that of smaller
commercially manufactured Danish wind turbines (Heymann, 1998).
4.5.5 The large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem in 1986-1990
Within this subsystem, all important actors were represented:
- the Ministry of Energy, which was responsible for the Wind Power Programme in
co-operation with the Danish utilities
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- the utilities, which were the owners of the large wind turbine and had a very large
say in the Wind Power Programme. SEAS, the Jutland utility was even more
involved, since it partly financed the Nibe turbines.
- the company Danish Wind Technology, established by the utilities and the
Ministry of Energy, which built most of the large wind turbines. Furthermore, a
number of companies were involved in building parts of the Tjæreborg wind
turbine. However, still no Danish firm was interested in developing and building
large wind turbines.
- the research institutes Risø and the Institute for Fluid Mechanics at the Danish
Technical University, which designed the large wind turbines
- intermediary organisations, which organised the funding
The large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem in the period 1986-1990 is
depicted in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: The large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem in  the period 1986-1991.
Around 1990, the large-scale wind turbine innovation system fell apart. The Danish
Wind Power Programme was terminated. Still no large Danish company had shown
any interest in developing large numbers of large wind turbines. The state sold its
share in the company Danish Wind Technology, which meant that the company
ceased to exist. By 1990, the small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem in
Denmark had developed so well, that there was no longer any need for the state to
own shares in a wind turbine production company and there was no need to extend the
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Wind Power Programme did not exist anymore. From this time on, all wind energy
activity in Denmark took place within the small-scale wind turbine innovation
subsystem. This subsystem will be described in the following sections.
4.5.6 Conclusion
Let us consider the learning processes within the large-scale wind turbine subsystem
in this period. Learning by searching remained important in the developing and
upscaling of the wind turbines. Learning by doing and learning by using became more
and more important, since more turbines were being built and operated. All large
Danish utilities were involved in the large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem in
this period. Learning by interacting with the utilities still went well, although the
utilities became less enthusiastic about wind energy as a result of the large number of
operating problems and the high costs incurred through these problems. Danish Wind
Technology was the manufacturer of the turbines of 1 MW and smaller. This
company was integrated well into the subsystem and learning by interacting went
smoothly. The 2 MW Tjæreborg turbine was built by a number of companies who had
no interest in the further development of wind turbines; they were therefore less well
integrated into the subsystem.
Although a great deal was learnt in this subsystem between 1975 and 1990, the
turbines remained very expensive and operating problems continued. The Danish
state, which did not have a history of setting up companies and owning large shares in
them, sold its shares in Danish Wind Technology around 1990. By that time, the
companies within the small-scale wind turbine subsystem had demonstrated their
ability to build wind turbines that were cheaper and more reliable than the wind
turbines built within the large-scale wind turbine subsystem.
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Part B: The small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem
4.6 1975 - 1980
In Denmark, as in the Netherlands, a small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem
developed as from the 1970s, which was relatively independent of the wind energy
R&D programmes set up by the Danish state. The first wind turbine producers in this
subsystem were adherents of the grassroots movement and small entrepreneurs. These
actors rediscovered Juul’s wind turbine and started developing wind turbines based on
this example. They were attracted to the idea of small locally-owned and locally-
governed power production units, instead of large power production units that were
centrally-owned and centrally-governed by the utilities. Furthermore, they saw
renewable energy as an abolutely essential substitute for environment-polluting fossil
fuels and for the nuclear power plants that were planned by the Danish utilities
(Jørgensen and Karnøe, 1995).
4.6.1 Riisager
The first small entrepreneur who started to manufacture wind turbines was a carpenter
called Riisager. He copied Juul’s design and built a 22 kW wind turbine using
materials that were at hand, like wood (for the blades) and lorry gears. Like Juul’s
turbine, Riissager’s turbine was stall regulated and had three broad rotor blades that
were supported with rods. Although Riisager applied for R&D support, he did not
receive any (Karnøe, 1991). He scaled up his turbine to 30 kW in 1976, and sold
about 50 turbines between 1975 and 1978 (Karnøe, 1991).
4.6.2 The Tvind turbine
Another important project in this period was the Tvind turbine. This turbine was
constructed and built between 1975 and 1978. Influenced by the debate on economic
growth, income distribution and environmental pollution, teachers and students at the
Tvind school decided to build the world’s largest wind turbine. This turbine had a
generating capacity of 2 MW and a 54 meter down-wind rotor. It did not have an
asynchronous generator, as did the Riisager turbines, and therefore the frequency of
the electricity produced was not of high enough quality to be fed into the electricity
grid. Measurements demonstrated that it was a good wind turbine, although there
were problems with regard to the structural dynamics; the problems were probably
caused by the down-wind position of the rotor (Karnøe, 1991).
The Tvind turbine was built by left-wing oriented people on a voluntary basis. These
people had different educational backgrounds. The design, blade profile and
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calculations were performed with the help of engineers. For example, the blade profile
was developed by an engineer who had also developed blade profiles for the F.L.
Smidth turbines in the Second World War. The fact that the Tvind turbine worked,
was psychologically very important for the grassroots movement. Furthermore,
experience was obtained in designing and manufacturing fibre glass rotor blades
(Karnøe, 1991).
Many other small Danish builders experimented with wind turbine designs, mainly
based on previous designs. For example, some engineering was added to Riisager’s
wind turbines. They were provided with an active yaw system to overcome the
turbine’s slow response to changes in wind direction and with fibre glass blades, made
with a small version of the Tvind mould. Furthermore, in this period a method was
developed to produce electricity that was of high enough quality to be fed into the
electricity grid (Karnøe, 1991).
4.6.3 The role of the wind turbine users
Up till 1979, the wind turbines were sold to idealistic buyers. They did not buy the
turbines because they expected to save money, but because they supported the green
movement (Jørgensen and Karnøe, 1995). Because they were so much in favour of the
development of renewable energy technologies, they were very active in trying to help
the manufacturers to improve the wind turbines. Furthermore, they were concerned
about the safety and reliability of the turbines. The early turbines did not perform
satisfactorily: often gearboxes were damaged, generators burned out and blades were
lost (Van Est, 1999).
Therefore, in 1978 the turbine owners set up the Danish Windmill Owners
Association, which initially consisted of about 40 people. The association offered
suggestions to manufacturers about how they could improve their turbines with
respect to safety and reliability. Furthermore, the association set up a monthly
magazine, called 'Naturlig Energi', in which the performance of different types of
turbines was disclosed. Because they were organised, the users created a strong
selection environment for the first Danish turbine builders. They strengthened and
stabilised the demand for wind turbines (Karnøe and Garud, 2001; Heymann, 1998).
Another very important achievement of the Danish Windmill Owners Association was
the fact that they negotiated collectively with the utilities. In Denmark, the utilities
were obliged to accept the electricity produced by independent small electricity
production units. The Danish Windmill Owners Association negotiated about the buy-
back tariff that the utilities would pay the small electricity producers. Because turbine
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owners were organised, they were more powerful in the negotiations than the
individual wind turbine owners in the Netherlands (Karnøe and Garud, 2001).
As from 1975, the grassroots movement organised so-called Wind Meetings, which
provided a forum for knowledge-sharing between wind turbine producers and users.
As a result of these meetings, which were held four to eight times a year, a large
collective knowledge base was created. Those present at the meeting felt they were
part of a community, a factor which promoted the development of trust and
knowledge sharing. They all had the same goal: to produce a significant number of
reliable well-functioning wind turbines to compete with the large centrally owned
power stations (Jørgensen and Karnøe, 1995).
4.6.4 The first small wind turbine companies
By 1978, about ten small wind turbine companies had developed. Many of these had
previously manufactured agricultural equipment. Their knowledge was based on the
manufacturing of machines, and they learned slowly, by way of trial-and-error, how to
manufacture and improve wind turbines (Karnøe and Garud, 2001). They obtained
their knowledge from previous wind turbines, like Juul’s, Riisager’s and the Tvind
turbine, from their own trial-and-error experience in the design and production of
wind turbines and from the turbine users, either individually or collectively during the
Wind Meetings. Their design philosophy was to build wind turbines that worked
reliably and safely (Karnøe, 1995). They were under pressure to improve their
turbines, especially because the performance of their turbines was made public in the
magazine Naturlig Energi.
All kinds of problems with a.o. rotor speeds, gear boxes, burned out generators,
broken yaw systems were handled. Design and construction were based upon trial-
and-error and simple rules of thumb (Karnøe, 1995). The manufacturers were used to
this way of working and they refrained from taking risks. Gradually, practical and
hands-on knowledge about the poorly understood technology accumulated. On the
basis of this knowledge, the design rules were gradually improved. Design and
development problems stemmed from turbine failures or from construction problems.
The failures were often solved by making the turbines more solid, or, in other words,
by ‘throwing metal on the problem’. This method increased the lifetimes of the
Danish wind turbines by limiting aerodynamic loads and preventing dynamic
vibrations (Karnøe, 1995).
The manufacturers could apply to the Danish Board of Technology, an agency of the
Ministry of Industry, for R&D subsidies of between 5,000 and 10,000 USD. Project
proposals were evaluated by the newly created Renewable Energy Committee. This
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committee, which consisted of prominent people like a professor at the Danish
Technical University, established links with political parties and ministries. The
committee played an important role in winning legitimacy for wind energy, also for
small wind turbines (Karnøe and Garud, 2001).
4.6.5 The Risø Test and Research Centre
As a part of the Danish Wind Power Programme, set up to support the technological
development and adoption of wind power (see part A of this chapter), in 1978 a three-
year grant of 5.5 million DKK was given to create a Test and Research Centre. This
Centre was located at the site of the Risø research centre, which had been established
in the 1950s to do research into nuclear power. The Test and Research Centre had a
very low status within the Risø research centre and was located in a small wooden
shed in a remote part of the site (Van Est, 1999)29.
By 1979, the first wind turbine had been erected at Risø (Karnøe, 1991). The Test and
Research Centre consisted of both theoretical thinkers and hands-on engineers, most
of whom had some previous experience with wind turbines. One of them had
designed the blades of the Tvind turbine. They were not in favour of nuclear power
stations and they wanted to develop a good alternative, namely wind turbines. Since
existing knowledge on wind turbines was very limited, the members of the Test and
Research Centre had much to learn. The Test and Research Centre was completely
separate from the research performed on the Nibe turbines, by the Danish Technical
University30 (Karnøe, 1991).
Because the Test and Research Centre had only received financing for three years,
their strategy was to be of immediate service to the wind turbine manufacturers. If the
manufacturers could be convinced of the usefulness of the Test and Research Centre,
it could in the future get its financing through orders from the manufacturers.
Therefore, the goal of the members of the Test and Research Centre was not to
develop the technically best wind turbine, but to develop a wind turbine industry. The
challenge they faced was to develop the kind of knowledge that would be of interest
to the turbine manufacturers (Karnøe, 1991).
                                                          
29 This was also true for the wind energy group at the Dutch research institute ECN.
30 The Test and Research Centre was only involved in the design of the blades of the Nibe turbines. The
rest of the design and the measurements were performed by the Danish Technical University (see part
A of this chapter).
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4.6.6 Financial support for wind turbine buyers
At the beginning, it was hard for the members of the Test and Research Centre to win
the trust of the turbine manufacturers. Many companies did not want to share their
products and design rules with the Test and Research Centre. However, things
changed in 1979. The second energy crisis, which occurred in 1979, and growing
unemployment made the Danish government take a new measure to encourage the
development and adoption of wind power. They decided to start supporting the
demand for wind turbines. As from 1979, turbine buyers could receive a 30%
investment subsidy. Three conditions had to be met to receive this subsidy (Van Est,
1997). First of all, only private wind turbine buyers would be eligible for an
investment subsidy. Secondly, the owner(s) of the wind turbines had to live within
three kilometres of the wind turbine. Thirdly, the turbine they bought had to be
approved by the Test and Research Centre. In this way, the government could keep
control over the development of small wind turbines. No money would be wasted on
unreliable wind turbines. Furthermore, turbine buyers would not be allowed to erect
wind turbines everywhere in the country.
This measure was very important for the turbine manufacturers, since it increased the
market for wind turbines at a very early stage. The measure was also very important
for the Test and Research Centre, since it forced the turbine manufactures to co-
operate with the Centre (Karnøe and Garud, 2001).
4.6.7 The approval criteria
The approval criteria were not very rigorous. The main reason for this was, that such
criteria were simply not available in 1979 (Karnøe, 1991). There had been no time to
develop them and the knowledge on which criteria could be based was lacking.
Furthermore, it was decided that in such an early phase of technological development
rigorous criteria would not be beneficial for the manufacturers. The approval criteria
were (Karnøe, 1991):
- the wind turbine had to have both an aerodynamic and a mechanical brake system,
just as Juul’s turbine had
- the loads on the tower and foundation had to be calculated and documented and
the static loads on the blades had to be measured.
Since the Test and Research Centre felt it lacked sufficient knowledge to develop the
criteria on its own, it developed them in co-operation with the turbine manufacturers
and the Windmill Owners Association. The criteria were based on the measurements
made on the Gedser turbine. Because of the incertainties involved, the criteria were
rather conservative, and encouraged the building of heavy wind turbines. Although it
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was not realised at the time, the heaviness of the wind turbines reduced the dynamic
loads, making them less vulnerable. However, the Test and Research Centre was
flexible, constantly incorporating suggestions that were put forward during formal and
informal interactions with turbine manufacturers and owners (e.g. during the Wind
Meetings). Furthermore, an old Riisager turbine was erected on the Risø site and
measured by the Test and Research Centre. These measurements provided important
new knowledge about turbine loads and structural dynamics (Karnøe, 1991). The
good performance of the turbine’s stall regulations convinced the members of the
Centre that the stall regulation was the best method of regulating a wind turbine.
Often, the turbine drawings and calculations the turbine manufacturers handed in were
insufficient. Therefore, members of the Test and Research Centre often visited the
companies. Then, they could see the designs and talk to the manufacturers. These
informal interactions were very important for the development of trust between the
manufacturers and the members of the Test and Research Centre and for the exchange
of knowledge (Karnøe, 1991).
4.6.8 The turbine market
In the period 1976-1979, about 170 small wind turbines were erected, 120 of them in
1979. The progress was clearly influenced by the investment subsidy. The real
pioneers like Riisager lacked the experience and capital to operate on a larger scale
and therefore could not benefit from the growing market. The small agricultural
machine companies like Vestas and Bonus were able to produce on a larger scale,
using the know-how of the pioneers and the patents they bought from them
(Heymann, 1998). They produced wind turbines by assembling standard components
(Jørgensen and Karnøe, 1995). For their designs they preferred available and well-
known technical solutions. When faced with technical problems, they increased the
structural stability by making the turbines stiffer. New technical solutions were only
introduced after satisfactory test operation (Heymann, 1998). Most wind turbines
were sold to co-operatives composed of a group of farmers. These were the same kind
of customers the turbine companies used to deal with. Furthermore, building small
series of turbines involved the same kind of design and manufacturing work as they
were used to.
Local ownership, imposed by the subsidy rules, often advanced local production,
since buyers perferred to purchase turbines from a manufacturer they knew and
trusted (Van Est, 1997). In this way, local user-producer networks were built up. The
fact that every manufacturer had its own local customers decreased the competition
between the manufacturers. This made it easier for them to disclose information to the
Test and Research Centre and during the Wind Meeting, at which other manufacturers
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were present. The manufacturers communicated informally, on the basis of a barter
economy about solutions for different problems (Karnøe, 1995). Furthermore, the
importance of learning by doing lowered the risk of providing information to other
manufacturers. They would not be able to incorporate the information satisfactorily
into their own turbines unless they had gained adequate experience beforehand (Van
Est, 1997).
Although local ownership was meant to control the market for wind turbines, it was
beneficial for the turbine manufacturers. Furthermore, local ownership increased
public support for wind energy. People who were aware of the disadvantages of wind
turbines also saw the advantages because wind turbines offered local employment.
Most of the people living near the wind turbines were part-owners of the turbines.
On average, the turbines produced between 1975 and 1980 had a power capacity of
10-30 kW and a rotor diameter of 4-10 metres. Many design concepts were used:
HAT turbines with two, three or four blades or VAT turbines. However, the most used
model was the three-bladed HAT turbine based on the Juul/Riisager design. Around
1979-1980 it became evident that this design functioned best. Therefore, this design
became the dominant design in Denmark (Karnøe, 1991). The development of a
dominant design was not imposed by the Test and Research Centre, but the Centre did
contribute to this development by deriving most of its knowledge from the Gedser and
Riisager turbines and also by deriving the approval criteria from these turbines
(Dannemand Andersen, 1993).
4.6.9 The small-scale wind turbine subsystem in 1975-1980
In this period, the Danish small-scale wind turbine subsystem was built up. This
subsystem was very strong, right from the beginning. Many small manufacturers were
present in the subsystem, most of them with the same background: they had experince
of producing agricultural machines.
Up till 1979, the turbine buyers were mainly grassroots enthusiast, who bought wind
turbines because they wanted to stimulate local self-suffiency by introducing small-
scale decentralised energy production. After 1979, when the investment subsidies for
wind turbine buyers were introduced, other buyers entered the subsystem; these were
mainly farmers and co-operatives. Policy-makers were present in the subsystem as
from 1979, when they introduced the investment subsidies. They were not very active
within the subsystem, because they saw large-scale wind energy as the most
promising form of renewable energy that could make a significant contribution to
Denmark's energy supply in the future.
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The Test and Research Centre at Risø played a central role in the small-scale
innovation subsystem since its establishment in 1979. The members of the Centre did
their best to become actively involved in the technology development of the small
wind turbine builders. Because they had not been given a large amount of funding, the
survival of the Centre was dependent on the survival of the small wind turbine
manufacturers. Figure 4.4 depicts the small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem
in the period 1975-1980.
Figure 4.4: The small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem in  the period 1975-1980.
4.6.10 Conclusion
What can be said about the learning processes within the small-scale wind turbine
subsystem in this period? Learning by interacting was definitely the most important
learning process in this period. Turbine builders, buyers and researchers formed a
tight network in which a large amount of information was exchanged. Turbine
builders learned from turbine users about the quality and the failures of their turbines.
Experiences were exchanged during informal contacts. During more formalised
contacts, the Wind Meetings, experiences were exchanged between turbine builders,
users and researchers. The turbine users increased their influence on the technology
development process by setting up a magazine, Naturlig Energi, in which they
published details of the performance of the various turbines. In this way, new buyers
could be informed and the turbine buyers could together stand up to the manufacturers
and insist that they improved their turbines with the help of input from the users.
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Local ownership, imposed by the subsidy rules, favoured learning by interacting
between turbine users and builders, since most turbine users lived near the turbine
builders.
After its establishment in 1979, the Test and Research Centre was a very important
actor within the subsystem. It built up a trusting relationship with the manufacturers
and began to build up a knowledge base for the subsystem. During informal contacts
at the Test and Research Centre, and during the Wind Meetings, the members of the
Centre co-operated in solving practical problems encountered by the manufacturers.
The approval criteria, set up in 1979, forced the manufacturers to co-operate with the
Centre and exchange knowledge with it. The approval criteria also guided the
technology development process, by the insistence on the presence of two
independent braking systems in the turbine.
Learning by searching was not prominent in this period in the small-scale wind
turbine subsystem. The manufacturers produced designs by imitating earlier wind
turbines, like the famous Gedser turbines and the Riisager turbines. Since these
turbines had proved reliable, imitating them was seen as a good way to design
turbines in accordance with the design philosophy in the subsystem: to make turbines
that worked reliably and safely. In the subsystem there was absolutely no drive to
build elegant and extremely cost-effective wind turbines.
When, in time, more and more turbines were built, learning by doing and learning by
using became more and more important. Users learned how their turbines operated,
and what failures could occur. Manufacturers learned how to build turbines and how
to solve practical problems in their own workshop or in the field, in co-operation with
users and researchers.
4.7 1981 - 1985
4.7.1 Energiplan 1981
In 1981, the adverse effects of the second oil crisis put renewable energy back on the
Danish political agenda. Directly after the second oil crisis, in 1979, a separate
department to deal with energy-related matters, the Ministry of Energy, had been set
up. Before 1979, wind energy-related matters had been handled by the Ministry of
Housing (Karnøe, 1998). The newly established Ministry was given the task of
preparing a national energy plan. This plan, called Energiplan 1981, was presented in
1981. Grassroots supporters had an influence on the contents of this plan, because
they were asked to comment on the preliminary versions (Van Est, 1999). The
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Energiplan 1981 contained a number of measures and proposals from the Alternative
Energy plan that was put forward by grassroots supporters in 1976. First of all, two
long-term energy scenarios were presented, one with and one without nuclear energy.
Secondly, the need for permanent energy saving was stressed. Thirdly, the maximum
development of decentralised co-generation plants and a stronger accent on renewable
energy options were put forward as important goals. With respect to wind energy, the
government aimed at the installation of 60,000 small wind turbines that would be able
to supply 8.5% of the energy demand in 2000 (Van Est, 1999). The use of large wind
turbines was regarded as an alternative to the small wind turbine development.
This clearly indicates that the development of small wind turbines was regarded as a
very serious option, whereas in 1976 only large wind turbines were considered to be
worth developmening and financing (see section 4.3.1). In 1981, small wind turbines
were put forward as the most promising option. R&D funding was placed second to a
policy of developing a wind turbine industry by way of market stimulation. In this
way, wind energy policy came to be part of both energy and industrial policy.
However, market stimulation slowed down in 1981 and the investment subsidy was
reduced from 30% to 20% (Karnøe, 1991).
4.7.2 The role of the Test and Research Centre
In spite of the reduction in investment subsidies, optimism persisted. At the end of
1981, 21 manufacturers had received type approvals for one or more wind turbines.
The Test and Research Centre at Risø played a large role in this optimism, both by
functioning as a binding agent within the innovation subsystem and by working hard
to increase the legitimacy of wind turbines as electricity production units. For
example, the Centre compiled a wind atlas for Denmark, in which the economic value
of wind energy was stressed (Hvidtfelt Nielsen, 2001).
The Test and Research Centre played a very important role in assembling and
upgrading a joint knowledge base for the innovation subsystem. The knowledge
consisted mainly of industrial knowledge about practical solutions to problems.
Furthermore, the Test and Research Centre conducted experiments that had a
practical, problem-solving focus. As from the mid-1980s, systematic research was
performed and reliable, empirically based models were developed. The knowledge
was transferred both in a formal way, via reports, technical regulations and norms,
and in an informal way during interactions between actors during formal and informal
contacts. The way in which the Centre handled the knowledge acquired by the
companies increased their trust in the Centre (Dannemand Andersen, 1993).
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4.7.3 Technology development
The actors in the innovation subsystem worked together in this period, trying to
increase the market for wind turbines by increasing the product quality and the cost-
effectivity of wind turbines. They succeeded in reducing investment incertainties by
developing good procedures for approval and financing. The most important technical
development activity within the companies was the scaling up of the turbines from a
30 kW capacity with a 10 metre rotor (averagely) in 1981 to a 55 kW capacity with a
20 metre rotor (averagely) in 1985 (Karnøe, 1991). This upscaling involved incremen-
tal innovations, since the design of the turbines was not changed. As a result of these
incremental innovations and the gradual elimination of design weaknesses, the cost
effectiveness of the turbines rose by up to 50% (Karnøe, 1991). The figure of 55 kW
was dictated by the standard generators that were available. As explained in the
previous section, the turbine manufacturers did not use specially designed components
for their turbines, but made use of standard components that were readily available.
Only one manufacturer, Vestas, began on its own to develop and produce wind
turbine components like blades and control systems. Vestas considered it important to
gather in-house knowledge about these components and to become independent of the
production capacity and delivery times of suppliers (Karnøe, 1991).
4.7.4 The Danish home market
Several hundreds of wind turbines were installed in Denmark between 1980 and 1982
(Van Est, 1999), almost all of them being three-bladed stall regulated upwind
turbines. Because of the large numbers the manufacturers gained considerable
experience of how to produce wind turbines in the most efficient way. Furthermore,
since the turbines were produced in series, costs could be reduced. Learning by using
and learning by interacting with users gave the manufacturers good insight into the
failures in their designs. Turbine development was characterised by the
implementation of ad-hoc solutions and trial-and-error learning based on rules of
thumb and the intuition of the manufacturer (Karnoe, 1991).
The buyers of the turbines continued to be grassroots advocates and co-operative
groups of farmers. Their choice of wind turbine to buy was strongly influenced by the
information about the electricity production and failures of the various wind turbines
given in the magazine Naturlig Energi. Since utilities could not profit from the
investment subsidy, they showed no interest in buying small wind turbines in this
period (Van Est, 1999; Karnøe, 1991).
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4.7.5 Wind turbine exports
At the end of 1981, optimism within the small-scale wind turbine subsystem
decreased. Two fierce storms swept over Denmark and destroyed 2% of the wind
turbines. This event, and the destruction of a 55 kW Windmatic turbine the debris of
which kept a main road blocked for hours, caused a large amount of bad publicity for
wind energy (Van Est, 1999). The bad publicity and the reduction in oil prices at the
beginning of the 1980s resulted in a decline in the demand for wind turbines in
Denmark. The home market almost halved in 1982 (Van Est, 1999). The wind turbine
manufacturers started to look for alternatives. The Technology Council of the
Ministry of Industry granted the manufacturers a subsidy to examine the American
market in 1982.
The examination was performed by a consultant, who concluded that the American
authorities, and particularly the Californian authorities, provided substantial subsidies
for wind turbine buyers. Federal and state tax credits jointly amounted to an
investment subsidy of 40-45%, which meant that even turbines that hardly produced
any electricity were profitable (Gipe, 1995). Furthermore, by way of the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act, utilities were compelled to buy electricity from private
electricity producers at fair prices. These measures made the Californian market very
attractive for wind turbine manufacturers. Thirdly, according to the consultant, many
competing turbine producers were active on the Californian market, but none of them
had a clear technological lead over the Danish manufacturers (Karnøe and Garud,
2001).
Exports to California started immediately. In the years before, Californian turbine
owners had had bad experiences with the unreliability and low electricity output of the
American-made wind turbines (Gipe, 1995). Therefore, they were willing to try
European-made turbines. The Danish turbines looked the most promising; the
manufacturers could demonstrate that their turbines had relatively good performance
characteristics and favourable reports had appeared in the magazine Naturlig Energi
published by the Danish Windmill Owners Association.
By the end of 1982 about 40 Danish wind turbines had been sold to customers in
California (Karnøe, 1991). The number increased to about 2,000 per annum in 1985
(Karnøe and Garud, 2001). The export of wind turbines provided the Danish
manufacturers with large growth opportunities. The number of people employed by
the Danish turbine manufacturers grew from about 300 to about 2,500 between 1982
and 1985 (Karnøe and Garud, 2001). During this period, the Danish market share in
California increased from 0% to 65%, and the cumulative installed turbine capacity
expanded from 71 MW to 1,250 MW. The cumulative installed wind turbine capacity
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of 1,250 MW was more than 10 times the cumulative installed capacity in Denmark at
the time. The Danish turbines, mainly 55 kW and 65 kW turbines, performed far
better than those of their competitors, who were 15 American and eight European
companies (Jørgensen and Karnøe, 1995). Furthermore, the strong dollar favoured
Danish exports (Van Est, 1999).
There were both advantages and disadvantages in exporting to California. Firstly, the
fast growth of the Danish turbine companies posed organisational challenges. Many
companies had to introduce more formal product development teams, which meant
that product development was no longer integrated with the shop floors producing the
turbines and handling the operational problems. However, the product development
teams were not isolated from the shop floors. There were still frequent interactions,
and the product developers were still able to learn from manufacturing and operating
problems (Karnøe and Garud, 2001).
Secondly, before granting funds or insurances the Danish insurance firms and
certification companies insisted on explicit criteria and explicit presentation of the
knowledge used in the design of turbines. This made the introduction of formal
product development teams even more important and enhanced the role of the Test
and Research Centre, which was required to approve the turbines. Furthermore, it
resulted in the entrance of a new actor into the small-scale wind turbine innovation
system: the engineer agency Tripod. This agency, consisting of engineers who had
worked in the Nibe turbines project at the Danish Technical University, developed
measurement methods and calculation programmes that could handle the problems
connected with aerodynamics and structural vibrations in wind turbines. This
formalised knowledge was exactly what the insurance firms and certification
companies required. Therefore, although the manufacturers were at first sceptical
about providing Tripod with design information, Tripod soon became an important
actor in the subsystem (Karnøe, 1991).
Thirdly, because the markets were no longer local, the Danish companies had to set
up formal procedures for the servicing and repairing of the turbines and for the
establishing of product guarantees. These procedures were new for the turbine
companies and they were developed by an expensive process of trial-and-error
(Karnøe and Garud, 2001).
4.7.6 A speed-up in technology development
During the first few first years of this period, the Danes exported mainly well-
developed 55-kW and 65-kW turbines, but the situation changed as from 1983.
Although the Danes won the competition with the American and the other European
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manufacturers, they started competing with each other on equal terms from a technical
perspective (Van Est, 1999). A technological rat race began, in which manufacturers
were forced to develop larger and more cost-effective wind turbines as rapidly as
possible. New Danish manufacturers entered the Californian market, hoping to get a
share of the profits. The strategy of these new manufacturers was to try and leapfrog
over the older manufacturers by introducing new and larger turbines on the basis of
the best existing technology. The existence of a publicly available, simple design, and
the availability of free advice from the Test and Research Centre made it possible for
them to do this (Van Est, 1999). However, because of their lack of experience built up
by learning by doing and learning by interacting with turbine users they found
manufacturing good wind turbines more difficult than they had expected.
At the same time, a second reason arose for the rapid development of larger and more
cost-effective wind turbines. Up till 1983, thousands of small wind turbines had been
erected in the windy Californian passes. If thousands more were to be installed there
would be a shortage good sites. Therefore, Californian wind park owners wanted to
save space by erecting wind turbines with larger generating capacities. Secondly, the
prospect of the expiry of the energy tax credits in 1986 created the need for more cost-
effective wind turbines. Since the costs for installation, maintenance and operation
were more or less independent of turbine capacity, larger turbines offered the benefits
of economies of scale (Van Est, 1999).
The Danish manufacturers were forced to scale up their wind turbines first to 75 kW
with a 17 metre rotor and then to 100-130 kW with rotor diameters of 19-20 metres in
a relatively short period. As a result, the companies started to export new, relatively
unproved wind turbine designs. The strong price and performance competition made
it impossible to sell the older turbine types at their old price, which lowered the profit
margins on the older turbine types. Manufacturers furthermore shifted rapidly from
batch to serial production in order to meet the growing demand. The cost reduction
resulting from the serial production was not offset by the price reductions carried
through in the struggle against competitors. As a result, by 1985, at the height of the
California export boom, a quarter of the total Danish turnover involved a loss, and
seven of the twelve Danish manufacturers active on the American market had
negative trading results (Van Est, 1999).
4.7.7 Technical problems
Trading results became even more negative because many technical problems arose,
particularly with the newly developed turbines. Because the newly developed turbines
had not been tested sufficiently, the technical problems had not been noticed by the
manufacturers. Selling turbines on the international market removed the important
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factor of geographical proximity. The manufacturers could not build up a relationship
with their customers and learn from their mistakes by learning by doing and learning
by interacting with users, as they had done in Denmark. The fact that the Californian
wind park owners serviced their own wind turbines reduced the feedback still further.
Furthermore, the Danish manufacturers had not considered the fact that the
Californian wind regime was completely different from that in Denmark. They had
assumed that their turbines would function just as well in California as in Denmark,
but this was not the case. The harsh Californian wind regime put extra demands on the
turbines (Van Est, 1999).
As a result of the above-mentioned factors, the turbines from almost all Danish
manufacturers had severe technical problems, particularly relating to gears,
overproduction in the generators, oil cooling systems and blades (Karnøe, 1991). The
Danish products, especially the larger turbine types, were of poorer quality and
therefore the Californian customers lost their trust in the Danish turbines. It also
proved very hard for the Danish manufacturers to exercise good project management,
product service and maintenance since they were exporting so many wind turbines to
California. The Californian market, which had been so promising at the beginning of
this period, created severe problems for the Danish manufacturers at the end of this
period. Around 1985, when the problems arose, many insurance companies lost their
faith in wind energy and withdrew from the subsystem. Many manufacturers also
disappeared from the subsystem (Van Est, 1999).
4.7.8 Growth in the Danish home market as from 1984
However, the Californian market had a positive effect on the Danish home market.
Following the example of the Californian wind parks, in 1984 in Denmark investment
subsidies of 40% became available for large-scale, privately-owned wind parks. In
addition, a new governmental subsidy was introduced for electricity produced by
renewable energy sources (Van Est, 1999). For every kWh of electricity produced, the
owner of the renewable energy source was to receive about 25 øre. Thirdly, in 1984 a
10-year agreement was reached between the utilities, the Windmill Owners
Association and the turbine manufacturers (Van Est, 1999). According to this
agreement the utilities had to:
- buy all the electricity that independent owners of renewable energy sources fed
into the electricity grid at the rate of 85% of the consumer price
- pay 35% of the costs of connecting the energy sources to the electricity grid, on
condition that the government would maintain the investment subsidy programme
As a result of these measures, the cost-effectiveness of wind turbines increased
enormously in Denmark. Investing in wind turbines became interesting for institutions
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and local municipalities. Projects were quickly established by project developers.
Cumulative installed wind turbine capacity in Denmark rose from 8 MW in 1984 to
about 20 MW in 1985 and about 30 MW in 1986 (Karnøe, 1991) (see figure 4.5).
About 25% of this capacity was installed in wind parks (Karnøe and Garud, 2001).
However, this fast growth and the prospect of further fast growth in the wind turbine
capacity in the country was not very promising in the utilities' opinion. The
government was also frightened by the large number of orders from project
developers. Therefore, the utilities secretly started negotiations with the government
about new regulations (Karnøe, 1991).
Figure 4.5: The development of cumulative wind turbine capacity in 1981-1985 (source:
Karnøe, 1991).
In December 1985, these negotiations resulted in a new restriction. New siting criteria
were formulated: all investors had to live within a radius of 10 kilometres of their
turbine(s) and the turbine(s) had to be erected in the municipality where the owners
lived. Furthermore, the extent to which individuals could invest relative to their use of
electricity was restricted: the amount of wind power generated must not exceed the
owner’s electricity consumption by more than 35%. This intervention ended a short
period during which projects were rapidly established in the whole country by large
investors. These new investors were damaging for the public image of wind energy.
To the public, local attachment and local benefits were very important (Van Est,
1997). One third of the annual turbine production was cancelled, which led to
problems within the industry.
4.7.9 The first 100-MW agreement
By way of compensation for the imposition of the new restrictions on private wind
turbine owners, the government forced the utilities to sign a 100-MW agreement. This
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agreement forced the utilities to erect 100 MW of wind turbine generating capacity
within the next five years (Van Est, 1999). In this way, the utilities could keep control
over the production of electricity by wind turbines. ELSAM was responsible for 55
MW, ELKRAFT for 45 MW (Gipe, 1995). The utilities agreed to develop wind
energy projects in a way that would optimise the conditions for a broad industrial and
technological development, including the development of new prototypes. For the
Danish wind turbine manufacturers, the agreement offered good and stable prospects
with regard to the home market. The timing was excellent; orders in Denmark had
been cancelled, there were problems in California and the Californian tax credits were
to expire quite soon.
By way of the 100-MW agreement, the small turbine manufacturers would be
incorporated into the network that the Danish government considered suitable for the
development of wind energy: the network of the large-scale wind turbine innovation
subsystem. Since in this subsystem no large companies showed any interest in
producing wind turbines, the only way in which wind turbines could be produced for
utilities was to include the small wind turbine manufacturers in this subsystem.
4.7.10 The small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem in 1981-1985
In this period, the small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem remained complete
and tight. Up till the first 100-MW agreement in 1985, all Danish wind turbine buyers
were private persons or co-operatives. They co-operated with the manufacturers to
improve the wind turbines. The Test and Research Centre remained a very important
actor in the subsystem. It served as the knowledge base of the subsystem and took an
active part in the development of the technology. The policy-makers started to play a
more active role in the subsystem in this period. In 1984, they started to promote the
erection of wind turbines in turbine parks by introducing a large investment subsidy
and high buy-back tariffs for these turbines. Furthermore, they involved the utilities in
the subsystem by signing the first 100-MW agreement with them in 1985. By way of
this agreement, the utilities were forced to take part in the small-scale wind turbine
subsystem.
The export of wind turbines to California brought about changes in the Danish small-
scale innovation subsystem, especially in 1984-1985 when large numbers of turbines
were exported. First of all, the turbine manufacturing companies grew fast. They were
forced to make organisational changes, e.g. to introduce special product development
teams. Secondly, the manufacturers started to co-operate with actors outside
Denmark, like Californian project developers and turbine service and repair
companies. Thirdly, the role of the insurance firms and certification companies within
the Danish small-scale innovation subsystem became larger. Because of the large
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number of turbines produced and the high risks involved, they demanded explicit
criteria and representation of knowledge used in design. This led to the entry of the
engineer agency Tripod into the subsystem, which developed ways to represent the
knowledge in a formalised way. Around 1985, when the problems in California arose,
many insurance companies lost their faith in wind energy and withdrew from the
subsystem. Many manufacturers also disappeared from the subsystem. Figure 4.6
depicts the small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem in the period 1981-1985.
Figure 4.6: The small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem in  the period 1981-1985.
4.7.11 Conclusion
Now let us look at the learning processes within the small-scale wind turbine
subsystem in this period. Within the Danish market, learning by interacting remained
the most important form of learning. Until 1985, almost all turbine buyers were still
local private persons and co-operatives. They exchanged a lot of information with the
turbine manufacturers about the problems they were having with their turbines. The
Test and Research Centre still played an active role in the exchange and build-up of
knowledge. The employees helped with finding practical solutions to operating and
manufacturing problems. They also performed some practical, problem-focused
research. Furthermore, on the basis of the knowledge gathered by interaction with
manufacturers, measurements on turbines and practical research, they started building
simple, empirically based models that turbine manufacturers could use to design their
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turbines. The engineering agency Tripod also started to build models and devise
calculation programmes.
This more formalised knowledge was what the manufacturers needed, especially for
the export of turbines to California. Certification and insurance companies were
demanding formalised forms of knowledge. Furthermore, the demand for fast
upscaling of wind turbines in California resulted in the design and manufacture of
larger and larger wind turbines. Learning by way of trial-and-error was far more
expensive with these turbines; this explains why calculation methods and models were
needed as input for design. Learning by using and learning by doing were especially
important on the Californian market, since thousands of wind turbines were sold.
Californian product developers learned that, although the operation statistics of the
turbines were very good in Denmark, the Danish turbines were not always adjusted to
the far harsher Californian weather conditions. Furthermore, they learned that it was
risky to buy turbines that were prototypes or not fully proven commercially. Because
the Danish manufacturers made use of Californian repair and service companies, they
were far less able to learn from their mistakes than in Denmark. Learning by
interacting between the Danish manufacturers and the Californian buyers went far less
smoothly than with the Danish buyers.
Danish manufacturers learned how to manufacture their turbines in series, and how to
do this in the most efficient way. They also learned how to design turbines not just on
the basis of trial-and-error, but also on the basis of more formal calculation methods
and how to record their knowledge in a more formalised way. Furthermore, they
learned managerial skills from their Californian activities, such as how to organise
information exchange between separate product development teams and shop floors,
how to guarantee product performance and insurance and certify a uniform turbine
quality. This knowledge could serve as a good input for future activities, provided the
companies were able to stay in business after the problems they had encountered on
the Californian market in the mid-1980s.
4.8 1986 - 1992
4.8.1 Problems for the Danish turbine manufacturers
In 1986, the Californian wind turbine subsidies expired and the dollar exchange rate
fell. Furthermore, because many newly developed and not fully tested turbines had
been sold to California in the previous years, many technical problems arose,
especially with the blades and the gears (Karnøe, 1991). This resulted in an
unexpected need for repairs. In California the technical problems made people lose
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their trust in wind turbines in general and in the Danish manufacturers in particular
(Gipe, 1995). Exports declined in 1986 and 1987, and came to a halt in 1988.
In Denmark too, banks, institutional investors, media and the turbine users reduced
their trust in wind turbines. Many institutional investors stopped investing in wind
turbines and insurers were unwilling to issue policies for wind developments.
Simultaneously, as from 1985 the Danish investment subsidies were reduced
continuously, dropping to 10% in 1989 and to 0% in 1991 (Gipe, 1995). It had been
reasoned in 1985 that by the year 1991 wind turbines would have become cost-
effective and competitive energy production units and therefore subsidies would not
be needed anymore. Only an indirect investment subsidy would remain the general
energy tax put on energy produced by wind turbines was refunded to the turbine
owner by the government (Jørgensen and Karnøe, 1995). The subsidy per kWh on
renewable energy sources would also remain (Van Est, 1999). However, the decrease
in investment subsidy made the demand for wind turbines decrease. The combination
of these factors resulted in a collapse of wind turbine sales and to the bankruptcy of
many Danish manufacturers in 1985 and 1986 (Karnøe, 1991).
4.8.2 A new start
However, many firms were able to make a new start. Many employees of firms that
were unable to start afresh were hired by firms that continued to build turbines. In this
way, knowledge and competence remained present in the innovation subsystem31
(Karnøe and Garud, 2001).
A great deal of new knowledge was developed during the export period, especially
managerial knowledge. The companies had learnt to reduce risks by (Van Est, 1999):
- not focusing on only one export country, thus avoiding the danger of possible
demand reductions as a result of policy changes
- hedging against exchange rate risks
- having more than one supplier for each turbine component or produce their
components themselves, in order to ensure a stable supply of components
From a technical point of view, they had learnt to:
- develop wind turbines in a more controlled way, especially by performing more
tests
- certify a uniform turbine quality
- guarantee project performance and insurance
The fact that many firms were able to make a new start was a result of large efforts to
revive the reputation of wind energy, especially on the part of the Windmill Owners
                                                          
31 As mentioned in Chapter 3, this also happened in the Netherlands in this and the following period.
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Association. This Association still had a large number of members and was therefore
able to lobby the government urging them to take more structural action to restore
trust in wind energy. This lobbying, combined with the appearance of large, reliable,
financially strong Japanes turbine manufacturers, like Mitsubishi, on the international
turbine market, convinced the government that it should take action. The Ministry of
Energy set up a committee to investigate possible ways of relieving the financial
burden on Danish investors; the Ministry was anxious to secure and support the
technological development of Danish turbines and safeguard their competitive
position on the international market. The Wind Turbine Guarantee Company was set
up and given a state guarantee of 750 million DKK, to guarantee the long-term
financing of large export projects (Van Est, 1999). This opened up new export
opportunities for the Danish manufacturers.
4.8.3 A new approval system
One of the conditions that the manufacturers would have to meet in order to qualify
for the guarantees was that their turbines would have to be approved according to a
new approval system (Hvidtfelt Nielsen, 2001). As mentioned before, the existing
approval system was not very strict. It was described in a 50-page document and
consisted of a design review and an examination of the basis of the calculations. A
new, more thorough approval system was needed to set levels for design,
manufacturing, transportation, installation and servicing of the turbines, especially
since the technical problems with the turbines had increased the costs of insurance.
Therefore, insurance companies began to demand that well-known classification
companies like Germanischer Lloyd and Det Norske Veritas should be responsible for
approving turbine projects.
The Danish government and manufacturers wanted to offer a Danish alternative to
these companies by developing a new Danish approval system. They argued that by
raising the quality of Danish wind turbines to international industrial standards and by
lowering certification costs the Danish position on the export market would be
strengthened again. A new approval system was developed by a newly established
working group under the Energy Agency, in co-operation with the Test and Research
Centre, the manufacturers, the insurance and certification companies and a number of
other organsiations. In the spring of 1991, the Danish Energy Agency issued an order
concerning type approval and certification of wind turbines. According to this order,
every wind turbine erected in Denmark after May 11th 1991 had to be type approved
by the Test and Research Centre or by another institution authorised by the Danish
Energy Agency. The technical basis of the new approval system covered more than
300 pages (Dannemand Andersen, 1993). The guarantee company was also
established in 1991 (Van Est, 1999).
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The primary aim of the new approval system was to bring into line the wind turbine
manufacturers, the approval authorities (the Energy Agency and the Test and
Research Centre) and the classification companies. To make the system more flexible,
there were three different categories of approval: A, B and C approvals (Hvidtfelt
Nielsen, 2001). The A approvals were the 'real' type approvals used by the larger
manufacturers, the B approvals were the 'reduced' approvals used by the smaller
manufacturers, and the C approvals were a kind of exemption used for temporary
approvals of prototypes and test models. All approval categories consisted of design,
product and installation approvals. In the design approval, the safety, the structural
strength, and the electrical system of the turbine design were assessed. This was done
by verifying the documentation of the manufacturer. To obtain the design approval,
taken over from the previous approval system, the design had to incorporate two
independent braking systems. While the design approval checked the turbine model,
the product approval checked the quality of individual wind turbines and their main
components. Product approval was concerned with the verification of the quality
management system of the manufacturer, including the control of the competencies of
the production labour, and production and quality control. The installation approval
was based on all damage and repairs (Hvidtfelt Nielsen, 2001).
4.8.4 Fast technology development once again
The reduced subsidies in California and Denmark forced the manufacturers to make
their wind turbines even more cost effective. As in the previous periods, they used
two strategies to do this: scaling up and optimising existing designs. Between 1986
and 1988, the wind turbines were scaled up from about 75 kW to 150-250 kW. After
1988, these turbines were optimised, and the development of even larger turbines with
generating capacities of 300-500 kW began (Karnøe, 1991).
Also as a result of the many technical problems that arose in the turbines in
California, product development was more thorough than before. The experience
gained in the hectic export period was thoroughly evaluated. Technology development
was performed in special R&D departments. The relationship of the manufacturers
with the Test and Research Centre also changed: they asked the Centre for a more
sophisticated form of knowledge to supplement their own knowledge base
(Dannemand Andersen, 1993). Instead of scaling up and optimising previous designs
that were based on the old Gedser turbine, turbine designers engaged in new
technological developments for the first time. For example, integrated gear-axis-yaw
systems were designed. Furthermore, attention was paid to the elegance of the design,
as a result of the siting problems that were beginning to arise (Karnøe, 1991).
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A big problem at the beginning of this period was the scarcity of turbine blades. The
manufacturers followed three strategies to overcome this problem (Karnøe, 1991):
- to manufacture their own blades, which is what Vestas did (as described above)
- to import blades from a foreign blade manufacturer, which is what Nordtank did
- to order blades from the newly established Danish blade manufacturer LM
LM developed new 11-metre and 12-metre blades for turbines with a capacity of 150-
180 kW and 180-250 kW respectively (Karnøe, 1991). They used a newly developed
blade profile, which had very good aerodynamic characteristics. The blades were
designed for stall-regulated turbines, the traditional Danish regulation system.
Because all Danish manufacturers except two used the same blades manufactured by
LM, their turbines remained very similar from a technical point of view: they
continued to be stall regulated three-bladed upwind turbines (Karnøe, 1991).
4.8.5 Turbine demand from utilities
The main reason why the remaining firms were able to stay in business was the 100-
MW agreement with the utilities. This agreement had been signed in 1985. Until 1988
the utilities were involved in developing organisational competencies and in
identifying good sites for the erection of wind turbines. Local resistance made it
difficult to find sites for the turbines. The prospect of a large home market enabled the
remaining manufacturers to stay in business. Market stimulation policies in other
European countries like Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands, which started at
the end of the 1980s, were likely to create a promising new export market and offer
even better opportunities for the Danish manufacturers (Karnøe and Garud, 2001).
The lack of demand for turbines from 1986 until 1988 caused by the Danish utilities
was an advantage for the manufacturers. It gave them more time to improve their
wind turbine designs and to develop new concepts.
The utilities wanted larger turbine models, because they were thought to be more cost-
effective and because they produced more electricity. This was the main reason for
the fast development of 300-500 kW turbines in this period. The turbines bought by
the utilities functioned well, although many of them had been developed quite
recently. This improved the utilities’ opinion of wind turbines. It opened the way for
learning by interacting between manufacturers and utilities. The utilities contributed
their expertise in electrical-technical subjects and the financing and insurance of
larger power production units to this learning process (Karnøe, 1991).
4.8.6 Good prospects for the turbine manufacturers
The year 1988 was a turning point for the Danish manufacturers. The utilities placed
large orders and the technological developments had resulted in well-functioning,
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cost-effective wind turbines that were able to compete with coal. Furthermore, exports
increased, particularly because of a new export guarantee offered by the state. As a
result of the technology development in the previous years, the Danish turbines had
regained their relatively good name compared to turbines from other countries.
Turbines were exported to other European countries, especially Germany and Spain,
but also to California, India and China (Karnøe, 1991).
The new European markets were very different from the utility-dominated, large-scale
projects in California. The European markets, called ‘extended home markets’, were
characterised by widely dispersed wind turbines and small wind parks with tens of
turbines averagely, as opposed to the 40-400 turbines in Californian wind parks. The
European markets strongly resembled the Danish market (Gipe, 1995). This, and the
fact that the European markets were nearer to Denmark in a geographical sense, made
it easier for the Danish manufacturers to deliver to these markets than to the
Californian market. Furthermore, the Danes applied what they had learned from their
Californian experience and established subsidiary companies in many European
countries, like Vestas Netherlands.
Environmental problems and the Chernobyl disaster in 1986 enhanced the legitimacy
of wind energy in this period. In April 1990, the energy plan Energi 2000 was
published. The plan emphasised the need for renewable energy. The overall objective
of the plan was stabilisation of global CO2-emissions by the year 2000 at the latest,
and a 20% reduction by 2005. This objective was taken over from the 1988 UN
conference on ‘The Changing Atmosphere’, which was one of the many follow-ups to
the Brundtland report.
In Energi 2000, the following goal was formulated with regard to wind energy: 1,500
MW of wind turbine capacity was to be installed before 2005. This goal was to be met
by way of agreements with the utilities. In 1990, the second 100-MW agreement was
signed between the government and the utilities. The utilities were required by policy-
makers to make a sincere and long-term contribution to the establishment of a
significant wind turbine capacity in Denmark, not just as turbine users, but as co-
developers. Their continued participation in the wind turbine innovation system was
essential. Their help was needed in order to further technology development and
establish a further 100 MW of wind turbines before January 1st 1994 (Van Est, 1999).
However, the policy of reducing the investment subsidies for private and co-
operatively organised wind turbine buyers was not changed. It was still argued that
subsidies were no longer needed, since turbines had become cost-effective. Therefore,
the demand from Danish private buyers and co-operatives, who traditionally had been
the most important turbine owners, decreased in this period. In 1991, the investment
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subsidies were abolished from one day to the next. A large number of orders were
cancelled (Karnøe, 1991; Van Est, 1999).
The prospect of a continuing demand for turbines from the utilities offset the
manufacturers’ problems caused by the decline in demand from private investors. The
continuation of the utility market offered them the possibility of recovering the costs
of the large investments they had made in terms of money, expertise, and time during
the previous years when they had developed a range of utility-grade wind turbines.
Figure 4.7 shows the development of cumulative installed wind turbine capacity in
Denmark in the period 1986-1991. Table 4.8 depicts the newly installed capacity in
the years 1987-1991, together with the percentage of this capacity owned by the
utilities.
Figure 4.7: The development of cumulative installed wind turbine capacity in 1986-1991
(source: IEA, 1993).
Table 4.8: The newly installed capacity, per year, and the percentage of this capacity that is
owned by the utilities32 (sources: Nielsen, 1993; Anonymous, 1993; Møller and Harrison,
1994).
Year Newly installed capacity (MW)  Percentage owned by utilities (%)
1987 40 13
1988 36 36
1989 21 21
1990 43 43
1991 20 20
                                                          
32 See section 3.8.9 for the same table on the Dutch situation.
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4.8.7 Siting problems
By this time, siting problems had worsened in Denmark. In the previous period, local
inhabitants were often in favour of wind energy because they could reap the benefits,
either because they were part-owners of the turbines or because the nearby turbine
manufacturers provided job opportunities. In the case of large turbine parks owned by
utilities, local benefits were absent. To overcome the siting problems, at the utilities’
request a special wind turbine siting committee was appointed by the government in
1991. This committee was responsible for finding sites for the second 100 MW utility
programme and for recommending general siting rules. It estimated that in Denmark
1,000 to 2,800 MW of wind turbine capacity could be installed, taking into account
local objections and the preservation of scenic areas. Because of the siting committee,
most Danish counties included wind energy in their regional plans (Gipe, 1995).
The siting problems posed a new technological challenge to the turbine
manufacturers: how to reduce the noise produced by the turbines. Furthermore, the
large size of the new turbines caused new technical problems. Stall regulation, the
traditional Danish form of power regulation, created problems when larger blades
were used. Because the velocity of the blade tip is far greater than the velocity of the
blade root in the case of large blades, it is very difficult to design blades that start to
stall at the same moment at every point of the blade. Furthermore, foreign turbines
showed that pitch regulation was more cost-effective. Therefore, many Danish
companies started to experiment with pitch regulation. Vestas developed blades that
were completely pitch regulated, and Danwin developed a combination of both
regulations: stall regulation at ‘normal’ wind speeds and pitch regulation at very low
or very high wind speeds (Karnøe, 1991). Vestas was very satisfied with pitch
regulation, because this form of regulation enabled them to turn the blades into vane
position when the wind was not blowing hard enough; this reduced the vibrations and
loads and therefore increased the turbine’s life span (Karnøe, 1991). All these new
technological developments made the Danish turbines more and more sophisticated.
Most Danish companies offered a range of turbines in this period: mainly two to five
different generating capacities between 100 and 500 kW. Furthermore, some
companies offered turbines with different rotor diameters for different wind regimes:
relatively large rotors for inland sites and relatively small rotor for coast sites
(Karnøe, 1991). In this way, buyers could obtain the most cost-effective turbine for a
specific site. This clearly reflects the scarcity of good sites and therefore the need to
adjust turbines as well as possible to the sites available. Here we have yet another
example of the large influence that the Danish turbine buyers exerted on technology
development.
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4.8.8 Offshore wind energy
Another way to solve the siting problems was to erect wind turbines at sea. The
Ministry of Energy set up a Committee for Offshore Wind Farms as early as
November 1987, just after the first siting problems had arisen. This committee was to
ensure the best possible start for wind energy offshore. In 1989, a suitable site for the
first offshore wind park was located. The site was north of Lolland, near the town
Vindeby. In the summer of 1989, the utility ELKRAFT declared that it was willing to
construct the Vindeby offshore wind park as part of the first 100-MW agreement in
order to gain experience in the field of offshore wind turbine installations. This wind
park would be the first offshore wind park in the world. ELKRAFT decided that the
turbine chosen for this wind park would be a commercially available wind turbine of
proven standard. A call for tenders went out for a very corrosion-resistant wind
turbine that was specially equipped for easy and cheap maintenance work offshore. In
June 1990, Bonus was selected to build turbines for the wind park. Bonus would adapt
its largest available wind turbine, a 450-kW turbine with a rotor diameter of 35
metres, to the tough weather conditions at sea (Van Est, 1999).
In mid-1991, the wind park was commissioned. It consisted of 11 stall-controlled
wind turbines in two rows, with a combined generating capacity of 5 MW. The park
was situated at a distance of 1.2 to 2.4 kilometres from the coast. The water depth at
the site varied between two and six metres. The costs of the project, including a two-
year measurement programme, were 80 million DKK (IEA, 1992).
4.8.9 The small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem in 1986-1991
At the start of this period, many manufacturers disappeared from the subsystem
because they went bankrupt. However, most of the knowledge and the employees
remained in the subsystem, because they were taken over by other manufacturers. A
number of manufacturers were able to start up again.
The number of foreign turbine buyers decreased, because the Californian subsidies
had expired. The number of Danish private and co-operative buyers slowly decreased
too, because of the step-by-step reduction in the Danish investment subsidies.
Although an indirect investment subsidy and a relatively high buy-back rate were still
available, many private and co-operative buyers decided not to buy a wind turbine
because of the risk and/or the price. However, a new actor emerged in the subsystem:
the Danish utilities. They became wind turbine buyers as a result of the 100-MW
agreement they signed in 1985. After two years of hesitation, the utilities started to
call for tenders for wind turbine parks. They played a more passive role in the
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technology development than the private and co-operative buyers, but they did steer
technology development by demanding new, larger wind turbines.
The insurance companies, many of which had lost their faith in wind energy in the
mid-1980s, remained present in the subsystem and enabled the manufacturers to keep
insuring their turbines and to stay in business. However, they demanded a change in
the approval system for wind turbines; this changed the role of the Test and Research
Centre within the subsystem. This Centre now started to play the role of a more
formal approval agency. Tripod also remained active in the subsystem by producing
more formalised knowledge.
The policy-makers played a more active role in the subsystem in this period. They
signed the second 100-MW agreement with the utilities in 1990, requesting a sincere
and long-term contribution from the utilities to the development of wind energy.
Furthermore, they established the Wind Turbine Guarantee Company, in order to
secure and safeguard further Danish wind turbine exports, and they started the
development of the new approval system. Figure 4.8 depicts the small-scale wind
turbine innovation subsystem in the period 1986-1991.
Figure 4.8: The small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem in  the period 1986-1991.
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4.8.10 Conclusion
Let us now turn to the learning processes within the small-scale wind turbine
innovation subsystem in this period. Learning by searching began to occur in a more
formalised way in the subsystem. For example, on the basis of R&D Vestas developed
a pitch control system. Whereas the stall control system had been imitated from
previous designs, like the Gedser turbine, the pitch control system was completely
new for the Danish manufacturers. Furthermore, after the Californian problems the
Danish manufacturers started to use more formal R&D, based not only on previous
experience but also on the newly developed more formal design calculations and
models from the Test and Research Centre and Tripod. In the further upscaling of the
turbines, the use of formal knowledge instead of trial-and-error methods became more
and more important.
Learning by interacting remained important, but it became more formalised than in
the previous periods. After the introduction of the new approval system, the Test and
Research Centre started to function as a more formal approval authority, demanding
formalised knowledge for the approval procedure. The role of learning by interacting
with private and co-operative users decreased, because demand from this user group
decreased. The turbines they bought were mainly smaller models, but many of the
learning processes in this period were focused on the further development of the
larger turbine models.
Learning by interacting with utilities became important in this period. The utilities
were anxious for new, larger turbine models and steered the development efforts of
the wind turbine manufacturers. The manufacturers, who had proved by 1998 that
their turbines with operating capacities of around 300 kW functioned well and were
cost-effective, used the design of these successful turbines for the development of
larger models. Problems with the larger models were reported by the utilities and led
to further adjustments, new design models and more calculations. The siting problems
reported by utilities and local authorities triggered technology development:
manufacturers started to improve the elegance and decrease the noise of their turbines.
4.9 1992 - 2000
4.9.1 Continuing stimulation measures from the government
In the 1990s, domestic demand for wind turbines was relatively low, especially as a
result of the siting problems. The manufacturers actively sought foreign markets in
order to increase their export of turbines. In 1995, turbines were sold to a large
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number of countries, including Germany, Great Britain, Sweden, the Netherlands, the
USA and China. In that year, the average Danish export share was 85% (Karnøe and
Jørgensen, 1996).
The Danish government was of the opinion that domestic wind turbine sales still
needed to be supported, by way of industrial policy and by way of energy policy. It
was important to keep stimulating the demand for wind turbines. In 1992, the Wind
Turbine Law was enacted. It stated that utilities had to pay all the expenses for
reinforcement of the grid in connection with the erection of wind turbines, but the
expenses of connecting the turbine to the public grid were to be paid by the turbine
owners (Van Est, 1999). Furthermore, all utilities had to keep buying electricity
generated by independent electricity producers at a rate a 85% of the electricity price.
In 1994, the government relaxed the conditions under which profits from investments
in wind energy were tax-free. Before 1994, all the participants in a wind project had to
live near the turbines. From 1994 on, only half the participants had to live near the
turbines. Furthermore, the maximum share of a participant in a wind project was
raised from 9 MWh to 20 MWh a year (Van Est, 1997). Thirdly, turbine owners who
replaced an older model with a new one could get a reinbursement of 15% of the
value of the old turbine. In this way, the total generating capacity of wind turbines in
Denmark could be increased without the need to solve siting problems. The
government still forced municipalities to find locations for wind turbines, but the
siting problems remained. In 1993, the Siting Committee had sent out a circular in
which it required the municipalities to indicate sites where wind turbines could be
placed. However, a weak point was that the government had added the clause that
municipalities did not have to take action if no space could be found. Therefore, the
siting problems were not solved by this circular (Van Est, 1997). In the same year, a
majority in the Danish parliament voted for a payback rate of 60 øre per kWh and for
a more streamlined programme to regulate the connection of wind turbines to the
electricity grid (Van Est, 1997).
In 1996, again new rules came into force. The maximum share of a participant in a
wind project was further enlarged from 20 MWh to 30 MWh. Furthermore, the
residence criterion was relaxed: from then on, a person who worked in a firm or
owned a house or real-estate in a municipality had a right to take part in a wind
project in that municipality, even if he lived elsewhere (Van Est, 1997).
In the same year, the Executive order was issued concerning the grid connection of
wind turbines (Van Est, 1997). According to this order, utilities were obliged to
provide grid connection facilities at any site which municipal planners had set aside
for the erection of at least 1.5 MW of wind turbine capacity. If the planned turbine
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capacity was lower than 1.5 MW, utilities were obliged to provide access to the local
11-20 kV grid, but the turbine owner was responsible for paying for the extension of
the grid needed to reach the site. However, if the cabling could be used for other
purposes during the normal extension of grid facilities, the utility had to pay for the
entire grid extension. If the grid had to be reinforced, this also had to be paid by the
utility, unless the utility could prove that the reinforcement in the area would be very
uneconomic. In spite of all these measures, turbine demand from private persons and
co-operatives did not return to its previous level (Van Est, 1997).
4.9.2 Turbine demand from the utilities
In this period, turbine demand from the utilities grew, as a result of the second 100-
MW agreement, although not as much as expected. In 1992, only about 14 MW was
installed, and in 1993 only 5 MW. By the end of 1993, the total wind turbine capacity
owned by the utilities had grown to 110 MW, instead of the 200 MW they had agreed
upon (IEA, 1994). The major cause was the siting problem. The utilities did not feel
responsible, since they had entered the second 100-MW agreement under the
condition that the government would ensure that sites were available (Van Est, 1999).
However, since demand from private investors declined further, the utilities’ share of
wind turbine capacity in the country grew considerably in the 1990s. Whereas in 1987
the utilities owned less than 5% of the total turbine capacity, the percentage increased
to 30% in 1990 and about 34% in 1996 (Heymann, 1998).
In this period, the role of the utilities within the small-scale wind turbine innovation
system became very different. Whereas in the previous periods, the utilities had
played a somewhat passive role, their role became more active in the 1990s. Turbine
demand from utilities became larger than demand from private persons and co-
operations. Negotiations between energy agencies and utilities continued in order to
determine the utilities’ future role in the development of wind energy. Joint private
and utility ownership of wind turbines became possible. In addition, the utility trade
association formed its own subsidiary to deploy its wind energy competencies as an
exporter of wind energy and a wind park operator (Karnøe and Garud, 2001).
Furthermore, the utilities changed their strategy and began purchasing the cheapest
large proven commercial wind turbines available on the market (Van Est, 1999). In
the previous period, they had often bought the largest available wind turbines, but
these were often prototypes or not sufficiently proven commercial turbines. By
erecting the largest wind turbines they saw an opportunity to fulfil the agreement in
the fastest way. However, they knew from experience that buying prototypes might
mean high operating costs, because the turbines had not been sufficiently tested.
Buying proven commercial wind turbines proved to be cheaper and less risky. Figure
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4.9 shows the development of the cumulative installed wind turbine capacity in
Denmark in the period 1992-2000.
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Figure 4.9: The development of the cumulative installed wind turbine capacity in 1992-2000
(sources: IEA, 1995; IEA, 1997; IEA, 1998; IEA, 1999; Windpower, 2001).
4.9.3 A changing role for the Test and Research Centre
In this period, the relationship between the Test and Research Centre and the turbine
manufacturers had become very different from the relationship in the early 1980s.
This was partly the result of a slow change over the years, and partly the outcome of
the introduction of the new approval system. The main changes in this relationship
were the following (Dannemand Andersen, 1993):
- The interaction had slowly become professionalised and formalised, both with
respect to research and to approval regulations.
- Before the introduction of the new approval system, research and regulation were
closely connected. After the new approval system had been introduced, these two
functions became far more separated.
- Before the introduction of the new approval system, approval was based mainly
upon assessments. The assessment procedure was slowly changed into a more
formal approval base and more formal procedures.
- Before, most research was based upon experience-based competence building,
which resulted in large improvements in the cost-effectivity of the wind turbines.
In this period, it was far harder and more expensive to carry through this kind of
improvement. This was not possible without more science-based research and
formal mathematical models. An example of this more science-based research by
the Test and Research Centre was the research into a small two-bladed turbine.
This research was started because two-bladed turbines were in use all over the
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world and the Danes did not have any experience with them, because since the
1970s they had built only three-bladed turbines. The turbine that was investigated
was very sophisticated: it was very flexible, had a downwind rotor and free
yawing (IEA, 1995)33.
- Before, informal interactions played the largest role in the exchange of
information between the Test and Research Centre and the manufacturers. In this
period, the licensing and insurance authorities asked for a more formal method of
knowledge transfer, via channels that could be documented.
4.9.4 Offshore wind energy
The Vindeby wind park functioned very well. Electricity production was about 60%
higher than on comparable land sites (IEA, 1995). The Test and Research Centre
performed a measurement programme. As a part of this programme, wind conditions
and turbulence at the offshore location were mapped (IEA, 1995).
In 1995, the second offshore wind park was built, in the Kattegat Sea, three kilometres
off the Danish coast. It was called the Tunø Knob wind park and was built by the
utility ELSAM. It consisted of 10 Vestas 500 kW pitch controlled wind turbines (IEA,
1995). Like the Bonus turbines at the Vindeby wind park, these Vestas turbines were
well-proven and commercially available. They were modified for the marine
environment, in that each turbine was equipped with an electrical crane so that major
parts such as generators could be replaced without the need for a floating crane.
Furthermore, the gearboxes were modified to allow a 10% higher rotational speed
than on the onshore version of the turbine. This would produce more noise, but that
would not be a problem at sea. The total costs were 87 million DKK (IEA, 1995). The
wind park performed extremely well, and production results were substantially higher
than expected. In the late 1990s, the Danish utilities announced major plans for the
installation of up to 4,000 MW of wind turbines offshore as from the year 2000
(Windpower, 2001).
4.9.5 Technology development
Besides developing offshore turbines, the Danish manufacturers continued their slow
scaling up of onshore turbine models. By 1994, 600 kW turbines were commercially
available. In 1994, Bonus installed a newly developed 750 kW turbine with a 50
metre rotor diameter at Tjæreborg. This turbine was the first Bonus turbine equipped
with pitch control (IEA, 1995). The reason for this change in power control
philosophy was that stall control had proven to be far more difficult when a turbine
                                                          
33 So far, neither this design principle nor ideas from it have been taken over by any Danish
manufacturer.
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had very large blades. Also, pitch control yielded higher power production. In 1995,
the Bonus 750 kW turbine suffered from overspeeding, which caused serious damage
to the rotor (IEA, 1997). The reason for this problem was the newly developed pitch
control system. Failures in the pitch bearings prevented the blades from moving to the
stop position. The design was improved and scaled up to 1 MW (IEA, 1997; Danish
manufacturers, a.n.).
After they had signed the second 100-MW agreement, the utilities asked for tenders
for 1 MW turbines (IEA, 1993). Many manufacturers therefore started scaling up their
turbines to megawatt-size. As from the mid-1990s, the first megawatt wind turbines
were built. In 1995, the prototype of the NEG Micon 1.5 MW turbine was
commissioned. It had a 60 metre rotor and two 750 kW generators operating in
parallel, which meant that the turbine could also operate at a power capacity of 750
kW, using only one generator. It was upgraded to a 64 metre rotor (IEA, 1996). In
1996, Vestas commissioned a 1.5 MW turbine. It had a 63 metre rotor and a 1.5 MW
generator (IEA, 1997). The second version had a 68 diametre rotor and a dual 1.65
MW / 300 kW generator (Danish manufacturers, a.n.).
In 1997, developments focused on refining the existing 500-600 kW turbines and
improving the MW-turbines (IEA, 1998). Refining the existing turbines included
improving them and slowly scaling them up, thereby creating a range of turbines with
different power capacities and rotor diameters, suitable for sites with different wind
regimes. The manufacturers used the platforms of their 500 kW turbines as a starting
point. Since the platforms on which the main axis, the generator and the rotor are
assembled take a long time to construct and are expensive to design, the
manufacturers’ design philosophy was based on making variations on the same
platform (Van Kuik, 1999). Making use of its 500 kW platform, NEG Micon
developed a 750 kW turbine with a 44 metre rotor diameter and a 600 kW turbine
with an 48 metre rotor diameter for sites with low wind speeds (IEA, 1998). Vestas
upgraded its 600 kW turbine to 660 kW with a 46 metre rotor and its 1.5 MW turbine
to 1.65 MW. Wind World announced the development of a 2.5 MW turbine, jointly
financed by the European Union (IEA, 1998).
Although most of the turbines sold were still the well-functioning and well-proven
turbines in the capacity range of 600-750 kW, the market for megawatt-turbines took
off in 1998. Megawatt-sized machines were considered to be ideal for offshore
applications and for areas where space for siting was scarce (Windpower, 2001).
Bonus commissioned a 2 MW turbine in 1998. It had a 72 metre rotor diameter and
had active stall power control, which meant that the blades could be pitched into the
stall position. In 1999, NEG-Micon commissioned a 2 MW turbine, with a 72 metre
rotor diameter. Its predecessors, up until the NEG-Micon 1.5 MW turbine, all had stall
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control, in accordance with the traditional Danish control philosophy. The 2 MW
turbine had active stall power control, like the Bonus 2 MW turbine. In the year 2000,
Nordex commissioned the prototype of its 2.5 MW turbine. It had a rotor diameter of
80 metres. The turbine had pitch control (Windpower, 2001).
Clearly, the Danish manufacturers had to change their philosophy in this period. The
trial-and-error approach did not work any longer when MW-size wind turbines were
being built. Therefore, sophisticated turbine design models and programmes,
developed by the Test and Research Centre and other research organisations, were
used for the new turbines. Furthermore, the traditional Danish stall regulation was no
longer considered as the best solution. As mentioned above, large blades presented
problems; it was difficult to design them in such a way that every part of the blade
started to stall at the same moment. Furthermore, pitch-controlled turbines from
foreign manufacturers were found to yield higher energy production. Therefore, many
Danish turbine manufacturers started using pitch systems in which the blades are
rotated into vane position, or they used an active stall system in which the blades are
rotated into stall position. The turbine manufacturers who did not proceed to pitch
regulation started introducing incremental innovations into the stall regulation. For
example, they borrowed the principle of vortex generators from the aircraft industry
(Boersma, 2000). These vortex generators are small strips, attached to the blades, that
can postpone the moment when the blades start to stall, thereby increasing the energy
production (Windpower, 2001).
4.9.6 The small-scale wind turbine innovation system in 1992-2000
The increasing siting problems, severely inhibiting turbine sales in this period, forced
the policy-makers to play an even more active role in the subsystem. The residence
criterion was relaxed twice and utilities were forced to improve grid facilities. These
measures were aimed at increasing turbine demand from private and co-operative
customers. However, their demand did not grow much in this period. Demand from
the utilities and therefore their role in the subsystem did grow in this period. Although
the utilities worked more slowly than expected, they erected wind turbine parks with
relatively large turbines, thereby increasing the total turbine capacity in the country at
a fast pace. They avoided the siting problems by starting to erect wind turbine parks at
sea.
The role of the Test and Research Centre within the subsystem changed further in this
period; it had started by being a co-operating 'partner' in technology development,
exchanging knowledge with the manufacturers mainly during informal interactions,
but it had now become a more formal research and approval authority. Furthermore,
the Centre started doing science-based research, e.g. into a model of a flexible turbine
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with a passive yaw system. Figure 4.10 shows the small-scale wind turbine innovation
subsystem in the period 1992-2000.
Figure 4.10: The small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem in  the period 1992-2000.
4.9.7 Conclusion
What can be said about the learning processes in this period? Learning by searching
became more important, since formal R&D was required for the design of the large
MW-turbines, mainly because trial-and-error learning had become far too risky and
expensive, but also because many manufacturers introduced new features in their
turbines in this period. An example of a new feature was the pitch control system,
which was used by more and more turbine manfacturers, in order to improve power
control and to increase energy output. For the development of their pitch control
system, the manufacturers could not rely on experience from the past, but had to
perform R&D. Furthermore, the formalised results of this R&D were required as input
for the new approval procedure. The Test and Research Centre also started learning
by searching in this period, in that it did research into a theory-based design of a
flexible wind turbine.
Learning by interacting between turbine manufacturers on the one hand and turbine
users and the Test and Research Centre on the other hand remained important, but was
not as important as in the previous periods. The interactions were more formal and
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knowledge from the Test and Research Centre was transferred to the manufacturers in
a more formalised way, e.g. via scientific reports or design models. Operational
experience obtained with the megawatt and offshore turbines was transferred from the
utilities, who owned the turbine parks, to the manufacturers. This experience was used
as input for further turbine refinement and upscaling.
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5 Conclusion
5.1 Introduction
Before presenting the conclusions of our study, we will briefly summarise how our
research was organised. The starting point of our research was the following broad
research question:
Why were the Danes more successful than the Dutch in building up wind turbine
capacity and a wind turbine industry in the period 1973-2000?
We decided to approach this research question by analysing the Danish and Dutch
wind turbine innovation systems. In chapter 2, we described the various elements that
constitute the innovation system approach. In short, the approach focuses on
technology development by interlinked actors in a system. Key parameters are:
- the sort of actors within the system
- the interactions between the actors within the system
- the institutional set-up of the system, framing the actions of the actors.
We focused on one type of interaction between the actors within the system: learning.
The innovation literature shows that learning processes are extremely important in
technology development. Therefore, we formulated the following specific research
question:
To what extent did the learning processes in the Dutch and the Danish wind turbine
innovation systems differ in the period 1973-2000 and what are the consequences of
these differences?
In chapter 2, we identified the four main types of learning referred to in the innovation
literature:
- learning by searching, or R&D, specifically taking place in firms and R&D
organisations
- learning by doing, involving the growth of production skills in firms
- learning by using, increasing the knowledge of users of the technology
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- learning by interacting, involving the transfer of knowledge between actors in the
innovation system
In order to operationalise these types of learning, we identified facilitating conditions
for each type of learning, which we could use later in our case study research. From
the literature on innovation and on organisations, we identified the following
conditions for these learning processes:
1. Learning by searching
Facilitating conditions:
- the presence of a technological guidepost, guiding the direction of search
- the availability of an appropriate scientific theory on the subject, guiding the direction of
search
- the presence of a technological paradigm, guiding the direction of search
- the presence of standards and regulations, guiding the direction of search
- changing circumstances
- an environment that is not (too) hostile
- the availability of capital
- some level of knowledge and expertise in the field of study
- the possibility of making mistakes and learning from them
- the way the ownership of novelties and new knowledge is organised
2. Learning by doing
Facilitating conditions:
- time
- a high production rate
3. Learning by using
Facilitating conditions:
- the presence of users during technology development
- a user group of minimum size and degree of sophistication
- contacts between the user and the producer
4. Learning by interacting
Facilitating conditions:
- mutual interest in the learning process
- proximity in the broad sense, including geographical closeness, cognitive closeness, a
common language and culture, national standardisation, common codes of conduct, a
certain lack of competition, mutual trust between the actors, and congruent frames of
meaning regarding the technology
- norms of openness and disclosure
- the presence of an intermediary
- the presence of a network builder
- the capacity to build new networks and destroy obsolete ones
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In the case study chapters, we described the sort of actors engaged in developing wind
turbines, the learning processes between the actors and the influence of the
institutional set-up on the actors and the learning processes. In this chapter, we will
make the connection between the case study chapters and chapter 2: what can be said
about the importance of learning in both countries and particularly of the presence of
the above-mentioned facilitating conditions? In this chapter, we will subdivide the
developments in the Netherlands and Denmark into different time periods, as we did
in the case study chapters. Furthermore, in each country we identify a large-scale
wind turbine innovation subsystem and a small-scale wind turbine innovation
subsystem. In the large-scale innovation subsystems, the focus was from the
beginning on the development of large, MW-size, wind turbines, whereas in the
small-scale innovation subsystems the focus slowly shifted from small, kW-size wind
turbines to larger ones. In the following, we describe the learning processes in both
countries per period and per subsystem. This method yields the clearest comparisons.
5.2 1975-1980
A wind turbine innovation system was set up in this period, both in the Netherlands
and in Denmark. In each country, there was both a small-scale and a large-scale
development.
5.2.1 Learning in the Netherlands
The large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem
In the Netherlands, the large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem was developed
first. Triggered by R&D subsidies provided by the Ministry of Economic Affairs,
several actors began to get involved in wind turbine R&D. The actors involved in this
innovation subsystem were the government, large companies, research institutes and
intermediary organisations. During this period, users or future users were absent from
the large-scale subsystem. The actors in the subsystem had a shared vision of who the
future turbine users would be: the utilities. However, the utilities were not interested
in wind turbines in this period and therefore were not engaged in the subsystem.
Furthermore, the actors did not aim to involve future users in their R&D.
The goal of the Ministry of Economic Affairs was to increase knowledge about:
- the potential contribution of wind energy to the energy provision in the Nether-
lands
- the technical features of wind turbines in general and of cost-effective large wind
turbines in particular
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Clearly, learning by searching was the most important type of learning in the large-
scale subsystem in this period. Two search paths were followed: one leading to the
horizontal axis turbine, or HAT-turbine, and the other to the vertical axis turbine, or
VAT-turbine. Within these search paths, large technological companies like Fokker,
Holec and Stork co-operated with research institutes like ECN and the technical
universities. The aim was to determine whether the HAT or the VAT would be the
more cost-effective wind turbine. No electricity producing wind turbines had been
built in the Netherlands before the 1970s so there was not technological guidepost
available for the researchers.
In spite of the absence of a technological guidepost, the circumstances were very good
for learning by searching. There was a shared vision that new, renewable energy
sources had to be developed. Not much was known about on wind energy and wind
turbines, so a whole new field was open for research. The researchers worked in a
sheltered environment. Large R&D-subsidies were available, sustaining the search
activities within the subsystem. Since the field of study was perceived to be very close
to aerospace engineering, search activities could be linked to the knowledge already
gained in that field. Aerospace theories and models were used in wind-energy and
wind-turbine R&D.
Learning by interacting between the companies and the research institutes went very
well. They shared a common frame of meaning regarding wind energy and wind
turbines: a large cumulative installed capacity of wind turbines was needed in the
Netherlands; the turbines would have to be large and cost-effective. Although views
differed on whether the HAT or the VAT turbine would be the more cost-effective
turbine, it was assumed that future R&D would make it clear which path should be
chosen for further development. The actors within the research teams met regularly
and exchanged information for the purpose of learning from each other and together
achieving the goals of the project. They all were highly educated and shared a
cognitive closeness, a common language and culture, and common codes of conduct.
They trusted each other and appreciated each other’s work.
Some learning by doing occurred in this period, because the first VAT prototype was
built. The turbine builder, Fokker, learned how to build a VAT turbine. Furthermore,
since Fokker was also the user of the VAT prototype, Fokker learned by using about
the operational problems of the VAT turbine. Since only one wind turbine was built in
this subsystem in this period, learning by doing and learning by using were
considerably less important than learning by searching.
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The small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem
In the small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem, circumstances were different.
About ten small manufacturers started to build wind turbines in this subsystem. The
major reason for them to become involved in wind turbine building was the
availability of the above-mentioned R&D subsidies. The main learning process in this
subsystem in this period was learning by doing. On the basis of trial-and-error, the
manufacturers slowly learned how to build wind turbines and how to keep them in
operation. The main goal was not to build the most cost-effective wind turbine, but
simply to build a wind turbine that worked.
The first wind turbines were sold during this period. Therefore, learning by using took
place as well. A small user group emerged. The users were interested in buying wind
turbines mainly out of concern for the environment. Secondly, they hoped to gain
financially from the production of electricity by their wind turbine. No investment
subsidies or subsidies of any other kind were available for the turbine users. The users
were living next to their wind turbine, so they could observe it closely. Most of the
users also lived near the turbine producers, so problems could be passed back quickly
to the producers. Through learning by interacting with the turbine users, the
producers learned about the operational problems of their wind turbines.
Learning by searching did not occur in this subsystem during this period. Learning by
interacting between turbine producers and the research institute ECN got off the
ground at the end of this period. We will go into this in section 5.3.1.
5.2.2 Learning in Denmark
The large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem
In the Danish large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem too, learning by
searching was the most important form of learning. Much research was done into the
possibilities of wind energy in Denmark. Furthermore, the two Nibe turbines were
designed and built in this period, on the basis of learning by searching. The
technological guidepost for the search activities was the Gedser turbine, which had
proved to work in the 1950s. Searching was also guided to some extent by
aerodynamic models and theories, but far less than in the Netherlands, because the
Danes did not have a history of aerodynamic research and because they did not
purchase an American aerodynamic model, since it was considered too expensive.
Learning by doing and learning by using began while the Nibe turbines were being
built and put into operation. Learning by using occurred only in one utility: SEAS.
Learning by interacting fared better in this subsystem than in the Dutch large-scale
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wind turbine innovation subsystem, since in Denmark the foreseen users, i.e. the
utilities, were involved in the subsystem from the start. Therefore, their viewpoints
could be taken into consideration from the beginning and a collective frame of
meaning with regard to wind energy could be formed at an early stage: i.e. to facilitate
the installation of a large number of large, cost-effective wind turbines within the
Danish electricity grid. Learning by interacting in this subsystem was hindered by the
fact that the turbine builders were hardly involved in the subsystem. They regarded
the design and the building of components of the Nibe turbines as a once-only job and
did not intend to set up a production line for wind turbines in the future. The situation
was quite different in the Dutch large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem. The
Danish manufacturers were less inclined to become actively involved in the
subsystem and exchange knowledge with the other actors.
The small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem
In the small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem in Denmark, learning by
interacting was the most important form of learning. A tight network was formed by
all the actors involved: turbine producers, users and researchers, and a great deal of
information was exchanged, right from the beginning. Since investment subsidies had
been introduced in Denmark in the 1970s, a relatively large market developed at an
early stage. Because of the existence of a large home market, a large user group
formed very early on and a lot of learning by using occurred. In contrast, in the
Netherlands the home market was very small in this period and remained relatively
small.
The user group in Denmark was not only larger than in the Netherlands, but it was
also better organised. The users formed an association in which they could be a strong
partner in negotiations with the utilities about buy-back tariffs for the electricity they
delivered to the grid, and in negotiations with the turbine manufacturers about
improving the technical performance of the wind turbines. They published details of
the performance of the Danish turbines in their magazine, forcing the producers to
improve their turbines if they were not performing well. Furthermore, turbine
manufacturers learned from users about the performance of their turbines when
technical problems arose. Information was exchanged both during informal contacts
and during more formal contacts, like the Wind Meetings, especially set up for this
purpose. Because the user group was larger and more organised than in the
Netherlands, learning by interacting between producers and users was also more
effective in Denmark.
Learning by interacting with researchers occurred at the Risø research institute. A test
field was established at Risø in 1979, earlier than in the Netherlands. From the
beginning, the wind energy researchers at Risø were dependent on the manufacturers
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for their financing. They received only a limited amount of money for a limited period
of time, and had to obtain the rest from the manufacturers. Although the
manufacturers were apprehensive at first, the Risø researchers were quickly able to
build up a trusting relationship with them and to start building a knowledge base for
the subsystem. During informal contacts on the testfield and during the Wind
Meetings, the members of Risø co-operated with the manufacturers to solve practical
problems. They were allowed to help solving specific problems as well, unlike the
Dutch research organisation ECN (see the following section). Furthermore, they
shared the same frame of meaning with the turbine manufacturers and saw the
advantage of trial-and-error learning and small upscaling steps. The approval criteria
that were set up in 1979 were an important factor in the relationship between Risø and
the manufacturers. From then on, wind turbines had to satisfy a number of technical
criteria before they could be sold. This forced the manufacturers to improve their
wind turbines and therefore to co-operate with Risø and disclose information.
There was no learning by searching in this subsystem in this period. The
manufacturers did not build their wind turbine on the basis of research, but on the
basis of the Gedser and the Riisager turbines, which had proved to work and served as
technological guideposts. Imitating them was seen as a good way to follow the design
philosophy in this subsystem: building - on the basis of trial-and-error - wind turbines
that were reliable and safe. The manufacturers did not have the urge to search for
more elegant, larger, or more cost-effective wind turbines, at least not during this
period. Building wind turbines that worked proved hard enough. Secondly, the fact
that all Danish turbine builders followed the same trajectory made co-operation easier.
During this period more and more turbines were build and sold; so learning by doing
became increasingly important. Manufacturers learned how to build their turbines in
the best way and how to solve practical problems, in co-operation with users and
researchers. In conclusion, we can say that early on in this very first period in
Denmark a tight network developed, which stimulated the exchange of information
between users, producers and researchers. This gave the Danish wind turbine
manufacturers a good starting position.
5.3 1981-1985
5.3.1 Learning in the Netherlands
The large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem
As in the previous period, the emphasis in this subsystem in the Netherlands was still
on learning by searching. First of all, knowledge was gained from desk research like
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the Plan Lievense and the Energo Project, both of which investigated how a large
wind turbine potential in the Netherlands could be realised with the help of energy
storage in water basins. In addition, learning by searching took place in the test and
measurement programmes of the two first wind turbine prototypes: the HAT-25 and
the VAT-15. Furthermore, knowledge was gained in theoretical research projects like
the tipvane project and in the predesign and design phases of the 300 kW and 1 MW
Newecs turbines and the 3 MW Grohat. R&D subsidies were still available for wind
energy research. The Ministry of Economic Affairs was highly in favour of
developing a strong wind turbine industry in the Netherlands that would play a
leading role internationally. Therefore, they made large R&D subsidies available and
gave the researchers a lot of freedom and a shielded environment. Mistakes could be
made without the fear of losing the R&D subsidies.
Learning by interacting between turbine manufacturers and research organisations
like ECN and the technical universities was still very important. In addition, learning
by interacting with foreign manufacturers and research organisations took place at the
international wind energy conferences, which started in this period and took place
every two years. Most manufacturers and research institutes that attended these
conferences shared a common frame of meaning with regard to wind energy: large
cost-effective wind turbines needed to be designed and built; and the designs should
be based on mathematical models and theoretical knowledge, derived mainly from the
aerospace research field.
In addition to the two prototypes, the first commercial wind turbines were built in this
period in the Dutch large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem. Three 300 kW
Newecs-25 turbines and one 1 MW Newecs-45 turbine were built by the manufacturer
Stork. Therefore, learning by doing became more important in this subsystem.
Furthermore, Stork gained operational experience, since it did the repair and service
work on the turbines. However, the knowledge gained by learning by doing remained
very limited, since only four wind turbines were built. Furthermore, these turbines
were not thoroughly tested before they were sold, which meant that only a limited
amount of knowledge was gained during the test programmes.
Learning by using got off the ground. The utilities of Zeeland, Schiedam and Curaçao
learned by using the Newecs-25 they had bought, and the utility of North-Holland
learned by using the Newecs-45.
Learning by interacting took place between the turbine users and the producers.
However, learning by interacting between the producers and the users went far less
smoothly than learning by interacting between the producers and the research
institutes. Contacts between producers and users were generally strained. They did not
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share the same frame of meaning regarding wind energy, since the utilities were not at
all enthusiastic about wind energy. They did not see how wind energy could be used
to supply a significant part of the Dutch electricity and did not consider it as a reliable
energy source. The operational problems with the Newecs turbines in this period also
had a negative impact on the relations between the producers and the utilities. Only
the Zeeland utility had a relatively positive opinion of wind energy. They were very
much involved in their wind turbine and quickly referred problems back to the
manufacturers. This improved the energy yield of their wind turbine.
In general, there was a lack of trust between the turbine producers and the research
institutes on the one hand and the utilities on the other hand. Therefore, although the
subsystem was complete in this period, consisting of producers, users, research
institutes, policy-makers and intermediaries, it was not a tight subsystem. The turbine
users were not really involved. The lack of trust became most apparent in the first
phase of the Sexbierum project, the first Dutch wind park. The turbine producer Stork
and SEP (the Co-operating Electricity Production Companies) did not trust each other
at all, which is one of the reasons why Stork's tender for the Sexbierum project was
not accepted. Holec, another large company that had hardly any experience of
building a wind turbine of the size SEP required, but which had built up a better
relationship with SEP in the past while providing electrical equipment to SEP, had its
tender accepted. However, Stork did learn by interacting in the Sexbierum project. For
instance, it learned about the viewpoints of the SEP and of the electricity sector in
general regarding wind turbines and about SEP's management of  large projects,
which involved the use of advisory committees and quality procedures.
The small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem
In this subsystem, learning by searching got off the ground in this period. Research
institutes like ECN became involved in small wind turbines and conducted research
into decentralised wind turbine systems. Furthermore, learning by interacting between
ECN and the small turbine manufacturers started. In 1980, ECN established a wind
turbine testfield. The small turbine manufacturers could place their turbine on the
testfield and have it tested by ECN. However, ECN was not allowed to give the
manufacturers specific design instructions, because that would cause unfair
competition. The manufacturers were only given general instructions about which
components of their turbine were not working properly and how these problems could
be solved. Learning by interacting between ECN and the small turbine manufacturers
went less smoothly than learning by interacting between ECN and the large turbine
manufacturers. Whereas the large turbine manufacturers shared ECN’s frame of
meaning concerning wind energy, i.e. build a very large number of large, cost-
effective wind turbines, designed on the basis of aerodynamic theory and models, the
small turbine manufacturers had a different frame of meaning. They were concerned
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mainly with building reliable wind turbines. They did not aim at making large
upscaling steps based on aerodynamic designs; their aim was to make small upscaling
steps based on trial-and-error and on experience gained with the building and
operating of earlier wind turbines. However, although ECN’s main focus was on large
wind turbines, some employees of ECN were also deeply involved in the development
of small wind turbines and did their best to help these manufacturers.
The manufacturers did not trust each other at all, which meant there was no learning
by interacting between the manufacturers. They did not learn from each other’s
problems, since the ECN test results were confidential and they did not discuss their
turbines or turbine problems with each other.
Learning by doing and learning by using became more important in this period, since
more small wind turbines were built and sold. Learning by doing also took place on
the ECN testfield, while manufacturers kept adjusting their turbines until they passed
the tests. Since the number of users grew, learning by using and learning by
interacting between users and producers gained in importance. However, the user
group remained relatively small, since no investment subsidies were available for
turbine buyers, which meant buying a wind turbine was very expensive and the pay-
back time was long. Furthermore, the buy-back tariffs provided by the utilities for the
electricity the turbine owners delivered to the grid were very low. The users did not
form a cohesive group, and therefore did not have a strong position while negotiating
with the utilities regarding the buy-back tariff.
Since the turbine users still lived mainly in the vicinity of the producers, learning by
interacting between users and producers remained important. The manufacturer
Lagerwey in particular managed to develop a good relationship with his customers,
which resulted in a good information exchange.
At the end of this period, learning to be viable became important. NEN norms for
wind turbines were defined. The manufacturers were only able to sell their turbines if
they had them tested by ECN and could hand over a certificate proving to the future
buyers and licensers that the turbine was working according to the NEN norms.
Therefore, they were forced to develop wind turbines that satisfied the NEN norms.
5.3.2 Learning in Denmark
The large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem
In this subsystem, learning by searching, mainly performed by the Danish Technical
University, remained important in this period. It was regarded as the basis of the
development of large wind turbines. Since the Nibe turbines had been in operation for
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a number of years and new turbines were built, learning by doing became more
important. Building reliable, well-functioning wind turbines turned out to be more
difficult than expected, particularly because of material fatigue problems. As more
utilities became involved in the subystem, learning by using and learning by
interacting with users became more important. Also, a wind turbine manufacturing
firm was established in this period: Danish Wind Technology. It was set up by the
Ministry of Energy and by the utilities, so it was well integrated into the subsystem. In
this way, a tight network was formed which facilitated the exchange of information
between the actors. In spite of technical problems with the first wind turbines, the
utilities remained involved in the subsystem and were willing to co-operate.
The small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem
Within the small-scale innovation subsystem, learning by interacting remained the
most important form of learning. The market kept growing and most turbine buyers
were local private persons and co-operatives. Furthermore, all actors in the subsystem
shared the same frame of meaning with regard to wind energy. This made the
exchange of information between the turbine producers and the users easy. Also
learning by interacting with Risø and the building up of knowledge by Risø continued
to play an important role. Risø engineers helped the turbine manufacturers to find
practical solutions to specific operating and manufacturing problems.
Furthermore, Risø started some practical and problem-focused research. In this
period, therefore, learning by searching started in the subsystem. On the basis of this
research and the knowledge gathered by the interaction with turbine producers and
measurements on turbines, Risø started to make more formalised, simple, empirically
based models that could be used to design wind turbines. These models were useful to
the turbine producers, since certification and insurance companies began to ask for
more formalised types of information about the technical aspects of the wind turbines.
This was especially the case on the Californian market, to which the Danes exported
thousands of wind turbines in this period.
Because of this large market, learning by using and learning by doing increased
enormously in this period. However, since the Californian buyers asked for a fast
upscaling of wind turbines, the turbines rapidly became larger and learning on the
basis of trial-and-error became more and more expensive. This is another reason why
the manufacturers started using more formalised design models in this period.
Learning by interacting with the Californian turbine users went far less smoothly than
with the Danish turbine users, because California was so far away.
However, the Danish manufacturers learned a great deal from the Californian
experience. For example, they learned that it is very risky to sell turbines that are
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prototypes and not fully proven commercially. Furthermore, they learned to adjust
their turbines to harsher weather regimes. Thirdly, they learned how to produce
turbines in series, and how to do this in an efficient way. This was a very important
learning experience at an early stage. Fourthly, they learned managerial skills, such as
how to organise information exchange between different company divisions. Fifthly,
they learned how to design turbines based on more formalised models and how to lay
down their knowledge in a more formalised way.
Although the Danish manufacturers ran into enormous financial difficulties when the
Californian market collapsed because the Californian investment subsidies had
ceased, the experience gained on this market was crucial. This made the difference
between the Dutch and the Danish small-scale wind turbine innovation system, that
was already appearing in the previous period because of the larger Danish home
market and the better learning by interacting within the Danish subsystem, even
larger.
5.4 1986-1991
5.4.1 Learning in the Netherlands
The large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem
In this period, learning by searching was still prominent in this subsystem in the
Netherlands. During the research and measurement programmes performed on the
HAT-25 and the Newecs-45 and at the Sexbierum wind power station, a great deal of
knowledge was obtained and computer programmes and models were validated and
adjusted. Furthermore, the tipvane research at Delft University of Technology
provided knowledge on aerodynamics. Large R&D funds were still available,
although, in the case of the tipvane research, it was recognised that there was less and
less chance of successful and useful outcomes. A research base for wind energy and
wind turbines was established slowly. Consequently, the dependence on models and
theories from the aerospace research field became smaller. Researchers began to
realise that wind turbines had other features than aeroplanes and that the models and
theories from aerospace research could not be used without significant adjustment.
Learning by interacting between the research institutes and the turbine producers
Holec and Stork remained important. Holec co-operated with KEMA, the research
institute of the electricity sector, while Stork co-operated mainly with ECN. Fokker
had stopped manufacturing wind turbines. In addition, learning by interacting between
the research institutes took place. ECN and Delft University of Technology performed
research together. Although they did not co-operate in the new research field of
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advanced flexible wind turbines, they did exchange knowledge, e.g. during national
and international wind energy conferences.
Learning by doing was important as well. Although Stork did not build any new
turbines in this period, it gained knowledge while maintaining and repairing the
Newecs turbines. Holec learned a lot while designing and producing the Sexbierum
wind turbines. Since they were obliged to follow the SEP quality procedures, they had
to use a new turbine production procedure. In this period Stork and Holec learned that
producing wind turbines was a very risky and expensive activity.
Learning by using occurred as well. The utilities learned that wind turbines were not
as reliable as they were claimed to be by the producers and the Ministry of Economic
Affairs. Keeping them in operation and repairing them turned out to be very
expensive. Their opinion of wind energy became worse in this period.
Learning by interacting between producers and users took place between Stork and
the utilities that owned Newecs turbines and in the Sexbierum project. In the
Sexbierum project, the actors met frequently during the design and manufacturing
phase. Besides turbine users and producers, also research institutes, especially
KEMA, were involved in the Sexbierum project. Furthermore, during the quality
control procedures a considerable amount of knowledge was transferred. E.g., after
the Sexbierum project, in other wind power station projects quality control procedures
were implemented as well. However, the most important aspects that were learnt
during the Sexbierum project were that producing wind turbines was still very
expensive and that wind turbines still could not meet commercial standards.
Because of the numerous problems that occurred both with the Newecs turbines and
the Sexbierum turbines, both Stork and Holec decided to stop producing wind turbines
in this period. As a result, in this period the manufacturers disappeared from the
subsystem. Consequently, the Dutch large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem
came to an end. The other actors within the subsystem, i.e. the research institutes, the
policy-makers, the turbine users and the intermediaries, turned their attention to the
small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem.
The small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem
In this period, learning processes in the small-scale wind turbine innovation
subsystem changed to a large extent. Whereas in the previous periods learning by
doing was the major learning process in this subsystem, now it was learning by
searching which gained importance. Turbine producers started to use models
developed by ECN to design their wind turbines. ECN research results concerning
flexible wind turbines and components were used by some small manufacturers in
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their designs. However, it turned out to be very difficult for them to apply ECN
research results in constructing a wind turbine that worked. The advanced components
caused many problems and the advanced wind turbines that were built did not work at
all. The manufacturers, who were used to building their turbines on the basis of trial-
and-error, turned out to be unable to make designs on the basis of scientific research.
Since far more wind turbines were sold than in the previous period and since serial
production was set up, learning by doing increased a great deal compared to the
previous period. The more turbines that were produced, the more experience was
gained on how to produce them efficiently. Furthermore, since more turbines were
operating in this period, more problems occurred and had to be solved; this increased
the producers’ knowledge about the functioning and possible failures of wind
turbines. On the ECN testfield, learning by doing occurred, since the manufacturers
were still allowed to adjust their turbines during the test period, supported by general
directions from ECN.
Learning by using increased as well, since far more wind turbines were in use. As
from 1986, when investment subsidies became available, the sale of turbines
increased rapidly. Hitherto, farmers and advocates of renewable energy had been the
most important turbine users in this subsystem, but now utilities and some co-
operatives were also starting to buy small wind turbines. These users required new
knowledge, e.g. about technical features and problems, but they also needed to know
how to obtain building permits and how to persuade local councils to change
development plans. This aspect was becoming more important in this period, since the
siting of wind turbines had become a problem.
Learning by interacting was important as wel, particularly learning by interacting
between the turbine manufacturers and the research institute ECN. Some
manufacturers interacted with ECN on the testfield and some while designing
advanced turbines and turbine components. Since the large turbine manufacturers had
stopped producing wind turbines, as from 1986 the attention of the research institutes
and the Ministry of Economic Affairs was directed towards the small turbine
manufacturers. ECN was forced by the Ministry of Economic Affairs to make its
research results applicable to the turbine manufacturers. Furthermore, the
manufacturers were stimulated to make use of research results because they could
thereby get higher R&D subsidies and the turbine buyers were able to obtain higher
investment subsidies if they bought technologically advanced wind turbines.
However, the frames of meaning of the research institutes and the manufacturers were
very different. The research institutes focused on large upscaling steps that would lead
to a cost-effective wind turbine, the manufacturers used small upscaling steps that
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would lead to a wind turbine that worked well. Although most of the manufacturers
tried to change their frame of meaning as a result of the R&D subsidies that were
available and the demand from utilities for large wind turbines, this involved a very
large change. Therefore, communication remained difficult. Only one manufacturer,
Lagerwey, who kept producing relatively small wind turbines for farmers, learned a
great deal by interacting with researchers, mainly by way of personal contact.
Scientific reports were hardly read by the small turbine manufacturers. Furthermore,
because of the high pressure on innovation and upscaling exerted on the
manufacturers in this period, they were in urgent need of the ECN research results.
However, these results were often made available rather late.
Learning by interacting between manufacturers and users remained important. Most
turbine manufacturers aimed at the new user group: the utilities. They learned about
the utilities’ frames of meaning regarding wind energy. As mentioned in the previous
section, the utilities were still not enthusiastic about wind energy. Therefore, their
frame of meaning regarding wind energy was very different from that of the wind
turbine manufacturers. This made learning by interacting between the manufactures
and the utilities difficult. The difference in the frames of meaning became particularly
obvious in the project Windplan, when the utilities intended to buy hundreds of MW
of wind turbines from the Dutch small manufacturers, but later cancelled their
decision. The manufacturers were not able to meet the technical standards set by the
utilities.
A new, very important, form of learning in this period was learning to be fundable.
The manufacturers had to make a good business plan if they wanted to continue
receiving R&D subsidies after 1986. Furthermore, the turbine buyers received
investment subsidies based on the generator capacity of the turbine they bought and
on how technically advanced the turbine was. Therefore, to boost the investment
subsidies the manufacturers started to produce wind turbines with relatively large
generators. As pointed out above, the efforts of some manufacturers to build advanced
wind turbines were not successful.
Another new form of learning was connected to the siting problem. Before a turbine
could be erected, problems like obtaining a building permit and persuading local
councils to change development plans had to be overcome. This meant that both the
turbine users and the producers had to acquire new skills.
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5.4.2 Learning in Denmark
The large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem
In this subsystem, learning by searching remained the most important form of
learning. Furthermore, since more turbines were built and operated, learning by doing
and learning by using became more important. However, since the number of turbines
built was far lower than in the small-scale innovation subsystem, learning by doing
and learning by using were less effective.
In this period, all large Danish utilities were involved in the large-scale wind turbine
innovation subsystem. Although they became less enthusiastic about wind energy
because of the large number of technical problems with their turbines and the high
costs resulting from these problems, learning by interacting between users and
producer still went well. The producer, Danish Wind Technology, was still well
integrated into the subsystem. The 2 MW Tjæreborg turbine was not built by Danish
Wind Technology, but by a number of companies each of which produced different
components. These companies were less involved in the subsystem, since they were
not interested in setting up a development line for wind turbines.
Although much was learned in this subsystem about wind energy and wind turbines,
the most important knowledge gained was that building large wind turbines was very
expensive and risky. The small turbine manufacturers had proved able to build
cheaper and more reliable wind turbines than Danish Wind Technology. Therefore,
the Danish state sold its shares in Danish Wind Technology around 1990. This meant
the end of the Danish large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem.
The small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem
In this subsystem, learning by searching became more important in this period. For
example, the manufacturer Vestas developed a pitch control system as a result of
R&D. Furthermore, after the problems on the Californian market, the small turbine
manufacturers started to incorporate into their designs R&D results and the design
calculations and models developed by Risø. As they scaled up their turbines trial-and-
error learning became less important and learning by searching became more
important.
Because by this time many wind turbines were in operation in Denmark, learning by
using and learning by doing were also important in this period. Turbine demand from
farmers and co-operatives decreased, but turbine demand from utilities increased as a
result of the 100 MW agreement, in which the utilities committed themselves to the
installation of 100 MW of wind turbine capacity. Because of the rise of utility-owned
wind turbine parks, learning by interacting between manufacturers and utilities
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became important. The utilities expressed a demand for new, larger turbine models,
thus steering the development efforts of the wind turbine manufacturers, like the
utilities did in the Netherlands. The development efforts of the Danish manufacturers
were not steered by policy measures, whereas they were in the Netherlands. In the
Netherlands the manufacturers were induced by high R&D subsidies to develop
advanced wind turbines. In order to develop larger models the Danish manufacturers
used the designs of their previous models, which had proved to work well and
efficiently. The models were gradually adjusted, on the basis of the problems that the
utilities encountered and on the basis of the design models and calculations developed
by Risø.
Both the Netherlands and Denmark had to face siting problems in this period.
However, in Denmark they were less serious than in the Netherlands because in
Denmark the population density is lower than in the Netherlands. Secondly, and more
importantly: in Denmark the local inhabitants gained advantages from wind energy.
Many of them found jobs in the by now very large companies, and many of them were
members of a co-operative that owned a wind turbine. The manufacturers did their
best to adjust the turbine models in order to decrease siting problems: they started to
develop more elegant models and to decrease the noise made by their wind turbines.
Learning by interacting with Risø remained important, although it became more
formalised than in the previous period. After the introduction of a new, stricter
approval system, Risø became a more formal approval authority, demanding more
formalised knowledge about the technical aspects of the wind turbines in connection
with the approval procedure. The relationship between the small turbine
manufacturers and Risø in Denmark was very different from that between the Dutch
small turbine manufacturers and ECN. In Denmark, Risø and the manufacturers
shared the same frame of meaning regarding wind energy, which had slowly changed
from building small turbines based on trial-and-error learning to making larger
upscaling steps based on more formalised R&D. Risø helped the manufacturers with
solutions to practical problems and passed more and more formalised knowledge and
design models. In the Netherlands on the other hand, as we already saw in section
5.4.1, the frame of meaning of ECN differed from that of the manufacturers, which
meant that learning by interacting between them was far less effective than in
Denmark.
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5.5 1992-2000
5.5.1 Learning in the Netherlands
The small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem
As in the previous period, learning by searching remained important in this period.
The manufacturers used computer programmes and other input from research
institutes for designing their turbines. Some of the results of the research into flexible
wind turbines was used by Lagerwey and by other manufacturers. Since the upscaling
race was becoming tougher in this period, the manufacturers tried to outperform their
competitors by incorporating research results in their designs. The trial-and-error
method was no longer sufficient and was becoming far too costly because of the size
of the wind turbines. Furthermore, at the end of this period research institutes did
much research into off-shore wind turbines. However, the spin-off of this research to
the Dutch manufacturers was limited. The manufacturers were too involved in
competition with foreign manufacturers that had entered the Dutch market in this
period.
Learning by doing remained important as well. Manufacturers learned a great deal
during tests and operation of the newly developed turbines about the turbines'
problems and about how to improve them. However, learning by doing was hindered
by the large pressure for upscaling. The next turbine type was often already being
developed although the test programmes for the previous turbine type had not yet
started. Consequently, learning that resulted from weaknesses in previous turbine
types could hardly be used for the design of new turbine types. Because of this rat
race, producing wind turbines was becoming more and more expensive. As a
consequence a number of Dutch manufacturers went bankrupt or merged. The number
of Dutch turbine manufacturers decreased in this period to three in 1998 and by 2000,
there was only one left.
Also learning by interacting with users remained important as a result of operational
problems with the wind turbines. Learning by interacting between the manufacturers
was still non-existent in the Netherlands. The manufacturers still did not trust each
other and did not want to co-operate, even in the generation of knowledge that was
generally applicable. Learning by interacting between manufacturers and researchers
became even more important than in the previous period. ECN, Delft University of
Technology and researchers from Stork were involved in some turbine development
projects. However, co-operation remained difficult between the practically oriented
manufacturers and the theoretically oriented researchers. Therefore, learning by
interacting was far less productive than in Denmark where the manufacturers and the
researchers shared the same frame of meaning. Although the gap between the ECN
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researchers and the turbine manufacturers became smaller over the years, many
problems remained.
5.5.2 Learning in Denmark
The small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem
In this period, learning by searching became even more important in this subsystem.
The turbines that were now being built were MW-turbines, which made trial-and-error
learning far too expensive and risky. Secondly, many manufacturers introduced new
technical features into their turbines. For example, more and more manufacturers used
the pitch control system in this period, in order to improve power control and to
increase the cost-effectiveness of the turbine. Risø also started learning by searching
in this period in that it began doing research into the theory-based design of a flexible
wind turbine.
Since more and more turbines, including MW and offshore turbines, were built in this
period, learning by doing and learning by using remained important, especially in the
case of the new turbine types. Learning by interacting between turbine producers,
users and researchers continued to be very important. However, the interactions
became more and more formalised. For example, Risø transferred its knowledge to
the manufacturers in a more formalised way, i.e. by way of scientific reports or design
models. Operational experience gained with the newly developed MW-turbines and
offshore-turbines was transferred from the utilities, who owned the wind turbine
parks, to the manufacturers. This knowledge was used for further development and
upscaling of the turbines. As in the previous period, learning by interacting continued
to be more smoothly than in the Netherlands.
5.6 Conclusions concerning the types of learning
What can be concluded about the different types of learning in the wind turbine
innovation systems in both countries? In this section we will comment separately on
learning by searching, learning by doing, learning by using and learning by
interacting.
5.6.1 Learning by searching
Learning by searching was more apparent in the Netherlands than in Denmark,
especially in the large-scale innovation subsystem. Although the Danes had a
technological guidepost to follow and the Dutch did not, the circumstances for
learning by searching were more favourable in the Netherlands. The main reason was,
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that in the Netherlands far larger R&D subsidies were available, both in the large-
scale and in the small-scale innovation subsystems. Therefore, the environment did
not impede to learning by searching.
Secondly, although the Dutch did not have a technological guidepost, they could base
their wind energy and wind turbine research on the experience, theories and models
from aerospace engineering, especially in the first decade. At that time they did not
realise that research results from the aerospace field could not always be used in the
wind energy field. It can be said that in the Netherlands during the whole period 1973-
2000 the emphasis was on learning by searching and it still is. The problem, however,
during the whole period was how to incorporate the knowledge obtained by learning
by searching into new wind turbines.
In the Dutch large-scale innovation subsystem, the knowledge gained by learning by
searching was translated into designs and into wind turbines. However, it turned out
that to produce wind turbines that work, one needs to know about their operation. In
the Dutch small-scale innovation subsystem, knowledge based on learning by
searching was hardly used in turbine designs. The few attempts at building flexible
wind turbines based on theoretical knowledge did not succeed. Only in the last decade
have the results of learning by searching been used more and more in wind turbines.
An example is the direct drive concept used by Lagerwey. However, also with this
concept, trial-and-error and hands-on experience were very important.
In Denmark, learning by searching was guided to a great extent by the Gedser wind
turbine which served as the technological guidepost. Theories and models from
aerospace research were not used as much as in the Netherlands, since the Danes did
not have any history of aerospace research and they did not have enough money to
buy models in the United States. Because far less R&D money was available than in
most other countries engaged in wind energy research, the Danes were forced to rely
on other forms of learning. Only in the last decade, when learning on the basis of trial-
and-error had become too costly due to the large size of the wind turbines, were the
results of learning by searching introduced into wind turbine designs.
5.6.2 Learning by doing
Learning by doing was far more important in Denmark than in the Netherlands. Far
more wind turbines were built, which enabled the Danes to gain much more
operational experience. In the 1970s, the Danish home market was already far larger
than the Dutch home market, as a result of the investment subsidies that were
available to wind turbine buyers in Denmark. Therefore, right from the start the
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Danish had a headstart in gaining know-how about how to build wind turbines in an
efficient and therefore relatively cheap way.
This made the Danes the most popular turbine manufacturers on the enormous
Californian market in the early 1980s. Since they produced thousands of turbines for
this market, they acquired a lot of knowledge through learning by doing. Furthermore,
they were the first to introduce serial production, a factor that increased their
headstart.
The Dutch, however, were confined to their home market, at least until the late 1980s,
when exports started to countries such as Germany and India. The Dutch home market
remained relatively small because of the absence of investment subsidies for wind
turbine buyers until 1986 and the low buy-back tariffs for electricity delivered to the
grid by wind turbine owners. When the market grew in the late 1980s, two new
problems arose: the siting problem and the competition from foreign manufacturers on
the Dutch market, especially the Danes. Therefore, the Dutch manufacturers were
unable to sell as many turbines as the Danish manufacturers.
5.6.3 Learning by using
Learning by using was also more important in Denmark than in the Netherlands. As
pointed out above, the Danish home market was far larger than the Dutch home
market. Furthermore, the Danes were able to ‘win’ many users on the Californian
market. The turbine users on the Danish market were deeply involved in wind energy
and because they had joined forces, they communicated with the manufacturers on an
equal basis.
Learning by using was also more important in the Danish large-scale wind turbine
innovation subsystem than in the Dutch large-scale wind turbine innovation
subsystem. First of all, more turbines were built, so more user experience was gained.
But secondly, and more importantly, the Danes involved the foreseen turbine users,
i.e. the utilities, in the large-scale innovation subsystem from the beginning. In the
Netherlands, the utilities were only involved at a later stage, i.e. when the turbines
built had to be sold. Only then, it turned out that the utilities had a lot of problems
with the wind turbines and were reluctant to comply with the ideas of the Dutch
turbine manufacturers and the Ministry of Economic Affairs with regard to wind
energy.
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5.6.4 Learning by interacting
The most important difference was in learning by interacting. In our opinion, the
Danish success in wind energy can be attributed mainly to this type of learning. In
Denmark, learning by interacting was very effective and involved all actors:
producers, users and researchers.
The Netherlands
Of course, learning by interacting also occurred in the Netherlands. In the large-scale
wind turbine innovation subsystem, it was very successful. The manufacturers and the
researchers were very close in a cognitive sense, shared the same frame of meaning
regarding wind energy, were mutually interested in the learning process and very
enthusiastic to make it work, were open and trusted each other. However, although
learning by interacting in the Dutch large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem
resulted in a large number of scientific reports and very ingenious and advanced wind
turbine designs, it did not lead to commercially viable wind turbines.
In the Dutch small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem, learning by interacting
between the producers and the users was the most important form of learning by
interacting. Before 1986, the users had been mainly farmers and advocates of
renewable energy. They often lived near the manufacturer and were keen on making
their turbine work well. They quickly referred problems back to the manufacturer.
Lagerwey in particular had a very good relationship with his customers. Unfortunately
however, the turbine users did not form a strong user group that was able to negotiate
with the turbine manufacturers on equal terms, as in Denmark.
After 1986, when investment subsidies became available, most wind turbines were
sold to utilities. Learning by interacting between turbine producers and the utilities
went less smoothly than with the other customer groups. Utilities had another frame
of meaning regarding wind energy, which made communication more difficult.
Furthermore, the utilities monitored their turbines less well than the other customer
groups.  Therefore, there was a delay in referring problems to the manufacturers.
Learning by interacting between the small turbine producers hardly occurred in the
Netherlands. The producers did not trust each other at all and were therefore not
willing to inform each other about their problems and their problem-solving
strategies. Norms of openness and disclosure did not exist. Furthermore, especially in
the first decade, the producers followed different technological trajectories, e.g. with
regard to stall or pitch regulation or generator type. The reason was that there was no
technological guidepost in the Netherlands. Since different technological trajectories
were followed, the producers could not learn as much from each other as they could
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have done if the same trajectory had been followed. ECN and Novem, who set
themselves up as network builders as from the late 1980s, were unable to improve the
relationships between the turbine producers.
Learning by interacting between the small turbines producers and the research
organisations occurred in the 1980s especially on the testfields. Lagerwey interacted
especially with Delft University of Technology on its testfield and obtained ideas
from that university about introducing flexibility into his wind turbines. The other
turbine producers interacted with ECN on its testfield. Since the producers did not
want the results of their turbine tests to be disclosed, the learning relationships were
on one-to-one basis: between ECN and one producer. To prevent distortion of
competition, ECN was not allowed to give specific instructions on how to improve the
turbines; they gave only more general instructions, e.g. regarding the securing of
bolts.
Particularly after 1986, when the large turbine producers had stopped building wind
turbines, the research organisations sought more interaction with the small wind
turbine producers. However, this did not go as well as expected. Interaction was in
some ways a collision of cultures: the research organisations thought in terms of large,
cost-effective wind turbines on the basis of scientific theories and models, and the
small turbine builders thought in terms of learning by doing and taking small
upscaling steps. The frames of meaning of the producers and the researchers regarding
wind energy were very different. They did not communicate on equal terms, were
cognitively not close and did not share a common language and culture. The research
organisations and the Ministry still adhered to their view that the Netherlands should
play a leading role internationally with regard to wind energy and that this should be
achieved by making large upscaling steps towards the making of a cost-effective wind
turbine. A.o. by making R&D subsidies dependent on the technological advances
incorporated in the wind turbines, the Ministry tried to force the small manufacturers
to change their frame of meaning. The demand from the utilities for large wind
turbines also forced the manufacturers to make large upscaling steps. Only Lagerwey
continued to produce relatively small wind turbines for farmers and other non-utility
customers.
With regard to norms of openness and disclosure; the turbine manufacturers were
willing to share some data with researchers, but some data were kept secret because
the manufacturers were afraid that competitors would learn too much about their data.
Both the manufacturers and the researchers had an interest in the learning process, the
manufacturers because they hoped to gain a competitive advantage by incorporating
research results into their designs, and the researchers because they were forced by the
Ministry of Economic Affairs to make their research results more readily available to
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the manufacturers and to co-operate more with them. Nevertheless, the learning
process remained difficult because of lack of trust and different frames of meaning.
Particularly in the 1990s, ECN and Novem in their role as network builders made
efforts to strengthen relationships within the small-scale innovation subsystem.
Furthermore, since interactions became more frequent over the years, the actors
learned about each other’s frames of meaning and problem-solving strategies.
Therefore, learning by interacting improved to some extent.
Denmark
In Denmark however, learning by interacting was far more successful. In the large-
scale innovation subsystem, turbine users were actively involved from the beginning
and therefore learning by interacting could take place right from the beginning, which
was not the case in the Netherlands. Although the Danish utilities were sceptical with
regard to wind energy, they were actively involved in the subsystem. Their views on
wind energy could be used in the designs and projects, whereas in the Netherlands the
conflicting views only became evident at a very late date, i.e. after the turbines had
been sold. It was only in the Dutch Sexbierum project, that the utilities were involved
from the beginning.
In the Danish small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem, learning by interacting
occurred between manufacturers, users and researchers. Let us look first at learning
by interacting between manufacturers and users. From the start, the user group was far
larger than in the Netherlands because of the Danish investment subsidies. The users
lived near the producers, as in the Netherlands, and also had a definite interest in
making wind energy work. The user group was large and powerful and became
stronger by joining forces in the Wind Turbine Owners Association. In this way, they
were a strong negotiating partner, both in the negotiations with the utilities about buy-
back tariffs for electricity sold to the grid and in the negotiations with the turbine
producers about technical improvements that were needed. By publishing details of
turbine performance in their magazine, they forced producers to improve the
performance of turbines that performed poorly.
Over the years, the relationships between producers and users became very strong.
Together they were determined to make wind energy work. Wind energy fitted well
into the Danish tradition of local self-sustenance. Furthermore, the success of the
wind turbine industry created a large number of jobs, something that was welcomed
by local inhabitants. Although siting problems arose in Denmark as from the 1990s,
these were to some extent offset by the benefits brought by wind energy. Wind energy
created employment and many people who lived near a wind turbine benefited from
the electricity produced by the turbine because they were involved in the co-operative
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that owned the wind turbine. In Denmark there were far more jobs in wind energy and
far more wind turbine co-operatives than in the Netherlands, which meant that far
more people benefitted from wind turbines in Denmark than in the Netherlands.
Learning by interacting between turbine producers and research organisations also
went better in Denmark than in the Netherlands. The most important reason is that
from the beginning the wind energy group at the Risø research institute was
dependent on the manufacturers for its finance. Risø employees had to achieve a good
relationship with the manufacturers within a few years, because thereafter they would
not receive any further subsidy. Although the manufacturers were just as apprehensive
and distrustful as the Dutch manufacturers at the beginning, the Risø researchers
managed to change this attitude. Furthermore, they communicated with the
manufacturers on equal terms and shared their frame of meaning and their enthusiasm
to make wind energy work. They managed to form a subsystem with far more trusting
relationships than in the Netherlands.
Since all turbine manufacturers followed the Gedser technology which produced
sturdy, stiff, stall-controlled three-bladed upwind wind turbines, they could focus all
their efforts on this design. In the Netherlands, on the other hand, the manufacturers
followed different trajectories. Furthermore, unlike the ECN researchers, the Risø
researchers were allowed to help the manufacturers with specific problems. Thirdly,
in the Danish case the advantages of learning by doing and trial-and-error, especially
in the first decade, were recognised and as a consequence the Risø researchers did not
try to impose a more scientific approach upon the turbine builders. At an early stage,
however, criteria which the turbines had to satisfy were formulated, e.g. safety
criteria, but these criteria were less strict than in the Netherlands and therefore gave
the manufacturers more freedom to follow other safety strategies.
Within the subsystem, an atmosphere of trust was created which enabled the
manufacturers to learn from each other as well. Although they were not willing to
share everything with their competitors, they did share general problems. This became
easier because they all followed the same technological guidepost.
Successful learning by interacting with users and researchers gave the Danish turbine
manufacturers a competitive advantage in the early 1980s. This enabled them to
outperform their competitors on the Californian market, which led to more learning by
doing and learning by interacting. After the collapse of the Californian market, they
were able to learn from their mistakes. Learning by interacting with the researchers
changed. The manufacturers realised that, because the turbines had become so large,
trial-and-error methods were no longer sufficient. Therefore, they began to use the
design models that had been developed by Risø on the basis of experience with and
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measurements on the previous turbines. We see that Risø ‘grew along with’ the
manufacturers and was able to give them the research input they needed in the
different phases of wind energy development: from hands-on trial-and-error
engineering to more scientifically based engineering. Especially in the last decade,
when the turbines designed were larger than 1 MW, the more scientifically based
pitch regulation was used more and more in Denmark, and features like optislip and
optistall were introduced. The scientific input into wind turbine design increased. But,
as mentioned before, this input grew at the request of the turbine manufacturers, who
encountered problems with their turbines and realised that the trial-and-error method
was no longer sufficient to solve these problems.
In the Netherlands on the other hand, increased scientific input into the design of wind
turbines is more a consequence of pushing by the research institutes and the Ministry
of Economic Affairs. After 1986, these institutes and the Ministry did their best to
impose their view upon the small wind turbine manufacturers: they pressed for the
production of large cost-efficient wind turbines on the basis of large upscaling steps
and scientific models.
5.7 In conclusion
Our research question was: To what extent did the learning processes in the Dutch
and the Danish wind turbine innovation systems differ in the period 1973-2000 and
what are the consequences of these differences?
Our answer to this question is as follows34. The Dutch wind turbine innovation system
was well suited to support learning by searching. It was a typical 'science-push'
innovation system. The wind energy researchers could build on an existing knowledge
base on aerodynamics, R&D subsidies were provided by the Ministry of Economic
Affairs and for a period of ten years the researchers were able to make mistakes and
learn from them. Learning by interacting was also supported by the Dutch wind
turbine innovation system, but only between the research institutes and the companies
that produced large wind turbines. The people in these institutes and companies
shared the same frame of meaning regarding wind energy, had the all been educated
at university level and trusted each other. However, learning by interacting between
the turbine producers and the turbine owners was problematic. In the first place, there
were relatively few turbine owners in the Netherlands, because investment subsidies
did not become available until 1986. Secondly, the majority of the energy companies,
who after 1986 were in most cases the turbine owners, were not very enthusiastic
                                                          
34 The facilitating and impeding conditions for learning that were present within the wind turbine
innovation systems are printed in italics.
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about wind energy. This inhibited learning by interacting with the turbine producers.
Learning by interacting between the research institutes and the producers of small
wind turbines was problematic as well. They did not share the same frame of meaning
regarding wind energy, had different educational backgrounds and did not trust each
other. Therefore, the results of learning by searching that took place in the research
institutes were not converted very well into the development of small wind turbines.
In Denmark, the situation was very different. Learning by searching was supported far
less by the innovation system than in the Netherlands. Far fewer R&D subsidies were
available and there was no aerospace knowledge base to build on. However, the other
types of learning were supported far better than in the Netherlands. Investment
subsidies were made available at an early stage, which created a relatively large user
group from the beginning. This, combined with the fact that the users organised
themselves, greatly stimulated learning by using and learning by interacting between
the turbine users and the turbine producers. These turbine users were mainly farmers
and small companies who were in favour of wind energy. This created trust and a
joint frame of meaning with the turbine producers. Whereas in the Netherlands the
wind energy innovation system was never very tight, since most turbine users were
not deeply involved, in Denmark the links within the innovation system were much
tighter. Furthermore, the Danish research institute had a good relationship with the
turbine producers. The researchers operated on the same cognitive level as the turbine
producers and shared the same frame of meaning regarding wind energy. In this way,
they supported the step-by-step learning and technology development process of the
turbine producers. And, to keep up with technology development, the research
institute gradually changed the nature of its knowledge supply to the turbine
producers. The hands-on knowledge of the 1970s was gradually replaced by more
science-based mathematical knowledge. The actors in the Danish wind energy
innovation system were well-adjusted to each other and evolved together, and kept
pace with technology development. In our view, learning by interacting between
turbine producers, turbine users and the Danish research institute was the main reason
for the Danish success and the lack of this type of learning was the main reason for
the Dutch lack of success.
How do our results fit into recent findings in current innovation research? In the last
few decades, innovation researchers have generally agreed that the science-push, or
linear, method is not successful in developing technology (see for example Harmsen,
2000). This corresponds to our finding that the Dutch science-push method failed in
the case of wind turbine development. Secondly, recent findings in innovation
research suggest that it is important for knowledge providers to produce knowledge
that meets the demands of the technology developers (Smits, 2001). This also
corresponds to our findings. In Denmark, the research institute offered the wind
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turbine companies the knowledge they needed at that particular moment. In the
Netherlands, especially after 1986, the research institutes offered knowledge that was
in many cases too scientific for the wind turbine producers. Thirdly, there is general
agreement between innovation researchers that companies do not innovate in
isolation. Innovation is a network activity, and the quality of the innovation system is
very important for the degree of success of the innovation process (Smits, 2001). The
differences in the success of the Dutch and the Danish wind turbine innovation
systems firmly underline this point. Fourthly, as we pointed out in chapter 2, the
innovation researcher Rosenberg stressed that in the development of  technologies like
wind turbines that consist of many interacting moving parts and that function in
unstable environments,  learning by using is very important. This also corresponds to
our findings. However, we would add that learning by interacting between the users
and the producers is even more important than learning by using. In any case, in the
development of wind turbines in the Netherlands and Denmark it was.
Can we now answer the question that was the starting point of our research? Why
were the Danes more successful than the Dutch in building up wind turbine capacity
and a wind turbine industry in the period 1973 – 2000? We can give a partial answer.
We identified important differences in learning processes, which were linked to
differences in the Dutch and Danish wind turbine innovation systems. Furthermore,
we linked these differences to differences in the performance of the innovation
systems. We can now conclude, in line with the theoretical notions of Rosenberg (see
above) and of Lundvall, that learning by interacting is of major importance in
innovation systems. There are strong indications that differences in the performance
of the Netherlands and Denmark are linked to differences in the kind of learning and
importance of learning, which in turn are linked to differences in the innovation
systems.
However, other aspects which we did not consider because of our focus on learning
processes might be important as well. Therefore, to answer this broad question, more
research is needed into other aspects of wind turbine development, such as the
characteristics of the turbine manufacturing companies. Furthermore, it would be
interesting to investigate whether our conclusion is also applicable to wind turbine
innovation systems in other countries. Is learning by interacting the dominant learning
process in other countries that have large wind turbine capacities and thriving wind
turbine industries, like Germany and Spain? This would be an interesting topic for
further research.
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Summary
Several Western countries started to develop renewable energy in the 1970s. Reasons
were the oil crisis and the Club of Rome report, which warned of imminent shortages
of traditional energy sources like oil and gas. The renewable energy source that
people had the highest expectations of was wind energy. Two of the countries that
were involved in the development of wind energy were the Netherlands and Denmark.
Both countries started this development around 1975 and their governments gave
active support. Furthermore, both countries have a comparable wind regime.
However, the result of the development of wind energy in each country is very
different. In the year 2000, Denmark had a flourishing wind turbine industry, that
produced wind turbines for the world market. Furthermore, at the end of the year 2000
the cumulative installed capacity of wind turbines in Denmark was 2,340 MW and
wind turbines produced 15% of the electricity demand. In the Netherlands, the
situation was far less rosy. Although 10 to 15 wind turbine manufacturers were active
on the Dutch market at the beginning of the 1980s, in 2000 only one remained.
Furthermore, at the end of the year 2000 only 442 MW of wind turbines had been
installed in the Netherlands, the target for the year 2000 having been 2,000 MW.
What is the reason for this large difference in the success of the Netherlands and
Denmark? This question is the starting point for our research. A difference in the total
amount of government subsidies cannot be the reason, since in Denmark the amount
was lower than in the Netherlands. The somewhat higher wind speed in Denmark
cannot be the main reason either. The same is true for the siting problems, which were
investigated in the 1990s. Already at the end of the 1980s, when the siting problems
were not yet a major problem, there was a clear difference between the Netherlands
and Denmark. Therefore, we must look somewhere else for an explanation: in the
course of technology development and the context in which it occurs. In the field of
innovation research, this context is called the ‘innovation system’. In the past 20 years
or so, much research has been done on the course of technology development and the
interaction of this development with the context in which it occurs. The results of this
research provide valuable insights into factors leading to the success or failure of
technology development.
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According to several innovation researchers, learning processes play an important role
in technology development. Therefore, in this research the focus is on the role of
learning processes in technology development. We investigate learning processes
within the wind turbine innovation system: within companies and organisations, and
between companies, organisations and customers. The specific research question in
this thesis is as follows:
To what extent did the learning processes in the Dutch and the Danish wind turbine
innovation systems differ in the period 1973-2000 and what are the consequences of
these differences?
In Chapter 2 we examine several theoretical approaches within innovation research.
We investigate what these approaches tell us about learning processes in technology
development and about the characteristics of innovation systems that facilitate these
learning processes. Then, we describe the innovation system approach in some detail.
Central to an innovation system are the various actors who are developing a
technology, the relations between these actors and the institutions that influence these
relations and actors. In the wind turbine innovation system we distinguish four
important actors: the manufacturers, the turbine owners, the researchers and the policy
makers. Financial streams and learning processes constitute the most important
relations between these actors.
Furthermore, we distinguish four kinds of learning processes: learning by searching
(or R&D), learning by doing (or by producing), learning by using and learning by
interacting. On the basis of the innovation literature we identify conditions that
facilitate these learning processes. These conditions are:
1. Learning by searching
Facilitating conditions:
- the presence of a technological guidepost, guiding the direction of search
- the availability of an appropriate scientific theory on the subject, guiding the direction of
search
- the presence of a technological paradigm, guiding the direction of search
- the presence of standards and regulations, guiding the direction of search
- changing circumstances
- an environment that is not (too) hostile
- the availability of capital
- some level of knowledge and expertise in the field of study
- the possibility of making mistakes and learning from them
- the way in which the ownership of novelties and new knowledge is organised
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2. Learning by doing
Facilitating conditions:
- time
- a high production rate
3. Learning by using
Facilitating conditions:
- the presence of users during technology development
- a user group of minimum size and degree of sophistication
- contacts between the user and the producer
4. Learning by interacting
Facilitating conditions:
- mutual interest in the learning process
- proximity in the broad sense, including geographical closeness, cognitive closeness, a
common language and culture, national standardisation, common codes of conduct, a
certain lack of competition, mutual trust between the actors, and congruent frames of
meaning with regard to the technology
- norms of openness and disclosure
- the presence of an intermediary
- the presence of a network builder
- the capacity to build new networks and destroy obsolete ones
In Chapters 3 and 4 we describe the case studies. Chapter 3 describes the development
of wind energy in the Netherlands, Chapter 4 the development in Denmark. In the
description we use the wind turbine innovation system as a framework and focus on
the nature and intensity of learning processes within this system. To this end, we look
for the facilitating conditions that we have identified. In both countries, we distinguish
two parallel wind turbine development paths and two accompanying innovation
subsystems: the large-scale subsystem and the small-scale subsystem. Within the
large-scale subsystems, the emphasis from the 1970s was on the development of large
wind turbines, with a power capacity of several megawatts. Within the small-scale
subsystems, the emphasis from the 1970s was on the development of smaller wind
turbines, with a power capacity of several tens of kilowatts, and on the slow upscaling
of these turbines. The development of the large-scale subsystems is described in part
A of Chapters 3 and 4, the development of the small-scale subsystems in part B of
these Chapters.
In Chapter 3, part A we deal with the developments within the large-scale wind
turbine innovation subsystem in the Netherlands. We describe how in the subsystem
already the emphasis from the beginning was very strongly on R&D, and thus on
learning by searching. A great deal of scientific research was done on the potential of
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wind energy and on the way in which the most cost effective wind turbine could be
developed in the minimum time. We look into the various projects within which large
horizontal axis turbines, vertical axis turbines and a wind park were developed. The
government supported these projects with large R&D subsidies. The major actors
were the research institutes, the governments and the large companies that were
involved in wind turbine development. The relations between these actors were good.
The foreseen turbine owners, the utilities, played only a minor role. Therefore, there
was hardly any learning by using or learning by interacting with turbine owners. We
see how technical problems and related financial problems led the producers of large
wind turbines to stop developing and producing wind turbines halfway through the
1980s.
In Chapter 3, part B we describe the development within the small-scale wind turbine
innovation subsystem in the Netherlands. We see that 10 to 15 small turbine
manufacturing companies arose because of the availability of R&D subsidies at the
beginning of the 1980s. Since wind turbine demand was not subsidised, the market
remained small. The manufacturers learned by interacting with their customers and
with the research institute ECN. However, because the approach of ECN was much
more science-based than that of the manufacturers and because the ECN was not
allowed to provide specific R&D instructions, learning by interacting between the
manufacturers and ECN remained limited. The manufacturers hardly interacted with
each other. As from 1986, the interactions between the research institutes and the
manufacturers became more intensive. By way of R&D subsidies, the manufacturers
were stimulated to make large technical development steps. The large difference in
education and frames of meaning however was still an impediment to learning by
interacting. Furthermore, the large technical development steps led to technical and
financial problems and competition particularly from Danish manufacturers on the
Dutch market increased. Many Dutch manufacturers went bankrupt.
In Chapter 4, part A we look at the developments within the large-scale wind turbine
innovation subsystem in Denmark. As in the Dutch large-scale innovation subsystem,
the emphasis was on the fast development of large wind turbines. In Denmark
however, fewer R&D subsidies were available however. Another difference between
the Danish and the Dutch subsystems was that in Denmark the foreseen turbine
owners, the utilities, were involved in the development of large wind turbines.
Because the turbine manufacturing company was set up by the Ministry of Energy and
the utilities, the relations within the subsystem were very tight; this facilitated learning
by interacting. However, the large financial risks led to the withdrawal of the Danish
government from the turbine manufacturing company in 1990. This meant the end of
the Danish large-scale wind turbine innovation subsystem.
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In Chapter 4, part B we describe the developments within the Danish small-scale
wind turbine innovation subsystem. In Denmark investment subsidies for wind
turbine buyers were introduced already in the 1970s. Because of this form of market
stimulation, many small wind turbine manufacturing companies were established. The
Danish research institute Risø helped the manufacturers with their R&D. This institute
functioned as a network builder. It communicated on the basis of equality and the
same cognitive background with the manufacturers. Thus it succeeded in building up
a good trust relationship with the manufacturers. This was stimulated by the Danish
government's way of financing Risø: only in the first three years was it directly
financed by the government, after that it had to obtain its finance via orders from the
manufacturers. Within the subsystem there were good relations between all the actors
and among the manufacturers themselves; as a result learning by interacting was very
effective. Because of the availability of a technological guidepost, a turbine that had
been developed in the 1940s and 1950s, all manufacturers made the same technical
choices and were therefore able to learn from each other. Because the Danish home
market was far larger than the Dutch one and because the Danish turbine owners
organised themselves, learning by interacting with turbine owners was also far more
effective. The export of wind turbines to the United States in the 1980s caused many
technical and financial problems. But, because of financial support and the continuing
trust of investors, the Danish manufacturers could solve these problems and learn
from their experience on the American market. As a result of all these factors, the
Danish manufacturers succeeded in building up a good position on the international
market. Because of a shift from experience-based learning to more science-based
R&D, the Danes gradually developed larger and larger and more and more advanced
wind turbines.
In Chapter 5 we draw conclusions. We describe the importance of the learning
processes in the developments in both countries. We conclude that learning by
searching was more successful in the Netherlands. Here, more R&D subsidies were
available and there was more scientific knowledge available on aerodynamics; this
served as a basis for the development of design models of wind turbines.
Learning by producing was more successful in Denmark. Both in the large-scale and
in the small-scale wind turbine innovation subsystems, far more wind turbines were
developed than in the Netherlands. The reason was that the Danish home market was
far larger because of the availability of investment subsidies. Furthermore, at a later
stage in Denmark siting problems were less important than in the Netherlands.
Learning by using was also more successful in Denmark. Because of the large home
market, there were more turbine owners, and they were better organised and more
integrated into the subsystem. In the large-scale subsystem too the turbine owners
were far more involved than in the Netherlands.
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The largest difference however can be seen in learning by interacting. In the
Netherlands,  in the large-scale subsystem there was a great deal of interaction
between manufacturers, research institutes and the government. However, the turbine
owners were hardly involved in the subsystem. In the small-scale subsystem, there
was considerable interaction between turbine producers and turbine owners,
especially if the owners were farmers or small companies. If the owners were utilities,
interaction was more difficult. The interactions between small turbine manufacturers
and the research institutes were often difficult as well. The research institutes had a
very different frame of meaning with regard to wind energy and their cognitive
background differed from that of the small turbine manufacturers. Even after 1986,
when this type of interaction was actively stimulated, it was not very successful. The
turbine manufacturers started taking too large steps in technical development, which
led to financial problems. There were still hardly any contacts between the
manufacturers, because of distrust. In Denmark, the situation was very different. Both
within the large-scale and within the small-scale wind turbine innovation systems the
users were actively involved in the development. Furthermore, the relations between
the research institute and the manufacturers and between the manufacturers were very
good. Therefore, learning by interacting was very effective.
In conclusion, we can say that the Dutch wind turbine innovation system was well
suited for learning by searching, but that the conversion of the knowledge that was
produced by learning by searching was problematic. The Danish wind turbine
innovation system on the other hand was well suited for learning by interacting. The
actors were adjusted to each other and shared the same frame of meaning. In our
opinion, the effective learning by interacting between the turbine manufacturers, the
turbine owners and the research institute was crucial for the Danish success, whereas
the Dutch lack of success can be attributed largely to the lack of learning by
interacting. This conclusion is supported by innovation theory: Lundvall stresses that
learning by interacting is very important in innovation systems, and Rosenberg points
to the importance of learning by using for technologies that consist of interacting
components. Wind turbines belong to this category. Other theoretical notions, like the
notion that the ‘science-push’ method fails to stimulate technology development and
the notion that the knowledge produced by research institutes must be tuned to the
knowledge demand of technology developers, are also in line with the results of our
research.
Can we now also answer the broad question that formed the starting point of our
research: Why were the Danes more successful than the Dutch in building up wind
turbine capacity and a wind turbine industry in the period 1973 – 2000? Partly. On
the basis of our results, combined with the above theoretical notions, we conclude that
there are strong indications that the different degrees of success of the Netherlands
and Denmark can be linked to differences in learning processes, which in turn can be
linked to differences in innovation systems. However, because our focus was on
Summary
231
learning processes, we excluded other factors from our analysis. Therefore, to answer
this broad question in more depth, more investigation is needed into other aspects of
wind turbine development, such as the characteristics of turbine manufacturing
companies.
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Samenvatting
Halverwege de jaren ’70 begonnen verschillende Westerse landen met het
ontwikkelen van duurzame energie. Aanleiding waren de oliecrises en de
waarschuwingen over dreigende tekorten aan de traditionele energiebronnen aardolie
en aardgas. De duurzame energiebron waar het meest van verwacht werd, was
windenergie. Twee van de landen die zich bezighielden met de ontwikkeling van
windenergie, waren Nederland en Denemarken. Beide landen begonnen met de
ontwikkeling rond 1975. In beide landen was sprake van actieve overheidssteun.
Bovendien hebben beide landen een vergelijkbaar windregime. Toch is het resultaat
van de ontwikkeling van windenergie in beide landen heel verschillend. In het jaar
2000 had Denemarken een florerende windturbine-industrie, die produceerde voor de
wereldmarkt. Daarnaast was het opgestelde vermogen aan windturbines in
Denemarken 2340 MW aan het eind van het jaar 2000. 15% van de elektriciteitsvraag
in Denemarken werd geproduceerd met windturbines. In Nederland was de situatie in
2000 veel minder rooskleurig. Hoewel in het begin van de jaren ’80 tien tot vijftien
windturbine-fabrikanten actief waren op de Nederlandse markt, was er in 2000 nog
maar een over. Verder was er aan het eind van het jaar 2000 in Nederland slechts 442
MW aan windturbines geïnstalleerd, terwijl het doel was om 2000 MW geïnstalleerd
te hebben in dat jaar.
Wat is de oorzaak van dit grote verschil in succes tussen Nederland en Denemarken?
Deze vraag is het startpunt voor dit onderzoek. Een verschil in de totale hoeveelheid
overheidssubsidie kan de reden niet zijn, aangezien in Denemarken minder subsidie is
verleend dan in Nederland. Ook de wat hogere windsnelheid in Denemarken geeft
geen afdoende verklaring. De plaatsingsproblematiek, die al eerder is onderzocht, is
ook niet de volledige verklaring. Al aan het eind van de jaren ’80, toen de
plaatsingsproblematiek nog geen grote rol speelde, was het verschil tussen Nederland
en Denemarken al duidelijk. Daarom zoeken wij naar de verklaring in een andere
hoek, namelijk die van het verloop van technologie-ontwikkeling en de context
waarbinnen dit plaatsvindt. Deze context wordt in het innovatieonderzoek aangeduid
als ‘innovatiesysteem’. De laatste decennia is er binnen de verschillende theoretische
stromingen die het innovatieonderzoek kent, veel onderzoek gedaan naar het verloop
van technologie-ontwikkeling en de interactie hiervan met de context waarbinnen zij
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plaatsvindt. De resultaten van dit onderzoek geven waardevolle inzichten in de
succes- en faalfactoren van technologie-ontwikkeling.
Volgens verschillende innovatie-onderzoekers spelen leerprocessen een belangrijke
rol in technologie-ontwikkeling. Daarom ligt in deze studie de focus op de rol van
leerprocessen in technologie-ontwikkeling. Daarbij gaat het om leerprocessen binnen
de windturbine-innovatiesysteem, dus binnen bedrijven en instellingen, en tussen
bedrijven, instellingen en klanten. De specifieke onderzoeksvraag van dit proefschrift
luidt:
In welke mate verschilden de leerprocessen binnen het windturbine-innovatiesysteem
in Nederland en Denemarken tussen de jaren ’70 en 2000 en wat zijn de
consequenties van deze verschillen?
In hoofdstuk 2 behandelen we de verschillende theoretische stromingen binnen het
innovatie-onderzoek. We kijken naar wat er binnen deze stromingen wordt gezegd
over leerprocessen tijdens technologie-ontwikkeling en over welke karakteristieken
van het innovatiesysteem deze leerprocessen faciliteren. Vervolgens bespreken we de
theorievorming rond innovatiesystemen. Binnen het innovatiesysteem gaat het om de
verschillende actoren die zich bezighouden met de ontwikkeling van een technologie,
de relaties tussen deze actoren en de instituties die deze relaties en actoren beïnvloe-
den. In het windturbine-innovatiesysteem onderscheiden vier belangrijke actoren: de
fabrikanten, de turbine-eigenaren, de onderzoekers en de overheid. De belangrijkste
relaties die we tussen hen onderscheiden, zijn financiële stromen en leerprocessen.
Verder onderscheiden we vier soorten leerprocessen: leren door te zoeken (ofwel
R&D), leren door te produceren, leren door te gebruiken en leren door te interacteren.
Op basis van de innovatie-literatuur identificeren we factoren die deze leerprocessen
faciliteren. Deze factoren zijn:
Leren door te zoeken:
- veranderende omstandigheden
- een niet (te) vijandige omgeving
- de aanwezigheid van kapitaal
- de manier waarop de eigendom van nieuwe kennis is georganiseerd
- een minimum kennisniveau op het betreffende gebied
- de mogelijkheid om fouten te maken en ervan te leren
Leren door te produceren:
- tijd
- een groot aantal geproduceerde objecten
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Leren door te gebruiken:
- de aanwezigheid van gebruikers tijdens de ontwikkeling van de technologie
- een gebruikersgroep met een minimum grootte en kennisniveau
- contacten tussen de gebruiker en de producent
Leren door te interacteren:
- wederzijdse interesse in het leerproces
- nabijheid in brede zin, inclusief geografische nabijheid, cognitieve nabijheid, een
gezamenlijke taal en cultuur, nationale standaardisatie, niet te veel concurrentie,
wederzijds vertrouwen en gelijke referentiekaders wat betreft de technologie
- normen van openheid
- de aanwezigheid van een intermediair
- de aanwezigheid van een netwerkbouwer, i.e. een actor die ervoor zorgt dat de relaties
binnen het innovatiesysteem sterk worden en blijven
- de mogelijkheid om nieuwe netwerken te bouwen en overbodige te vernietigen
In de hoofdstukken 3 en 4 beschrijven we de case-studies. In hoofdstuk 3 wordt de
ontwikkeling van windenergie in Nederland beschreven, in hoofdstuk 4 die in
Denemarken. In de beschrijving gaan we uit van het windturbine-innovatiesysteem als
kader en focussen we op de aard en de intensiteit van de leerprocessen binnen dit
systeem. Hiertoe gaan we op zoek naar de aanwezigheid van de faciliterende factoren
die we hebben onderscheiden. Voor beide landen onderscheiden we twee parallelle
ontwikkelingslijnen en twee bijbehorende sub-innovatiesystemen: het grootschalige
en het kleinschalige. Binnen de grootschalige subsystemen lag vanaf de jaren ’70 al
de nadruk op de snelle ontwikkeling van grote windturbines, met een vermogen van
enkele megawatts. Binnen de kleinschalige subsystemen lag vanaf de jaren ’70 de
nadruk op de ontwikkeling van kleinere windturbines, met een vermogen van enige
tientallen kilowatts, en de langzame opschaling hiervan. De ontwikkeling van de
grootschalige subsystemen beschrijven we in deel A van de hoofdstukken 3 en 4, de
ontwikkeling van de kleinschalige subsystemen in deel B van deze hoofdstukken.
In hoofdstuk 3, deel A bespreken we de ontwikkelingen binnen het grootschalige
windturbine-innovatiesubsysteem in Nederland. We beschrijven hoe in dit subsysteem
vanaf het begin heel sterk de nadruk lag op R&D, dus leren door te zoeken. Er werd
veel wetenschappelijk onderzoek uitgevoerd naar het potentieel van windenergie en
naar de manier om de meest kosteneffectieve windturbine in snel tempo te
ontwikkelen. We gaan in op de verschillende projecten waarbinnen grote horizontale-
asturbines, verticale-asturbines en een windpark werden ontwikkeld. Deze projecten
werden door de overheid gesteund met grote R&D-subsidies. De belangrijkste actoren
waren de onderzoeksinstituten, de overheid en de grote bedrijven die zich bezig
gingen houden met windturbine-ontwikkeling. Deze actoren hadden goede onderlinge
relaties. De beoogde turbine-eigenaren, de energiebedrijven, speelden slechts een
Learning in wind turbine development
236
kleine rol. Hierdoor werd er nauwelijks geleerd door te gebruiken en door te
interacteren met windturbine-eigenaren. We zien hoe technische problemen en
hieraan gerelateerde financiële problemen ertoe leidden dat de producenten van de
grote turbines halverwege de jaren ’80 een voor een besloten om te stoppen met het
ontwikkelen en produceren van windturbines.
In hoofdstuk 3, deel B gaan we in op de ontwikkelingen binnen het kleinschalige
windturbine-innovatiesubsysteem in Nederland. We zien hoe door de aanwezigheid
van R&D-subsidies in het begin van de jaren ’80 tien tot vijftien kleine
turbinebedrijfjes ontstonden. Doordat de vraag naar windturbines niet werd
gesubsidieerd, bleef de markt echter klein. De bedrijfjes leerden door te interacteren
met hun klanten en ook met het onderzoeksinstituut ECN. Doordat de aanpak van het
ECN veel wetenschappelijker was dan bij de bedrijfjes en ook doordat het ECN geen
concrete R&D-aanwijzingen mocht geven, bleef het leren door te interacteren tussen
de bedrijfjes en ECN echter beperkt. Tussen de bedrijfjes onderling waren nauwelijks
interacties. Vanaf 1986 werden de interacties tussen de onderzoeksinstituten en de
bedrijven intensiever. Door middel van R&D-subsidies werden de bedrijven
gestimuleerd om met behulp van de onderzoeksinstituten grote technische
ontwikkelingsstappen te maken. Het grote verschil in opleiding en referentiekaders
bleef echter een belemmering voor leren door te interacteren. Verder leverden de
grote technische ontwikkelingsstappen technische en financiële problemen op en werd
de concurrentie van met name Deense bedrijven steeds groter. Veel Nederlandse
bedrijven gingen failliet.
In hoofdstuk 4, deel A bespreken we de ontwikkelingen binnen het grootschalige
windturbine-innovatiesubsysteem in Denemarken. Net als in het Nederlandse
grootschalige subsysteem, lag hier de nadruk op de snelle ontwikkeling van grote
windturbines. In Denemarken waren echter minder R&D-subsidies beschikbaar. Een
ander verschil met het Nederlandse subsysteem was, dat in Denemarken de beoogde
turbine-eigenaren, de energiebedrijven, wel een rol speelden in de ontwikkeling van
de grote windturbines. De turbineproducent was opgezet door het ministerie van
energie en de energiebedrijven. Op die manier waren de relaties binnen het
subsysteem erg hecht, wat het leren door interacteren vergemakkelijkte. De grote
financiële risico’s leidden er echter toe dat in 1990 de Deense overheid zich terugtrok
uit dit bedrijf. Dit betekende het einde van het Deense grootschalige windturbine-
innovatiesubsysteem.
In hoofdstuk 4, deel B beschrijven we de ontwikkelingen binnen het Deense
kleinschalige windturbine-innovatiesubsysteem. Al in de jaren ’70 werden in
Denemarken investeringssubsidies voor windturbinekopers geïntroduceerd. Door deze
vorm van marktstimulering ontstonden veel kleine windturbinebedrijfjes. De
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bedrijfjes werden bij hun R&D geholpen door het Deense onderzoeksinstituut Risø.
Dit instituut functioneerde als een netwerkbouwer. Het communiceerde op basis van
gelijkwaardigheid en dezelfde cognitieve achtergrond met de bedrijven en slaagde
erin om een goede vertrouwensband met hen op te bouwen. Dit werd gestimuleerd
door de Deense overheid, door de manier waarop Risø gefinancierd werd: alleen de
eerste drie jaren kreeg het rechtstreekse financiering van de overheid; daarna moest
het de financiering verkrijgen uit opdrachten van de bedrijven. Binnen het subsysteem
hadden alle actoren, ook de bedrijfjes onderling, goede relaties, waardoor er volop
werd geleerd door te interacteren. De aanwezigheid van een voorbeeld-windturbine,
ontwikkeld in de jaren '40 en ’50, leidde ertoe dat bijna alle bedrijfjes dezelfde tech-
nische keuzes maakten en dus optimaal van elkaar konden leren. Doordat de Deense
markt veel groter was dan de Nederlandse en de Deense turbine-eigenaren zich
verenigden, was leren door te interacteren met turbine-eigenaren ook veel effectiever.
De export van windturbines naar de Verenigde Staten in de jaren ’80 leverde veel
technische en financiële problemen op. Maar, o.a. door financiële steun en een
blijvend vertrouwen van investeerders, wisten de Deense bedrijven die problemen op
te lossen en te leren van hun ervaringen op de Amerikaanse markt. Door al deze
factoren slaagden de Deense bedrijven erin een goede internationale
concurrentiepositie op te bouwen. Door een verschuiving van ervaringsleren naar
meer op wetenschap gebaseerde R&D, ontwikkelden zij in kleine stappen steeds
grotere en geavanceerdere windturbines.
In hoofdstuk 5 trekken we conclusies. We beschrijven het belang van de
onderscheiden leerprocessen in de ontwikkelingen in beide landen. We concluderen
dat leren door te zoeken succesvoller was in Nederland. Hier waren meer R&D-
subsidies beschikbaar en was meer wetenschappelijke kennis aanwezig over
aerodynamica, op basis waarvan ontwerpmodellen voor windturbines werden
ontwikkeld.
Leren door te produceren was succesvoller in Denemarken. Zowel in het groot-
schalige subsysteem als in het kleinschalige werden hier veel meer windturbines
ontwikkeld dan in Nederland. De reden was, dat door de aanwezigheid van
investeringssubsidies de Deense thuismarkt veel groter was. Verder speelde in een
later stadium in Denemarken plaatsingsproblemen een kleinere rol dan in Nederland.
Ook leren door te gebruiken was in Denemarken succesvoller. Door de grotere
thuismarkt waren er meer turbine-eigenaren, die bovendien beter georganiseerd en in
het subsysteem geïntegreerd waren. Ook in het grootschalige subsysteem waren de
turbine-eigenaren veel meer betrokken bij de ontwikkelingen dan in Nederland.
Het grootste verschil is echter te zien bij leren door te interacteren. In Nederland werd
er in het grootschalige subsysteem wel veel geïnteracteerd door de bedrijven, de
onderzoeksinstituten en de overheid. De turbine-eigenaren waren echter maar
zijdelings betrokken bij het subsysteem. In het kleinschalige subsysteem waren wel
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veel interacties tussen de turbineproducenten en de eigenaren, met name als de
eigenaren boeren of kleine bedrijven waren. Als de eigenaren energiebedrijven waren
verliepen de interacties moeilijker. De interacties tussen kleine turbineproducenten en
de onderzoeksinstituten verliepen vaak moeizaam. De onderzoeksinstituten hadden
een totaal ander referentiekader ten aanzien van windenergie en een andere cognitieve
achtergrond dan de kleine windturbineproducenten. Ook na 1986, toen deze vorm van
interactie actief werd gestimuleerd, leverde dit weinig op. De turbinefabrikanten
gingen te grote technische ontwikkelingsstappen maken, wat resulteerde in financiële
problemen. Contacten tussen de producenten waren er nauwelijks, door een groot
onderling wantrouwen. In Denemarken was de situatie heel anders. Zowel binnen het
grootschalige als binnen het kleinschalige subsysteem waren de gebruikers actief bij
de ontwikkeling betrokken. Daarnaast waren de contacten tussen het
onderzoeksinstituut en de producenten en ook tussen de producenten onderling heel
goed. Hierdoor was het leren door te interacteren erg effectief.
Concluderend kunnen we zeggen dat het Nederlandse windturbine-innovatiesysteem
goed toegerust was om leren door te zoeken te faciliteren maar dat de zo
geproduceerde kennis moeilijk omgezet kon worden in de geproduceerde
windturbines omdat leren door te interacteren in Nederland moeilijk verliep. Het
Deense windturbine-innovatiesysteem was echter goed toegerust om leren door te
interacteren te vergemakkelijken. De actoren waren goed op elkaar ingespeeld,
vertrouwden elkaar en hadden hetzelfde referentiekader. In onze opinie is het goede
leren door te interacteren tussen turbineproducenten, turbine-eigenaren en het Deense
kennisinstituut de crux van het Deense succes, terwijl het gebrek aan leren door te
interacteren in Nederland de reden is voor het gebrek aan Nederlands succes. Deze
conclusie wordt ondersteund door de theorie: Lundvall benadrukt dat leren door te
interacteren van groot belang is in innovatiesystemen, terwijl Rosenberg wijst op het
belang van leren door te gebruiken voor technologieën die bestaan uit interacterende
onderdelen, zoals windturbines. Ook andere theoretische noties, zoals de notie dat de
‘science-push’ methode niet werkt om technologie-ontwikkeling te stimuleren en de
notie dat de kennis geproduceerd door onderzoeksinstituten afgestemd moet zijn op de
kennisvraag van technologie-ontwikkelaars, komen overeen met onze
onderzoeksresultaten.
Kunnen we nu ook antwoord geven op de brede vraag waarmee we ons onderzoek
begonnen: Waarom waren de Denen succesvoller dan de Nederlanders in het
ontwikkelen van een windturbine-capaciteit en een windturbine-industrie in de
periode 1973-2000? Gedeeltelijk. Op basis van onze bevindingen, in combinatie met
de bovenstaande theoretische noties, kunnen we concluderen dat er sterke indicaties
zijn dat het verschil in succes in Nederland en Denemarken te maken heeft met
verschillen in leerprocessen, die weer te maken hebben met verschillen in de
innovatiesystemen. We hebben echter, door te focussen op leren, andere factoren
buiten beschouwing gelaten. Daarom is er, om deze vraag diepgaander te beant-
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woorden, meer onderzoek nodig naar andere aspecten van windturbine-ontwikkeling,
zoals bijvoorbeeld de eigenschappen van de turbinebedrijven.
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Nawoord
Het is af! Na ruim vier jaar van pieken en dalen heb ik dit promotie-avontuur
afgesloten. Veel mensen hebben mij op de een of andere manier geholpen om de
eindstreep te bereiken. Deze mensen wil ik hier tot slot bedanken.
Allereerst dank aan mijn promotoren. Kees en Ruud, dank voor jullie steun en jullie
vertrouwen in mij tijdens het promotie-onderzoek. Kees, jouw grote interesse in de
case-studies, je vele contacten in de windenergiewereld en je nauwgezette
commentaar op mijn teksten zijn van groot belang geweest voor mijn onderzoek.
Ruud, dankzij jou zijn theorie en case-studies in mijn onderzoek nauw verweven
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voor de manier waarop ze mij tijdens gesprekken, tijdens de vele vergaderingen die ik
mocht bijwonen en door het uitlenen van bergen literatuur snel wegwijs gemaakt
hebben in het onderwerp 'windenergie in Nederland'. Speciale dank aan mijn kamer-
genoot Nico van der Borg, aan Wim Stam en Bert Janssen voor alles wat ze me
hebben geleerd. Ook alle andere mensen uit de Nederlandse 'windenergiewereld' die
me met dit onderzoek hebben geholpen, tijdens interviews of meer informele
gesprekken, wil ik hier bedanken.
At the end of 1998, I stayed at the Institut for Organisation og Arbejdssociologi at the
Copenhagen Business School in Copenhagen, Denmark. I want to thank Peter Karnøe,
Kristian Hvidtfelt Nielsen and Robson Rocha for all they taught me about wind
energy in Denmark and about investigating technology development. Også vil jeg
takke Henrik, Jonna og Morten Lundsgaard. Mange tak for hjælpe mig med så mange
tinge i løbet af mit ophold i Rødovre.
Ook wil ik mijn collega's van de disciplinegroep Innovatiewetenschap bedanken voor
de prettige werksfeer. In het  bijzonder wil ik eerst Jan Faber bedanken. Jan, jij
vertelde me over dit promotie-onderzoek en bracht me in contact met Kees. Ook heb
je gedurende de hele periode met me meegedacht en me veel goede adviezen gegeven
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over de aanpak van het onderzoek en het aanscherpen van de tekst. Ook als je het zelf
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van hoofdstukken. Dank aan Marius Meeus en Bas van Waveren voor het geven van
adviezen voor het theoriehoofdstuk en aan Carmen Jansen, Ellen Moors en Marike
Weltje voor de opbeurende gesprekken als het even iets minder vlot ging. Ook 'onze'
studenten Natuurwetenschap en Innovatiemanagement wil ik bedanken. Ik heb jullie
met erg veel plezier onderwijs gegeven.
En, 'last but not least' mijn familie en vrienden. Papa en mama, Marcelle en Michel,
opa en ook omie en Anneke en Otto, bedankt voor jullie voortdurende interesse in
mijn werk en vertrouwen in mij. En ook voor jullie begrip als ik het even alleen over
andere dingen wilde hebben of een weekendje wilde komen uitrusten in Zeeland of in
Groningen. Dan mijn beste vrienden. Dayline, Maaike, Ria, Jean-Paul, Sandra en
Monique, bedankt voor alle goede gesprekken, maaltijden, kopjes thee en geïnte-
resseerde telefoontjes. Ik heb het enorm gewaardeerd. Maaike en Ria, bedankt voor
alle hulp met het Engels. Tot slot nog mijn speciale dank aan Carmen en Dayline:
bedankt dat jullie tijdens mijn promotie, als paranimfen, letterlijk achter me willen
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